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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Francesco Guala; Luigi Mittone; Matteo Ploner |
| Abstract: | Group membership increases cooperation in social dilemma games, altruistic donation in dictator games, and fair offers in ultimatum games. While the empirical study of group action has grown rapidly over the years, there is little agreement at the theoretical level on exactly why and how group membership changes individual behaviour. According to some theorists, the effect of group framing is channelled primarily via the beliefs of group members, while others identify changes in preference as the key explanatory mechanism. We report an experiment using the minimal group paradigm and a prisoner’s dilemma with multiple actions, in which we manipulate players’ beliefs and show that common knowledge of group affiliation is necessary for group action. We also observe puzzling variations in behaviour when knowledge of group membership is asymmetric, which may be interpreted as cognitive dissonance generated by a normative cue administered in a highly unusual situation. |
| Keywords: | group identity, team preferences, social dilemmas, experimental economics |
| JEL: | C72 C92 H41 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trn:utwpce:1203&r=evo |
| By: | Aldo Rustichini (Department of Economics, University of Minnesota - University of Minnesota); Marie-Claire Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS : UMR5824 - Université Lumière - Lyon II - École Normale Supérieure - Lyon) |
| Abstract: | We show with a laboratory experiment that individuals adjust their moral principles to the situation and to their actions, just as much as they adjust their actions to their principles. We first elicit the individuals' principles regarding the fairness and unfairness of allocations in three different scenarios (a Dictator game, an Ultimatum game, and a Trust game). One week later, the same individuals are invited to play those same games with monetary compensation. Finally in the same session we elicit again their principles regarding the fairness and unfairness of allocations in the same three scenarios. Our results show that individuals adjust abstract norms to fit the game, their role and the choices they made. First, norms that appear abstract and universal take into account the bargaining power of the two sides. The strong side bends the norm in its favor and the weak side agrees : Stated fairness is a compromise with power. Second, in most situations, individuals adjust the range of fair shares after playing the game for real money compared with their initial statement. Third, the discrepancy between hypothetical and real behavior is larger in games where real choices have no strategic consequence (Dictator game and second mover in Trust game) than in those where they do (Ultimatum game). Finally the adjustment of principles to actions is mainly the fact of individuals who behave more selfishly and who have a stronger bargaining power. The moral hypocrisy displayed (measured by the discrepancy between statements and actions chosen followed by an adjustment of principles to actions) appears produced by the attempt, not necessarily conscious, to strike a balance between self-image and immediate convenience. |
| Keywords: | Moral hypocrisy; fairness; social preferences; power; self-deception |
| Date: | 2012–05–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00702578&r=evo |
| By: | Kenju Kamei; Louis Putterman |
| Abstract: | The expectation that non-cooperators will be punished can help to sustain cooperation, but there are competing claims about whether opportunities to engage in higher-order punishment (punishing punishment or failure to punish) help or undermine cooperation in social dilemmas. In a set of experimental treatments, we find that availability of higher-order punishment increases cooperation and efficiency when subjects have full information on the pattern of punishing, including its past history, and opportunities to punish are unrestricted. Availability of higher-order punishment reduces cooperation and efficiency if it is restricted to counter-punishing alone, if past history is unavailable, and if there is a dedicated counter-punishment stage. |
| Keywords: | collective action, social dilemma, voluntary contribution, public goods, punishment, counter-punishment, higher-order punishment. |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bro:econwp:2012-3&r=evo |
| By: | Leonardo Becchetti (Università di Roma "Tor Vergata"); Stefano Castriota (Università di Roma "Tor Vergata"); Pierluigi Conzo (Università di Napoli and CSEF) |
| Abstract: | Natural disasters have been shown to produce effects on social capital, risk and time preferences of victims. We run experiments on altruistic preferences on a sample of Sri Lankan microfinance borrowers affected/unaffected by the tsunami shock in 2004 at a 7-year distance from the event (a distance longer than in most empirical studies). We find that people who suffered at least a damage from the event behave in dictator games less altruistically as senders (and expect less as receivers) than those who do not report any damage. Interestingly, among damaged, those who suffered also house damages or injuries send (expect) more than those reporting only losses to the economic activity. Since the former are shown to receive significantly more help than the latter we interpret this last finding as a form of indirect reciprocity. |
| Keywords: | tsunami, disaster recovery, social preferences, altruism, development aid |
| JEL: | C90 D03 O12 |
| Date: | 2012–05–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sef:csefwp:316&r=evo |
