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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Amdur, David; Schmick, Ethan |
| Abstract: | We compare the strategy and direct-response methods in a one-shot trust game with hidden action. In our experiment, the decision elicitation method affects neither participants' behavior nor their beliefs about this behavior. We conclude that the direct-response method does not, by itself, induce guilt aversion. |
| Keywords: | Trust; guilt aversion; strategy method; direct-response method; behavioral economics; experimental economics |
| JEL: | D03 A13 C91 |
| Date: | 2012–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:40148&r=evo |
| By: | Michalis Drouvelis; Julian C. Jamison |
| Abstract: | The authors extend the standard public goods game in a variety of ways, in particular by allowing for endogenous preference over institutions and by studying the relationship between individual types, their preferences, and later behavior within the various institutional environments. They collect individual data on a variety of demographic factors, in addition to measuring levels of risk aversion and ambiguity aversion (over both gains and losses). The authors then elicit preferences in an incentive-compatible manner over voluntary contribution mechanisms with and without reward and punishment options. Finally, they randomly assign subjects to one of the four institutions and observe repeated play. They find that payoffs are significantly greater when punishment is allowed but that only a small minority of participants prefers such an environment. There is at most a weak link between individual characteristics and elicited preferences over environments. On the other hand, institutional preferences, as well as individual characteristics, are more strongly predictive of behavior in the public goods game. For instance, loss averse individuals preemptively reward more often when that option is available. This result suggests that when studying social interactions, especially if people can choose whether to participate in a sanctions-and-rewards mechanism, it is important to consider individual attitudes toward risk and uncertainty. |
| Keywords: | Human behavior ; Public goods ; Uncertainty ; Risk ; Reward (Psychology) |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedbwp:12-5&r=evo |
| By: | Luigi Luini; Annamaria Nese; Patrizia Sbriglia |
| Abstract: | The aim of this paper is to ascertain whether trust is affected by contagion and herding in small groups of trustors who can observe each other’s choices over time. We account for three important factors of trustors’preferences, namely: risk attitude, generosity and expected trustworthiness. Using our data, we test the basic hypothesis that an individual's propensity to trust recipients in the Trust Game may be affected by the observed behavior of other trustors. Our results confirm that trust is affected by contagion effects. Furthermore, we find that specific types of agents (generous or untrusting) frequently imitate the same type when placed in the same group. Finally, we find that untrusting individuals are less affected by their peers compared to generous individuals, and that they are less prone to imitation when placed in groups of agents who have the same characteristics. |
| Keywords: | trust game, experiments, social influence, imitation. |
| JEL: | C72 C91 |
| Date: | 2012–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:usi:labsit:040&r=evo |
| By: | Dai, Darong; Shen, Kunrong |
| Abstract: | In the present paper, a new approach to equilibrium selection for very general normal form games has been constructed by introducing stochastic optimal stopping theory into classical evolutionary game theory. That is, the new game equilibrium is induced by both stochastic group evolution and decentralized rational individual choice. Moreover, stability of the game equilibrium is confirmed from both time and space dimensions. |
| Keywords: | Stochastic replicator dynamics; Rational choice; Normal-form game equilibrium; Stability |
| JEL: | C70 C62 |
| Date: | 2012–01–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:40133&r=evo |
| By: | Ismael Rodriguez-Lara (ERI-CES); Pablo Brañas-Garza (Universidad de Granada) |
| Abstract: | This paper provides novel results for the extensive literature on dictator games: recipients do not expect dictators to behave selfishly, but instead expect the equal split division. The predictions made by dictators are notably different: 45% predicted the zero contribution and 40% the equal split. These results suggest that dictators and recipients are heterogenous with regard to their degree of strategic sophistication and identify the dictator's decision power in a very different manner. |
| Keywords: | expectations, strategic sophistication, dictator game, equal, split, guessing |
| JEL: | C91 D63 D64 |
| Date: | 2012–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dbe:wpaper:0412&r=evo |
| By: | Kohler, Stefan |
