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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Jérôme Hergueux (LaRGE - Université de Strasbourg et Sciences Po); Nicolas Jacquemet (Paris School of Economics - Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne et Université de Lorraine - BETA) |
| Abstract: | Internet is a very attractive technology for experiments implementation, both in order to reach more diverse and larger samples and as a field of economic research in its own right. This paper reports on an experiment performed both online and in the laboratory, designed so as to strengthen the internal validity of decisions elicited over the Internet. We use the same subject pool, the same monetary stakes and the same decision interface, and randomly assign two group of subjects between the Internet and a traditional University laboratory to compare behavior in a set of social preferences games. This comparison concludes in favor of the reliability of behaviors elicited through the Internet. Our behavioral results contradict the predictions of social distance theory, as we find that subjects allocated to the Internet treatment behave as if they were more altruistic, more trusting, more trustworthy and less risk averse than laboratory subjects. Those findings have practical importance for the growing community of researchers interested in using the Internet as a vehicle for social experiments and bear interesting methodological lessons for social scientists interested in using experiments to research the Internet as a field. |
| Keywords: | Social experiment, field experiment, internet, methodology, randomized assignment. |
| JEL: | C90 C93 C70 |
| Date: | 2012–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mse:cesdoc:12070&r=evo |
| By: | Jérôme Hergueux (LaRGE Research Center, Université de Strasbourg); Nicolas Jacquemet |
| Abstract: | Internet is a very attractive technology for experiments implementation, both in order to reach more diverse and larger samples and as a field of economic research in its own right. This paper reports on an experiment performed both online and in the laboratory, designed so as to strengthen the internal validity of decisions elicited over the Internet. We use the same subject pool, the same monetary stakes and the same decision interface, and randomly assign two groups of subjects between the Internet and a traditional University laboratory to compare behavior in a set of social preferences games. This comparison concludes in favor of the reliability of behaviors elicited through the Internet. Our behavioral results contradict the predictions of social distance theory, as we find that subjects allocated to the Internet treatment behave as if they were more altruistic, more trusting, more trustworthy and less risk averse than laboratory subjects. Those findings have practical importance for the growing community of researchers interested in using the Internet as a vehicle for social experiments and bear interesting methodological lessons for social scientists interested in using experiments to research the Internet as a field. |
| Keywords: | Social Experiment, Field Experiment, Internet, Methodology, Randomized Assignment. |
| JEL: | C90 C93 C70 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lar:wpaper:2012-10&r=evo |
| By: | Barreira da Silva Rocha, André; Laruelle, Annick |
| Abstract: | Differently from previous studies of tag-based cooperation, we assume that individuals fail to recognize their own tag. Due to such incomplete information, the action taken against the opponent cannot be based on similarity, although it is still motivated by the tag displayed by the opponent. We present stability conditions for the case when individuals play unconditional cooperation, unconditional defection or conditional cooperation. We then consider the removal of one or two strategies. Results show that conditional cooperators are the most resilient agents against extinction and that the removal of unconditional cooperators may lead to the extinction of unconditional defectors. |
| Keywords: | evolution, similarity, cooperation, snowdrift game, replicator dynamics |
| Date: | 2012–09–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehu:ikerla:201262&r=evo |
| By: | Emmanuel PETIT (GREThA, CNRS, UMR 5113); Anna TCHERKASSOF (Laboratoire Interuniversitaire de Psychologie. Personnalité, Cognition et Changement Social (LIP/PC2S), Université Pierre Mendès France); Xavier GASSMANN (Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, Université de Rennes) |
