|
on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Brañas-Garza, Pablo; Bucheli, Marisa; García-Muñoz, Teresa; Espinosa Alejos, María Paz |
| Abstract: | Research on moral cleansing and moral self-licensing has introduced dynamic considerations in the theory of moral behavior. Past bad actions trigger negative feelings that make people more likely to engage in future moral behavior to offset them. Symmetrically, past good deeds favor a positive self-perception that creates licensing effects, leading people to engage in behavior that is less likely to be moral. In short, a deviation from a “normal state of being†is balanced with a subsequent action that compensates the prior behavior. We model the decision of an individual trying to reach the optimal level of moral self-worth over time and show that under certain conditions the optimal sequence of actions follows a regular pattern which combines good and bad actions. We conduct an economic experiment where subjects play a sequence of giving decisions (dictator games) to explore this phenomenon. We find that donation in the previous period affects present decisions and the sign is negative: participants’ behavior in every round is negatively correlated to what they did in the past. Hence donations over time seem to be the result of a regular pattern of self-regulation: moral licensing (being selfish after altruist) and cleansing (altruistic after selfish). |
| Keywords: | moral self-licensing, moral cleansing, experiments, moral behaviour |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehu:dfaeii:8763&r=evo |
| By: | Erte Xiao; Howard Kunreuther |
| Abstract: | Previous findings on punishment have focused on environments in which the outcomes are known with certainty. In this paper, we conduct experiments to investigate how punishment affects cooperation in a two-person stochastic prisoner’s dilemma environment where each person can decide whether or not to cooperate, and the outcomes of alternative strategies are specified probabilistically under a transparent information condition. In particular, we study two types of punishment mechanisms: 1) an unrestricted punishment mechanism: both persons can punish; and 2) a restricted punishment mechanism: only cooperators can punish non-cooperators. We show that the restricted punishment mechanism is more effective in promoting cooperative behavior than the unrestricted one in a deterministic social dilemma. More importantly, the restricted type is less effective in an environment where the outcomes are stochastic than when they are known with certainty. Our data suggest that one explanation is that non-cooperative behavior is less likely to be punished when there is outcome uncertainty. Our findings provide useful information for designing efficient incentive mechanisms to induce cooperation in a stochastic social dilemma environment. |
| JEL: | C72 C73 C91 D02 D03 |
| Date: | 2012–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18458&r=evo |
| By: | Jeffrey Butler; Paola Giuliano; Luigi Guiso |
| Abstract: | Trust beliefs are heterogeneous across individuals and, at the same time, persistent across generations. We investigate one mechanism yielding these dual patterns: false consensus. In the context of a trust game experiment, we show that individuals extrapolate from their own type when forming trust beliefs about the same pool of potential partners - i.e., more (less) trustworthy individuals form more optimistic (pessimistic) trust beliefs - and that this tendency continues to color trust beliefs after several rounds of game-play. Moreover, we show that ones own type/trustworthiness can be traced back to the values parents transmit to their children during their upbringing. In a second closely-related experiment, we show the economic impact of mis-calibrated trust beliefs stemming from false consensus. Miscalibrated beliefs lower participants experimental trust game earnings by about 20 percent on average. |
| JEL: | A1 A12 D01 Z1 |
| Date: | 2012–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18460&r=evo |
| By: | Regner, Tobias; Riener, Gerhard |
| Abstract: | We construct a simple three person trust game with one trustor and two trustees. The trustor has the possibility to either trust both trustees or none, while the trustees make their decisions either sequentially or simultaneously, depending on the treatment. When trustees play sequentially, follower trustees who are informed about the leader's choice are significantly more selfish than in the simultaneous move treatment, independent of the leader's choice. Leaders do not behave significantly different than in the baseline treatment. Follower trustees cherry pick the motivation that materially serves them best. When the leader trustee plays selfish, they tend to conform. When the leader makes a pro-social choice, followers seem to perceive the duty as already fulfilled by the leader. While guilt works well as a motivational force in a dyadic situation, it gets alleviated easily when the situation allows a shifting of responsibility. -- |
| Keywords: | Team production,Trust,Choice architecture,Guilt aversion,Conformity,False consensus effect,Lab experiment,Cherry picking |
| JEL: | D03 D71 C79 C92 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:68&r=evo |
| By: | Espinosa Alejos, María Paz; Kovarik, Jaromir; Brañas-Garza, Pablo; Cobo-Reyes, Ramón; Jiménez, Natalia; Ponti, Giovanni |
| Abstract: | We provide empirical evidence to support the claims that social diversity promotes prosocial behavior. We elicit a real-life social network and its members’ adherence to a social norm, namely inequity aversion. The data reveal a positive relationship between subjects’ prosociality and several measures of centrality. This result is in line with the theoretical literature that relates the evolution of social norms to the structure of social interactions and argues that central individuals are crucial for the emergence of prosocial behavior. |
