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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Cameron, Lisa A. (Monash University); Erkal, Nisvan (University of Melbourne); Gangadharan, Lata (Monash University); Zhang, Marina (University of Melbourne) |
| Abstract: | Cultural traits play a significant role in the determination of economic outcomes and institutions. This paper presents evidence from laboratory experiments on the cultural integration of individuals of Chinese ethnicity in Australia, focusing on social preferences, preferences for competition, and risk attitudes. We show that the greater the share of education an individual receives in the West, the more they behave like Western subjects and the less they behave according to the norms of their Eastern heritage. Increased exposure to Western education has a strong negative impact on altruism, trust, and trustworthiness. For risk and competitive preferences, our results are gender-specific. These results have important implications for policy making and institution building in multi-cultural societies. |
| Keywords: | cultural integration, cultural transmission, cultural diversity, cultural assimilation, acculturation, immigration, social preferences, preferences for competition, risk aversion |
| JEL: | C91 J15 D64 D03 |
| Date: | 2012–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6467&r=evo |
| By: | Christoph Engel (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn); Lilia Zhurakhovska (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn) |
| Abstract: | If two players of a simultaneous symmetric one-shot prisoner’s dilemma hold standard preferences, the fact that choosing the cooperative move imposes harm on a passive outsider is immaterial. Yet if participants hold social preferences, one might think that they are reticent to impose harm on the outsider. This is not what we find, however severe the externality. A within-subjects measure of reticence to impose harm does not explain cooperation. But the externality makes participants more pessimistic. However conditional on their beliefs participants are more, not less cooperative if cooperation entails harm on an outsider, again however severe the externality. |
| Keywords: | externality, prisoner’s dilemma, Modified Dictator Game, Beliefs |
| JEL: | C72 C91 D03 H23 |
| Date: | 2012–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2012_02&r=evo |
| By: | Jieyao Ding (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn) |
| Abstract: | Bracketing is a mental procedure about how people deal with multiple tasks. If a decision maker handles all the tasks at the same time, it is called broad bracketing. If she handles the tasks separately, e.g., one or a few tasks each time, it is called narrow bracketing. This paper experimentally investigates the effect of broad versus narrow bracketing in the context of a mini-trust game. The result shows that, in the narrow bracketing treatment, the investor (first mover) is more likely to place trust on others, but the receiver (second mover) is less likely to fulfill the trust under the same condition. The effect is partly conditional on beliefs in others' behavior. |
| Keywords: | meta-study, self-control, general theory of crime |
| JEL: | K42 D03 K14 C13 |
| Date: | 2012–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2012_06&r=evo |
| By: | Becker, Anke (University of Bonn); Deckers, Thomas (University of Bonn); Dohmen, Thomas (ROA, Maastricht University); Falk, Armin (University of Bonn); Kosse, Fabian (University of Bonn) |
| Abstract: | Although both economists and psychologists seek to identify determinants of heterogeneity in behavior, they use different concepts to capture them. In this review we first analyze the extent to which economic preferences and psychological concepts of personality – such as the Big Five and locus of control – are related. We analyze data from incentivized laboratory experiments and representative samples and find only low degrees of association between economic preferences and personality. We then regress life outcomes – such as labor market success, health status and life satisfaction – simultaneously on preference and personality measures. The analysis reveals that the two concepts are rather complementary when it comes to explaining heterogeneity in important life outcomes and behavior. |
| Keywords: | risk preference, time preference, social preferences, locus of control, Big Five |
| JEL: | C91 D01 D80 D90 I00 J30 J62 |
| Date: | 2012–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6470&r=evo |
| By: | Marco Casari; Timothy N. Cason |
| Abstract: | Experimental evidence has accumulated highlighting the limitations of formal and explicit contracts in certain situations, and has identified environments in which informal and implicit contracts are more efficient. This paper documents the superior performance of explicit over implicit contracts in a new partnership environment in which both contracting parties must incur effort to generate a joint surplus, and one (“strong”) agent controls the surplus division. In the treatment in which the strong agent makes a non-binding, cheap talk “bonus” offer to the weak agent, this unenforceable promise doubles the rate of joint high effort compared to a baseline with no promise. The strong agents most frequently offered to split the gains of the high effort equally, but actually delivered this amount only about onequarter of the time. An explicit and enforceable contract offer performs substantially better, increasing the frequency of the most efficient outcome by over 200 percent relative to the baseline. |
| Keywords: | Experiments; laboratory; social preferences; inequity aversion; reciprocity; trust. |
| JEL: | C70 D03 |
| Date: | 2012–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pur:prukra:1270&r=evo |