| Abstract: | Our experiment aims at examining the impact of induced shame on altruism in a dictator game context with exit option. Using an Internet design, we collect a large battery of psychological and demographic variables which enables us to investigate dispositional and social characteristics likely to influence subjects’ altruistic behaviour. Using the emotional induction technique, we induce either shameful or neutral emotions to the participants before they play the dictator game. We then measure the evaluation that subjects give of their own emotions, and subsequently observe their altruistic behaviour. We find that imagined shame-induction is able to increase significantly altruistic behaviour. We observe that forty-one percent of participants are willing to choose to exit the game and do not observe any difference in exiting between the two emotion conditions. Our data show that women are significantly more eager to take the exit option than males. Economics students are, to a large extent, more prone to adopt greedy choices patterns than other social sciences students. |
| Keywords: | Shame; Induction procedure; Altruism; Internet experiment; Gender differences |
| JEL: | C91 D81 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:grt:wpegrt:2012-25&r=evo |
| By: | Fairley, Kim; Sanfey, Alan; Vyrastekova, Jana; Weitzel, Utz |
| Abstract: | Despite intensive research there is no clear evidence for a link between lottery risk preferences and risk involved in trusting others. We argue that this is partially due to a misalignment of the underlying sources of risk. Trusting is giving up control to a human source of risk while lottery risk has a mechanistic source. We propose a risky trust game that experimentally elicits social risk preferences that pertain to the same underlying human source. Our results show that transfers in the classic trust game are indeed best explained by social risk preferences and not by lottery risk preferences with an underlying mechanistic source. In addition, we argue that the type of uncertainty also plays a role. In the absence of objectively known probabilities of trustworthiness, trust also has an ambiguous component. We therefore decompose uncertainty in the trust game into social risk and an ambiguous component. Our results provide evidence that, when accounting for social risk, subjects who score high on ambiguity tolerance explain some of the remainder of trusting behavior. |
| Keywords: | Trust; trust game; decision making under uncertainty; risk; ambiguity; source of uncertainty |
| JEL: | C9 C7 D8 |
| Date: | 2012–10–29 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:42302&r=evo |
| By: | Butler, Jeffrey V. (Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance); Giuliano, Paola (University of California, Los Angeles); Guiso, Luigi (Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance) |
| Abstract: | When we take a cab we may feel cheated if the driver takes an unnecessarily long route despite the lack of a contract or promise to take the shortest possible path. Is our decision to take the cab affected by our belief that we may end up feeling cheated? Is the behavior of the driver affected by his beliefs about what we consider cheating? We address these questions in the context of a trust game by asking participants directly about their notions of cheating. We find that: i) both parties to a trust exchange have implicit notions of what constitutes cheating even in a context without promises or messages; ii) these notions are not unique – the vast majority of senders would feel cheated by a negative return on their trust/investment, whereas a sizable minority defines cheating according to an equal split rule; iii) these implicit notions affect the behavior of both sides to the exchange in terms of whether to trust or cheat and to what extent. Finally, we show that individuals’ notions of what constitutes cheating can be traced back to two classes of values instilled by parents: cooperative and competitive. The first class of values tends to soften the notion while the other tightens it. |
| Keywords: | trust, trustworthiness, social norms, culture, cheating |
| JEL: | A1 A12 D1 O15 Z1 |
| Date: | 2012–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6961&r=evo |
| By: | Cueva, Carlos (Univeristy Cambridge); Dessi, Roberta (IDEI, Toulouse School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | We provide an experimental test of the role of self-signaling in decisions to do- nate to charity. Our data strongly supports the theoretical prediction of a non- monotonic, hill-shaped relationship between self-confidence, proxied by the Social Potency personality trait, and prosocial behavior motivated by image concerns. Making self-image concerns more salient can more than double donations by indi- viduals with medium self-confidence. |
| Keywords: | charity, donations, prosocial behavior, self-signaling, self-image, personality, leadership, social norms, social potency. |
| JEL: | D01 D03 D64 |
| Date: | 2012–10–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ide:wpaper:26357&r=evo |
| By: | Christian Bjørnskov; Pierre-Guillaume Méon |
| Abstract: | In the paper, we argue that trust is the missing link relating education, institutions, and economic development. We argue that increased trust both increases education and improves legal and bureaucratic institutions, which in turn spurs economic development. We substantiate this intuition with a series of regressions that show that trust determines both education and the quality of institutions, and that education and institutions in turn affect GDP per capita. |