| Keywords: | social diversity, social norms, prosocial behavior |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehu:dfaeii:8764&r=evo |
| By: | Subhashish Modak Chowdhury (University of East Anglia); Joo Young Jeon (University of East Anglia) |
| Abstract: | We investigate the consequences of a pure income effect on the altruistic behavior of donors. Inequity aversion theories predict either no effect or a decrease in giving, whereas warm-glow theory predicts an increase in giving with an increase in the common income of donor and receiver. Theoretical predictions being contradictory, we run a dictator game in which we vary the common show-up fee of both the dictator and the recipient, but keep an extra amount to be shared the same. The prediction of the warm-glow theory is supported. |
| Keywords: | dictator game, altruism, income effect, inequity aversion, warm-glow |
| JEL: | C91 D03 D64 |
| Date: | 2012–10–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uea:wcbess:12-04&r=evo |
| By: | Francisco Campos-Ortiz; Louis Putterman; T. K. Ahn; Loukas Balafoutas; Mongoljin Batsaikhan; Matthias Sutter |
| Abstract: | We study experimentally the protection of property in five widely distinct countries-Austria, Mexico, Mongolia, South Korea and the United States. Our main results are the correlations between experimental choices with indicators regarding the security of property, trust and the quality of government. We show that subjects from countries with: (1) higher levels of trust or perceptions of safety are more prone to abstain from plundering and devote less resources to protect their property; and (2) high-quality political institutions support collective protection of property through taxation more often. Our results highlight the relevance of socio-political factors in determining countries' success in addressing collective action problems including safeguarding property rights. |
| Keywords: | Property Rights, Efficiency, Experiment, Socio-Political Factors. |
| JEL: | C91 C92 D03 H41 P14 |
| Date: | 2012–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdm:wpaper:2012-12&r=evo |
| By: | Felipe Kast; Stephan Meier; Dina Pomeranz |
| Abstract: | We test the effectiveness of self-help peer groups as a commitment device for precautionary savings, through two randomized field experiments among 2,687 microentrepreneurs in Chile. The first experiment finds that self-help peer groups are a powerful tool to increase savings (the number of deposits grows 3.5-fold and the average savings balance almost doubles). Conversely, a substantially higher interest rate has no effect on most participants. A second experiment tests an alternative delivery mechanism and shows that effects of a similar size can be achieved by holding people accountable through feedback text messages, without any meetings or peer pressure. |
| JEL: | D00 D03 D11 D12 D14 E2 E20 E21 O2 O20 O54 |
| Date: | 2012–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18417&r=evo |
| By: | Irma Clots-Figueras (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid); Roberto Hernán González (Economic Science Institute, Chapman University); Praveen Kujal (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid) |
| Abstract: | Several situations in our daily interactions are characterized by uncertainty and asymmetric information regarding the final outcomes. For example, an investor may overstate a project’s value, or a superior may choose to under, or over, state the gains from a project to a subordinate. We modify the standard investment game to study the effect of possible deception, i.e. over-, or under-, statement of the true value, on investee (and investor) behavior. We find that deception is prevalent and around 66% of the investors send false messages. Investors both over-, and under-, state the true value of the multiplier, k. We elicit investee beliefs and find that investees are naive in that almost half of them believe the message they receive. Meanwhile, a large proportion of investors think that sending a message was useful. The introduction of the possibility of deception does not affect trust or trustworthiness on average, but deceivers make the deceived worse off, return less and are more likely to report lying to avoid harming others. Finally, an increase in information asymmetry increases deception. |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:12-23&r=evo |
| By: | Heinz Welsch (University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics); Jan Kühling (University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | We develop and test a model of social comparison in which individuals gain status through pro-social behavior (competitive altruism) and in which they endogenously choose the reference group and associated reference standard involved in signaling status (reference group selection). In our framework of private provision of environmental public goods, the optimal reference standard involves a balance between the magnitude of the status signal (implying a low reference standard) and the higher value of the signal in a greener social environment. By using a unique set of survey data we find evidence of (a) respondents behaving in a competitively altruistic fashion and (b) reference persons’ intensity of pro-environmental behavior depending on relevant attitudes of the respondents, consistent with predictions from our framework of reference group selection. |
| Keywords: | competitive altruism; reference groups; endogenous reference standard; pro-environmental behavior; private public good provision |
| JEL: | D64 H31 H41 Q00 |
| Date: | 2012–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:old:wpaper:350&r=evo |