| Abstract: | Zimbabwean villagers of distinct background have resettled in government organized land reforms for more than three decades. Against this backdrop, I assess the level of social cohesion in some of the newly established communities by estimating average preferences for fairness in a structural model of bounded rationality. The estimations are based on behavioral data from an ultimatum game field experiment played by 234 randomly selected households in six traditional and 14 resettled villages almost two decades after resettlement. In two out of three distinct resettlement schemes studied, the resettled villagers exhibit significantly higher degrees of fairness ($p ≤ 0.11$) and rationality ($p ≤ 0.04$) than those who live in traditional villages. Overall, villagers are similarly rational ($p = 0.30$) but the attitude toward fairness is significantly stronger in resettled communities ($p ≤ 0.01$). These findings are consistent with the idea of a raised need for cooperation required in recommencement. |
| Keywords: | Africa; behavioral economics; inequality aversion; land reform; impact evaluation; social change; social development; social preferences; structural estimation; quantal response model |
| JEL: | D03 Q15 C93 |
| Date: | 2012–07–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:40248&r=evo |
| By: | Erik Stam |
| Abstract: | This paper is an inquiry into the role of entrepreneurship in evolutionary economic geography. The focus is on how and why entrepreneurship is a distinctly spatially uneven process. We will start with a discussion on the role of entrepreneurship in the theory of economic evolution. Next, we will review the empirical literature on the geography of entrepreneurship. The paper concludes with a discussion of a future agenda for the study of entrepreneurship within evolutionary economic geography. |
| Date: | 2011–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wiw:wiwrsa:ersa10p1267&r=evo |
| By: | Sascha Behnk (LEE and Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón, Spain); Iván Barreda-Tarrazona (LEE and Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón, Spain); Aurora García-Gallego (LEE and Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón, Spain) |
| Abstract: | Asymmetric information is a common characteristic of economic relationships and often provides incentives to deceive. Being aware of previous findings showing that ex post transparency about conflicts of interest leads to even more deception, we hypothesize that the timing of disclosing a conflict of interest plays a role in this context. Using different scenarios of a sender-receiver game, we investigate if, instead of providing ex ante information, the effect of an ex post disclosure is to reduce treacherous advice. Our results show that timing actually matters: subsequent transparency significantly reduces deception when it is announced as a threat, which creates awareness of the presence of a whistleblower. An intrinsic motivation seems to play a certain role that goes beyond lying and guilt aversion: embarrassment. Furthermore, we examine if the provision of different alternatives to deception (honest vs. payoff-equalizing messages) has an important impact on individual behavior. We find that honesty is not the most favored alternative to deception. Subsequent transparency increases honest behavior only under particular conditions but strongly increases the tendency to equalize payoffs. |
| Keywords: | deception, transparency, disclosure, sender-receiver game, information transmission, behavior, experiment |
| JEL: | D03 C91 D82 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jau:wpaper:2012/14&r=evo |
| By: | Alexander L. Davis; John H. Miller; Roberto A. Weber |
| Abstract: | Extensive research in economics explores generosity in monetary allocations, while generosity in non-laboratory contexts often involves the allocation of consumption goods or non-monetary harm. Psychological evidence suggests that generosity may be higher in such contexts. We compare generosity in decisions that vary whether allocations are monetary or non-monetary, and whether they involve utility gains or losses. In two experiments, generosity is higher in nonmonetary contexts. Thus, the typical monetary laboratory Dictator game may underestimate generosity in many non-laboratory contexts. We find a weak relationship between individuals’ allocation decisions in monetary and nonmonetary contexts, but a strong relationship within monetary contexts. |
| Keywords: | Altruism, generosity, harm, experiment |
| JEL: | D03 D64 C91 |
| Date: | 2011–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:econwp:050&r=evo |
| By: | Leonardo Bursztyn; Florian Ederer; Bruno Ferman; Noam Yuchtman |