| Keywords: | Development; Social trust; Institutions; Education |
| JEL: | O43 O47 O57 Z13 |
| Date: | 2012–10–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sol:wpaper:2013/130489&r=evo |
| By: | Becker Anke; Deckers Thomas; Dohmen Thomas; Falk Armin; Kosse Fabian (ROA rm) |
| Abstract: | Although both economists and psychologists seek to identify determinants ofheterogeneity in behavior, they use different concepts to capture them. In this reviewwe first analyze the extent to which economic preferences and psychological conceptsof personality - such as the Big Five and locus of control - are related. We analyze datafrom incentivized laboratory experiments and representative samples and find onlylow degrees of association between economic preferences and personality. We thenregress life outcomes - such as labor market success, health status and life satisfaction- simultaneously on preference and personality measures. The analysis reveals that thetwo concepts are rather complementary when it comes to explaining heterogeneity inimportant life outcomes and behavior. |
| Keywords: | labour economics ; |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:umaror:2012012&r=evo |
| By: | Lucifora, Claudio (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore); Tonello, Marco (Catholic University Milan) |
| Abstract: | We analyze students' cheating behavior during a national evaluation test. We model the mechanisms that trigger cheating interactions between students and show that, when monitoring is not sufficiently accurate, a social multiplier may magnify the effects on students' achievements. We exploit a randomized experiment, which envisaged the presence of an external inspector in the administration and marking of the tests, to estimate a structural (endogenous) social multiplier in students' cheating. The empirical strategy exploits the Excess-Variance approach (Graham, 2008). We find a strong amplifying role played by social interactions within classrooms: students' cheating behaviors more than double the class average test scores results. The effects are found to be larger when students are more homogeneous in terms of parental background characteristics and social ties. |
| Keywords: | social multiplier, students' cheating, randomized experiment |
| JEL: | C31 D62 I21 |
| Date: | 2012–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6967&r=evo |
| By: | Jeffrey V. Butler; Paola Giuliano; Luigi Guiso |
| Abstract: | When we take a cab we may feel cheated if the driver takes an unnecessarily long route despite the lack of a contract or promise to take the shortest possible path. Is our decision to take the cab affected by our belief that we may end up feeling cheated? Is the behavior of the driver affected by his beliefs about what we consider cheating? We address these questions in the context of a trust game by asking participants directly about their notions of cheating. We find that: i) both parties to a trust exchange have implicit notions of what constitutes cheating even in a context without promises or messages; ii) these notions are not unique – the vast majority of senders would feel cheated by a negative return on their trust/investment, whereas a sizable minority defines cheating according to an equal split rule; iii) these implicit notions affect the behavior of both sides to the exchange in terms of whether to trust or cheat and to what extent. Finally, we show that individual's notions of what constitutes cheating can be traced back to two classes of values instilled by parents: cooperative and competitive. The first class of values tends to soften the notion while the other tightens it. |
| JEL: | A1 A12 D01 Z1 |
| Date: | 2012–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18509&r=evo |
| By: | Cueva, Carlos (Univeristy Cambridge); Dessi, Roberta (IDEI, Toulouse School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | We provide an experimental test of the role of self-signaling in decisions to do- nate to charity. Our data strongly supports the theoretical prediction of a non- monotonic, hill-shaped relationship between self-confidence, proxied by the Social Potency personality trait, and prosocial behavior motivated by image concerns. Making self-image concerns more salient can more than double donations by indi- viduals with medium self-confidence. |
| JEL: | D01 D03 D64 |
| Date: | 2012–10–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:26358&r=evo |
| By: | Kiridaran Kanagaretnam; Stuart Mestelman; S. M. Khalid Nainar; Mohamed Shehata |