| By: | Irina Cojuharenco; Gert Cornelissen; Natalia Karelaia |
| Abstract: | We suggest that cultivating an individual's connectedness to others promotes socially responsible behavior both directly and indirectly – through increased perceived ability to make a difference. Individuals whose interdependent self is more prominent feel they have more of an impact on larger scale societal outcomes and, therefore, engage more in socially responsible behaviors than do individuals whose independent self is more prominent. We test these hypotheses in two experiments in which participants make financial contributions or exert an effort for a social cause. In a survey, we find that perceived effectiveness mediates the effect of self-construal on socially responsible consumption. |
| Keywords: | self-construal, interdependent self, independent self, socially responsible behavior, perceived effectiveness |
| JEL: | C91 D64 |
| Date: | 2011–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:upf:upfgen:1292&r=evo |
| By: | Moti Michaeli; Daniel Spiro |
| Abstract: | This paper studies theoretically the aggregate distribution of revealed preferences when heterogeneous individuals make the trade o? between being true to their real opinions and conforming to a social norm. We show that in orthodox societies, individuals will tend to either conform fully or ignore the social norm while individuals in liberal societies will tend to compromise between the two extremes. The model sheds light on phenomena such as polarization, alienation and hypocrisy. We also show that societies with orthodox individuals will be liberal on aggregate unless the social norm is upheld by an authority. This suggests that orthodoxy cannot be maintained under pluralism. |
| Date: | 2012–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:huj:dispap:dp609&r=evo |
| By: | Trautmann, Stefan T. (Tilburg University); van de Kuilen, Gijs (Tilburg University); Zeckhauser, Richard J. (Harvard University) |
| Abstract: | We test whether and how membership in the upper class affects ethical behavior in a large representative population sample. Using objective measures of socioeconomic status to define class, we find no evidence of a general tendency for upper class to be less ethical, although we do replicate previous findings that higher status leads to less condemnation of infidelity. We also find evidence that higher class status leads to more self-focus and disengagement, as previously shown in laboratory studies with convenience samples. |
| Date: | 2012–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp12-019&r=evo |
| By: | Harttgen, Kenneth; Opfinger, Matthias |
| Abstract: | We construct an index for national identity using information from the World Values Survey on peoples’ attitudes concerning politics and to the state itself. We then analyze the relationship between our new measure of national identity and social heterogeneity. The results indicate that religious diversity is significantly and positively related to national identity, whereas other variables proxying social heterogeneity are not. We argue that national identity is a substitute for religion. At high levels of religious diversity people do not identify with their religious group. They search other objects of identification offering common values and norms. Hence, people identify at the national level. Furthermore, democratic institutions and mobility throughout the country affect national identity positively. |
| Keywords: | National Identity, Social Heterogeneity, Religious Diversity, Common Beliefs |
| JEL: | J15 O1 Z12 |
| Date: | 2012–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:han:dpaper:dp-491&r=evo |
| By: | Jellal , Mohamed |
| Abstract: | We integrate a general social norm function which associates status to accumulation of capital and consumption into a simple model of endogenous growth. We show that societies which place a greater weight on capital as opposed to consumption will experience fast growth.Our results are consistent with those obtained by Baumol(1990) in the context of entrepreneurship and by Fershtman and Weiss (1991 |
| Keywords: | Beliefs ; social incentives; social status; growth |
| JEL: | Z1 D9 O43 Z13 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:39157&r=evo |
| By: | Daniel Müller; Benno Torgler; Eric M. Uslaner |
| Abstract: | Algan and Cahuc in "Inherited Trust and Growth" (AER, 2010) argue that "inherited trust" is a key factor in explaining growth rates across countries. They derive a measure of inherited trust by linking respondents’ "home countries" in the United States General Social Survey (1972-2004) and the 2000 wave of the World Values Survey. Algan and Cahuc then estimate trust levels for people born before 1910 (inherited trust in 1935) and afterwards (inherited trust in 2000). They show a strong link between economic growth rates and inherited trust. We do not challenge this result, but we do argue that: (1) the 2000 World Values Survey has many anomalous results; (2) the estimates for inherited trust in 1935 are mostly based upon tiny samples for most ethnic heritage groups in the General Social Survey; and (3) Algan and Cahuc’s findings are based upon two-tailed rather than one-tailed tests. We reestimate their model using the more reliable waves of the World Values Survey and find much weaker relationships between inherited trust in 1935 and trust in the home country. We also suggest caution in the overall measure of inherited trust in 1935. |
| Keywords: | inherited trust; generalized trust; US immigrants |
| JEL: | N31 N32 Z12 Z13 |
| Date: | 2012–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cra:wpaper:2012-04&r=evo |