| Abstract: | Using a field experiment conducted with a financial brokerage, we attempt to disentangle channels through which a person’s financial decisions affect his peers’. When someone purchases an asset, his peers may also want to purchase it because they learn from his choice (“social learning”) and because his possession of the asset directly affects others’ utility of owning the same asset (“social utility”). We randomize whether one member of a peer pair who chose to purchase an asset has that choice implemented, thus randomizing possession of the asset. Then, we randomize whether the second member of the pair: 1) receives no information about his peer, or 2) is informed of his peer’s desire to purchase the asset and the result of the randomization determining possession. We thus estimate the effects of: (a) learning plus possession, and (b) learning alone, relative to a control group. In the control group, 42% of individuals purchased the asset, increasing to 71% in the “social learning only” group, and to 93% in the “social learning and social utility” group. These results suggest that herding behavior in financial markets may result from social learning, and also from a desire to own the same assets as one’s peers. |
| JEL: | C93 D03 D14 D83 G0 G11 M31 |
| Date: | 2012–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18241&r=evo |
| By: | Tonin, Mirco (University of Southampton); Vlassopoulos, Michael (University of Southampton) |
| Abstract: | Contributing to a social cause can be an important driver for workers in the public and non-profit sector as well as in firms that engage in Corporate Social Responsibility activities. This paper compares the effectiveness of social incentives to financial incentives using an online real effort experiment. We find that social incentives lead to a 20% rise in productivity, regardless of their form (lump sum or related to performance) or strength. When subjects can choose the mix of incentives half sacrifice some of their private compensation to increase social compensation, with women more likely than men. Furthermore, social incentives do not attract less productive subjects, nor subjects that respond more to exogenously imposed social incentives. Our calculations suggest that a dollar spent on social incentives is equivalent to increasing private compensation by at least half a dollar. |
| Keywords: | private incentives, social incentives, sorting, prosocial behavior, real effort experiment, corporate social responsibility, gender |
| JEL: | D64 J24 J32 L3 M14 M52 |
| Date: | 2012–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6716&r=evo |
| By: | Wahl, Fabian |
| Abstract: | This paper analyses the connection between legal origins and generalized trust. Based on recent results of institutions and trust research it argues that legal origins and trust are connected via the beliefs of agents. Next, it develops hypotheses about a complex and self-reinforcing causal relation between both. It then shows empirically that indeed, legal origins and contemporary trust are robustly connected with each other. In a next step, it investigates the deep historical roots of trust to construct proxies for historical trust levels in 1500 AD. By making use of the historical trust scores and information about the exogenous or endogenous introduction of legal origins in certain countries it assess some of the claims about causality made before. Here, it found confirming evidence for the propositions of Aghion et al. (2010), namely that (i) countries for which legal origins are endogenous did develop other legal traditions depending on their ex-ante (historical) trust values and (ii) that the effects of an exogenous introduction of legal origins vary depending on ex-ante trust levels. -- |
| Keywords: | Trust,Legal Origins,Colonization,Institutions,Causality,Deep Rooted Factors of Development |
| JEL: | K40 N10 O10 Z10 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:fziddp:522012&r=evo |
| By: | Tuba Inal Cekic |
| Abstract: | The concept of social capital, comprising social networks, norms of reciprocity and trust, has been gaining wide interest among researchers and policy makers. So it became a common concept to use social capital as a way to both describe and understand economical, political and social wellbeing of community. While the importance of social capital is highlighted in regional and rural development strategies, Turkey has gone into a fundamental restructuring process in rural and regional development policies in terms of European Union (EU) membership process. Social capital factors in rural settlements within the context of rural development in Rural area of Hilvan, has been put forth as the main theme of this paper. The paper aims to provide an overview of the concept of social capital for rural development and discusses social capital in terms of participation, trust, openness to diversity, and social-institutional networks. Potential items to measure these elements were developed in an empirical study conducted in rural area of Hilvan. Statistical analysis has been used to define factors of social capital and relation between factors and other independent variables like characteristics of rural settlements, socio-cultural structure of rural households and agricultural property and production types. |
| Date: | 2011–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wiw:wiwrsa:ersa10p96&r=evo |