| Abstract: | In a laboratory-controlled environment characterized by uncertainty and incomplete information we provide experimental evidence on the effects of transparency and empowerment on trust (investment by a principal) and trustworthiness (reciprocal behavior of an agent) in a simple two-person investment game. We find that when principals are empowered by being able to punish agents who may not act in a way the principal believes is in the principal’s best interest, trust and investment increases over that which is realized in the absence of empowerment. We also find that when asymmetric or incomplete information characterizes the investment game the levels of trust (investment) are lower than when information is complete (the environment is transparent). In transparent environments the effect of empowerment is about the same regardless of whether empowerment is introduced or removed. However, in opaque environments, the loss of empowerment has a substantially greater negative effect on trust that the positive effect associated with the introduction of empowerment. While this environment is substantially abstracted from the naturally occurring environment, these results suggest that practical public policies designed to increase transparency in financial transactions are likely to have positive effects on investment. Furthermore, public policies designed to empower principals, such as the Say on Pay practices, are likely to increase investment while the limitation of the empowerment of principals with respect to their agents (consistent with deregulation) will have a much more dramatic negative impact on trust (and investment). |
| Keywords: | investment, empowerment, veto, trust, trustworthiness, reciprocity, say on pay |
| JEL: | C70 C91 D63 D81 D82 |
| Date: | 2012–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mcm:deptwp:2012-12&r=evo |
| By: | Brishti Guha (Singapore Management University, School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | Many men invest in their sisters’ children instead of their wives’. Existing theories addressing such behavior depend on the level of paternity probability in such men’s societies being implausibly low. I link this anthropologically observed investment behavior with the experimentally observed phenomenon that some individuals are ambiguity averse. Arguing that men’s decisions are made under ambiguity, I show that an increase in ambiguity aversion results in investment in sisters’, rather than wives’, children. I show that this can happen even under risk neutrality. I also consider the special cases of a SEU maximizer and of extreme ambiguity aversion in the Gilboa-Schmeidler sense. Extremely ambiguity averse individuals invest in sister’s children regardless of risk preference or actual paternity rates. An increase in ambiguity, rather than an increase in ambiguity aversion, in contrast, may affect the investment decision either way. When sufficiently many men are ambiguity averse, inheritance norms could become avuncular, affecting women’s incentives and generating a bias towards actual nonpaternity. This is consistent with, but represents an unusual explanation of, data which show correlations between inheritance norms and actual paternity rates. |
| Date: | 2012–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:siu:wpaper:33-2012&r=evo |
| By: | Headey, Bruce (Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research); Muffels, Ruud (Tilburg University); Wagner, Gert G. (DIW Berlin) |
| Abstract: | There are strong two-way links between parent and child happiness (life satisfaction), even for 'children' who have grown up, moved to their own home and partnered themselves. German panel evidence shows that transmission of (un)happiness from parents to children is partly due to transmission of values and behaviors known to be associated with happiness (Headey, Wagner and Muffels, 2010, 2012). These values and behaviors include giving priority to pro-social and family values, rather than material values, maintaining a preferred balance between work and leisure, active social and community participation, and regular exercise. Both parents have about equal influence on the values and behaviors which children adopt. However, the life satisfaction of adult 'children' continues to be directly influenced by the life satisfaction of their mothers, with the influence of fathers being only indirect, via transmission of values and behaviors. There appears to be a lifelong happiness dividend (or unhappiness dividend) due to parenting. Structural equation models with two-way causation indicate that the life satisfaction of offspring can significantly affect the satisfaction of their parents, as well as vice-versa, long after the 'children' have left home. Data come from 25 waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel Survey (SOEP, 1984-2008). SOEP is the only panel survey worldwide in which data on life satisfaction have been obtained from parents and an adequate sub-sample of children no longer living in the parental home. |
| Keywords: | life satisfaction, subjective well-being, child happiness, inter-generational transmission, German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), structural equation models |
| JEL: | D60 I31 J13 J22 C33 |
| Date: | 2012–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6944&r=evo |