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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Erik O. Kimbrough (Simon Fraser Unviersity); Alexander Vostroknutov (Maastricht University) |
| Abstract: | Rules are thought to persist to the extent that the direct benefits of having them (e.g. reduced transactions costs) exceed the costs of enforcement and of occasional misapplications. We argue that a second crucial role of rules is as screening mechanisms for identifying cooperative types. Thus we underestimate the social value of rules when we consider only their instrumental value in solving a particular problem. We demonstrate experimentally that costly rule-following can be used to screen for conditional cooperators. Subjects participate in a rule-following task in which they may incur costs to follow an arbitrary written rule in an individual choice setting. Without their knowledge, we sort them into groups according to their willingness to follow the rule. These groups then play repeated public goods or trust games. Rule-following groups sustain high public goods contributions over time, but in rule-breaking groups cooperation decays. Rulefollowers also reciprocate more in trust games. However, when individuals are not sorted by type, we observe no differences in the behavior of rule-followers and rule-breakers. |
| Keywords: | experimental economics, rules, social dilemmas, cooperation |
| JEL: | C91 C92 D70 D03 |
| Date: | 2012–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sfu:sfudps:dp12-15&r=evo |
| By: | Lambarraa, Fatima; Riener, Gerhard |
| Abstract: | Charitable giving is one of the major obligations Islam and a strong Muslim norm endorses giving to the needy, but discourages public displays of giving. This norm is puzzling in light of previous evidence, suggesting that making donations public often increases giving. We report the results two field experiments with 534 and 186 participants at Moroccan educational institutions (among them two religious schools) to assess the effects this moral prescription on actual giving levels in anonymous and public settings. Subjects who participated in a paid study were given the option to donate from their payment to a local orphanage, under treatments that varied the publicity of the donation and the salience of Islamic values. In the salient Islamic treatment, anonymity of donations significantly increased donation incidence from 59% to 77% percent as well as average donations for religious subjects from 8.90 to 13.00 Dh. This findings stand in stark contrast to most previous findings in the charitable giving literature and suggest to rethink fundraising strategies in Muslim populations. |
| Keywords: | Charitable giving, Islam, Social pressure, Priming, Religion, Norms, Field experiment, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, H40, C93, D01, Z12, |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:iaae12:126795&r=evo |
| By: | Velu, Chander (University of Cambridge); Iyer, Sriya (University of Cambridge); Gair, Jonathan R. (University of Cambridge) |
| Abstract: | Players cooperate in experiments more than game theory would predict. In order to explain this, we introduce the 'returns-based beliefs' approach: the expected returns of a particular strategy in proportion to the total expected returns of all strategies. Using a decision analytic solution concept, Luce's (1959) probabilistic choice model, and 'hyperpriors' for ambiguity in players' cooperability, our approach explains empirical observations in classic games such as the Prisoner's Dilemma. Testing the closeness of fit of our model on Selten and Chmura (2008) data for completely mixed 2x2 games shows that with loss aversion, returns-based beliefs explain the data better than other equilibrium concepts. |
| Keywords: | subjective probabilities, decision making, cooperation |
| JEL: | D01 D03 |
| Date: | 2012–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6711&r=evo |
| By: | Schubert, Manuel; Graf Lambsdorff, Johann |
| Abstract: | Psychology has inspired economics to recognize intentions in addition to outcomes as being relevant for utility and behavior. Reciprocal behavior, in particular, has been related to the kindness of chosen actions and how kindness can be derived from the benefits obtained in unchosen alternatives. This study shows that a richer understanding of kindness is required. We carry out ultimatum games with a reduced space of strategies and observe that subjects refrain from negative reciprocity (rejecting proposals) if an unchosen alternative was costly to the proposer. Second, we find proposers to anticipate this behavior. Not only the benefits are relevant for assessments of kindness, the costs of kindness matter as well. -- |
| Keywords: | intentions,reciprocity,fairness |
| JEL: | C70 C91 D63 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:upadvr:v6412&r=evo |
| By: | Harttgen, Kenneth (Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit); Opfinger, Matthias (Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit) |
| Abstract: | We construct an index for national identity using information from the World Values Survey on peoples’ attitudes concerning politics and to the state itself. We then analyze the relationship between our new measure of national identity and social heterogeneity. The results indicate that religious diversity is significantly and positively related to national identity, whereas other variables proxying social heterogeneity are not. We argue that national identity is a substitute for religion. At high levels of religious diversity people do not identify with their religious group. They search other objects of identification offering common values and norms. Hence, people identify at the national level. Furthermore, democratic institutions and mobility throughout the country affect national identity positively. |
| Keywords: | Religious Diversity; National Identity; Common Values |
| JEL: | J15 O10 Z12 |
| Date: | 2012–06–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:aiccon:2012_107&r=evo |
| By: | Sara Savastano (Faculty of Economics, University of Rome "Tor Vergata") |
| Abstract: | Linking to a growing literature in behavioral economics, this study combines neuroscience, psychology, and behavioral economics to empirically analyze the extent to which academic achievement, the relative weight of rationality vs. fairness in decision-making, and life satisfaction are affected by cognitive ability, persistent personality traits, and short-term stimuli based on psychological priming techniques. Prior to undertaking a course exam and playing the role of the respondent in an ultimatum game, a group of Masters and PhD students were stimulated either emotionally (via chocolate tasting) or rationally (via mathematical problem solving). Results show that, in addition to rational skills, short term stimuli and persistent personality traits have a significant impact on academic performance. They also influence the extent to which decisions are affected by notions of rationality and fairness and individuals’ subjective satisfaction with life. Given the economic importance of the associated outcomes, this opens up an important research agenda. |
