nep-evo New Economics Papers
on Evolutionary Economics
Issue of 2012‒07‒14
six papers chosen by
Matthew Baker
City University of New York

  1. Charitable Giving Among Females and Males: An Empirical Test of the Competitive Altruism Hypothesis By Robert Böhm; Tobias Regner
  2. Calamity, Aid and Indirect Reciprocity: the Long Run Impact of Tsunami on Altruism By Leonardo Becchetti; Stefano Castriota; Pierluigi Conzo
  3. Analogies and Theories: The Role of Simplicity and the Emergence of Norms By Gabrielle Gayer; Itzhak Gilboa
  4. On the norms of charitable giving in Islam: A field experiment By Lambarraa, Fatima; Riener, Gerhard
  5. Self-Rewards and Personal Motivation By Alexander K. Koch,; Julia Nafziger; Anton Suvorov; Jeroen van de Ven
  6. Do cooperative enterprises create social trust? By Sabatini, Fabio; Modena, Francesca; Tortia, Ermanno

  1. By: Robert Böhm (Center for Empirical Research in Economics and Behavioral Sciences (CEREB), University of Erfurt, Germany); Tobias Regner (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany)
    Abstract: We conduct a real-effort task experiment where subjects' performance translates into a donation to a charity. In a within-subjects design we vary the visibility of the donation (no/private/public feedback). Confirming previous studies, we find that subjects' performance increases, that is, they donate more to charity, when their relative performance is made public. In line with the competitive altruism hypothesis, a biology-based explanation for status-seeking behavior, especially male subjects increase performance in the public setting.
    Keywords: social preferences, other-regarding behavior, charitable giving, social-image concerns, competitive altruism, experiments, social status
    JEL: C91 D03 J16
    Date: 2012–07–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2012-038&r=evo
  2. By: Leonardo Becchetti (Faculty of Economics, University of Rome "Tor Vergata"); Stefano Castriota (University of Perugia); Pierluigi Conzo (Faculty of Economics, University of Rome "Tor Vergata" and CSEF)
    Abstract: Natural disasters have been shown to produce effects on social capital, risk and time preferences of victims. We run experiments on altruistic, time and risk preferences on a sample of Sri Lankan microfinance borrowers affected/unaffected by the tsunami shock in 2004 at a 7-year distance from the event (a distance longer than in most empirical studies). We find that people who suffered at least a damage from the event behave in dictator games less altruistically as senders (and expect less as receivers) than those who do not report any damage. Interestingly, among damaged, those who suffered also house damages or injuries send (expect) more than those reporting only losses to the economic activity. Since the former are shown to receive significantly more help than the latter we interpret this last finding as a form of indirect reciprocity.
    Keywords: tsunami, disaster recovery, social preferences, altruism, development aid
    JEL: C90 D03 O12
    Date: 2012–07–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:239&r=evo
  3. By: Gabrielle Gayer (Department of Economics [Israël] - Bar-Ilan University); Itzhak Gilboa (GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC - GROUPE HEC - CNRS : UMR2959, Tel-Aviv University - Tel-Aviv University)
    Abstract: We consider the dynamics of reasoning by general rules (theories) and specific cases (analogies). When an agent faces an exogenous process, we show that, under mild conditions, if reality happens to be simple, the agent will converge to adopt a theory and discard analogical thinking. If, however, reality is complex, the agent may rely on analogies more than on theories. By contrast, when the process is generated by agents' predictions, convergence to a theory is much more likely, as in the emergence of norms in a coordination game. Mixed cases, involving noisy endogenous processes are likely to give rise to complex dynamics of reasoning, switching between theories and analogies.
    Keywords: analogies, theories, simplicity, norms
    Date: 2012–06–28
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00712917&r=evo
  4. By: Lambarraa, Fatima; Riener, Gerhard
    Abstract: Charitable giving is one of the major obligations Islam and a strong Muslim norm endorses giving to the needy, but discourages public displays of giving. This norm is puzzling in light of previous evidence, suggesting that making donations public often increases giving. We report the results two field experiments with 534 and 186 participants at Moroccan educational institutions (among them two religious schools) to assess the effects this moral prescription on actual giving levels in anonymous and public settings. Subjects who participated in a paid study were given the option to donate from their payment to a local orphanage, under treatments that varied the publicity of the donation and the salience of Islamic values. In the salient Islamic treatment, anonymity of donations significantly increased donation incidence from 59% to 77% percent as well as average donations for religious subjects from 8.90 to 13.00 Dh. This findings stand in stark contrast to most previous findings in the charitable giving literature and suggest to rethink fundraising strategies in Muslim populations. --
    Keywords: Charitable giving,Islam,Social pressure,Priming,Religion,Norms,Field experiment
    JEL: H40 C93 D01 Z12
    Date: 2012
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:59&r=evo
  5. By: Alexander K. Koch, (Department of Economics and Business, Aarhus University, Denmark); Julia Nafziger (Department of Economics and Business, Aarhus University, Denmark); Anton Suvorov (CEFIR and New Economic School); Jeroen van de Ven (University of Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute)
    Abstract: Self-administered rewards are ubiquitous. They serve as incentives for personal accomplishments and are widely recommended to increase personal motivation. We show that in a model with time-inconsistent and reference-dependent preferences, self-rewards can be a credible and effective tool to overcome self-control problems. We also characterize the type of self-rewards that can be used, such as vice goods and virtue goods, and analyze which types of goods will be preferred by the individual.
    Keywords: Quasi-hyperbolic discounting, reference-dependent preferences, loss aversion, self-control, self-rewards, goals
    JEL: D03 D81 D91
    Date: 2012–07–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aah:aarhec:2012-14&r=evo
  6. By: Sabatini, Fabio; Modena, Francesca; Tortia, Ermanno
    Abstract: This paper contributes to the literature by carrying out the first empirical investigation into the role of different types of enterprises in the creation of social trust. Drawing on a unique dataset collected through the administration of a questionnaire to a representative sample of the population of the Italian Province of Trento in March 2011, we find that cooperatives are the only type of enterprise where the work environment fosters the social trust of workers.
    Keywords: cooperative enterprises; nonprofit organizations; trust; social capital; intrinsic motivations; inclusive governance; work organization
    JEL: P13 Z1 Z13 L31 L33
    Date: 2012–07–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:39814&r=evo

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