| Keywords: | Neuroeconomics, Psychology and Behavioral Economics, Satisfaction with life, Rational Choices, Consumer Theory |
| JEL: | C91 D01 D87 D60 I20 |
| Date: | 2012–07–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:241&r=evo |
| By: | Eike Kroll (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg); Ralf Morgenstern (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg); Thomas Neumann (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg); Stephan Schosser (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg); Bodo Vogt (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg) |
| Abstract: | While experimental research on social dilemmas focuses on the distribution of gains, this paper analyzes social preferences in the case of losses. In this experimental study, participants share a loss in a Nash bargaining game. Instead of monetary losses, we use waiting time as an incentive. We assume that participants prefer less to more waiting time. Our experiment consists of four versions of the Nash bargaining game, which vary in a way that allows a comparison of four classical concepts on negotiations (Nash, Equal Loss, Equal Gain, and Kalai-Smorodinski), and Inequality Aversion. We find an equal split of waiting time for all parameter variations. Therefore, our experimental evidence shows that Inequality Aversion provides a better prediction than do classical concepts for the outcome of a Nash bargaining game involving losses. Furthermore, participants resort to Inequality Aversion at the cost of overall welfare. |
| Keywords: | bargaining, losses, inequality aversion, experimental economics |
| JEL: | C7 C9 |
| Date: | 2012–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mag:wpaper:120014&r=evo |
| By: | Juan-Camilo Cárdenas; Anna Drebber; Emma von Essen; Eva Ranehill |
| Abstract: | This paper compares cooperation among Columbian and Swedish children aged 9-12. We illustrate the dynamics of the prisoner’s dilemma in a new task that is easily understood by children and performed during a physical education class. We find some evidence that children cooperate more in Sweden than in Colombia. Girls in Colombia are less cooperative than boys, whereas our results indicate the opposite gender gap in Sweden. On average, children are more cooperative with boys than with girls. |
| Date: | 2012–07–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:000089:009800&r=evo |
| By: | Schubert, Manuel |
| Abstract: | Intention-based models of reciprocity argue that people assess kindness by measuring the intended consequences of actual behavior (deeds) against foregone payoffs resulting from unchosen alternatives (omissions). While the effects of omissions have been intensively studied in recent years, less has been done with respect to the impact of deeds on reciprocation. I employ a novel game that alters the intended consequences behind actual behavior at constant levels of unchosen alternatives and realized payoffs. Aggregate results suggest that intended consequences only weakly matter for negative reciprocity. I find men to abstain from retaliation when others intend to mildly harm them. Women, however, seem to be largely invariant to intended consequences of actual behavior. -- |
| Keywords: | intentions,reciprocity,kindness,gender |
| JEL: | D63 C78 C91 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:upadvr:v6512&r=evo |
| By: | Fabio Sabatini; Francesca Modena; Ermanno Tortia |
| Abstract: | This paper contributes to the literature by carrying out the first empirical investigation into the role of different types of enterprises in the creation of social trust. Drawing on a unique dataset collected through the administration of a questionnaire to a representative sample of the population of the Italian Province of Trento in March 2011, we find that cooperatives are the only type of enterprise where the work environment fosters the social trust of workers. |
| Keywords: | Cooperative enterprises, nonprofit organizations, trust, social capital, motivations, inclusive governance, work organization. |
| JEL: | L31 L33 P13 Z1 Z13 |
| Date: | 2012–07–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eei:rpaper:eeri_rp_2012_10&r=evo |
| By: | Eike Kroll (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg); Judith Trarbach (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg); Bodo Vogt (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates preferences for different health profiles, especially sequences of increasing and decreasing pain. We test conflicting predictions in terms of preferences over two painful sequences. The QALY concept relevant for the determination of different levels of health-related quality of life implies indifference, whereas behavioral theories find preferences related to ordering, following the peak-end-rule. Using an experimental design with real consequences we generate decisions about painful sequences induced by the cold pressor test. The results are compared with hypothetical choice data elicited using standard methods. We find that hypothetical methods reveal decisions in line with the peak-end-rule. However when it comes to real consequences of their decisions, subjects are on average not willing to pay for that preference. |
| Keywords: | pain, peak-end-rule, willingness-to-pay |
| JEL: | D8 C9 |
| Date: | 2012–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mag:wpaper:120012&r=evo |
| By: | Siegfried K. Berninghaus (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Institute for Economic Theory and Statistics); Werner Güth (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group); Stephan Schosser (University of Magdeburg, Chair of Empirical Economics) |
| Abstract: | Bounded rationality questions backward induction, which however, does not exclude such reasoning when anticipation is easy. In our stochastic (alternating offer) bargaining experiment, there is a certain first-period pie and a known finite deadline. What is uncertain (except for the final period) is whether there is a further period. Whereas backward induction requires information about all later pie sizes and probabilities, forward reasoning is expected to consider only the immediate prospects. Rather than relying only on decision data, we try to assess the cognitive approach such as forward reasoning of backward induction by control of information retrieval. We find that participants who begin with the shortest games before playing possibly longer games, initially resort to backward induction before switching to forward-looking behavior. |
| Keywords: | backward induction, forward reasoning, bargaining |
| JEL: | C70 C72 C91 |
| Date: | 2012–07–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2012-041&r=evo |