| By: | Dietrich, Franz; List, Christian |
| Abstract: | Behaviourism is the view that preferences, beliefs, and other mental states in social-scienti c theories are auxiliary constructs re-describing people's behav- ioural dispositions. Mentalism is the view that they capture real phenomena, no less existent than the unobservable entities and properties in the natural sciences, such as electrons and electromagnetic elds. While behaviourism has long gone out of fashion in psychology and linguistics, it remains the dominant orthodoxy in economics, especially in the form of revealed preferencetheory. We aim to (i) clear up some common conceptual confusions about the two views in economics, (ii) situate the debate in a broader historical and philosophical context, and (iii) defend a mentalist approach to economics. Setting aside normative concerns about behaviourism, we show that mentalism is in line with best scienti c practice even if economics is treated as a purely positive science of human social behaviour. We distinguish mentalism from, and reject, the radical neuroeconomic view that social behaviour should be explained in terms of people's brain processes, as distinct from their mental states. |
| Keywords: | behaviourism; mentalism; realism; economic models; preferences; beliefs; rationalization; philosophy of science; neuroeconomics |
| JEL: | B0 C0 A11 D03 D0 N0 A12 D01 A14 B41 |
| Date: | 2012–04–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:37813&r=evo |
| By: | Bobkova, Nina; Egbert, Henrik |
| Abstract: | The article provides a survey of the growing experimental literature on the investigation of corruption and extends previous surveys. We discuss three aspects which deserve more attention in further research. These are, first, a more careful consideration of individual norms, second, a broader perspective on the influence of norms within groups on corrupt behaviour, and, third, embedding corruption experiments in more extended social science research on corruption. |
| Keywords: | bribery; corruption experiments; economic experiments |
| JEL: | D73 Z1 C92 C91 |
| Date: | 2012–04–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:38163&r=evo |
| By: | Emrah Arbak (CEPS - Centre for European Policy Studies - Centre for European Policy Studies); Marie-Claire Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS : UMR5824 - Université Lumière - Lyon II - École Normale Supérieure - Lyon) |
| Abstract: | In social dilemmas, leading a team by making heroic efforts may prove costly, especially when the followers are not adequately motivated to make similar sacrifices. Attempting to shed light on what drives people to lead, we devise a two-stage public good experiment with endogenous timing. We show that leading by making generous contributions is widespread and relatively persistent. At least three motives explain this behavior. Some use leadership strategically to distill personal gains, with the expectation that others will respond by being at least as generous. Others are more altruistic, volunteering to lead even though this may come at a personal cost. Yet for another fraction of volunteers, a concern for maintaining a positive social image appears to be responsible. We also find that voluntary leaders are not necessarily more influential than randomly-chosen leaders. |
| Keywords: | leadership, endogenous selection, influence, voluntary contribution, experiment |
| Date: | 2012–04–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00664830&r=evo |
| By: | Todd Cherry (Department of Economics, Appalachian State University); E. Lance Howe (Department of Economics, University of Alaska Anchorage); James J. Murphy (Department of Economics, University of Alaska Anchorage) |
| JEL: | C92 D81 O13 Q20 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ala:wpaper:2012-01&r=evo |
| By: | Francesc Dilmé (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania) |
| Abstract: | Consider the following situation involving two agents who belong to a large society. One of the agents needs help to avoid a big loss. The other agent may either incur a low cost to help him or do nothing. If agents do not recognize each other, providing incentives for socially optimal behavior (helping) is, in general, very difficult. We use a repeated anonymous random matching setting in a large society to understand how, in the previous situation, help may take place in equilibrium. We find explicit equilibria that, unlike other models proposed in the literature, feature smooth aggregate behavior over time and robustness to many perturbations, such as the presence of behavioral types or trembles. We consider the joint limit of increasing the size of the society and making it more interactive (or patient.) Under this limit, our equilibria resemble the tit-for-tat strategy for the prisoner’s dilemma, introducing some small probability of forgiveness. The model is also applied to bilateral trade, where the mechanism used to spread deviations is transmissive instead of contagious. The smooth evolution of the aggregate variables over time makes the model suitable for empirical work. |
| Keywords: | Cooperation, Many Agents, Repeated Game, Unilateral Help |
| JEL: | D82 C73 D64 |
| Date: | 2012–03–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pen:papers:12-011&r=evo |
| By: | Elinder, Mikael (Department of Economics); Erixson, Oscar (Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | Since the sinking of the Titanic, there has been a widespread belief that the social norm of ‘women and children first’ gives women a survival advantage over men in maritime disasters, and that captains and crew give priority to passengers. We analyze a database of 18 maritime disasters spanning three centuries, covering the fate of over 15,000 individuals of more than 30 nationalities. Our results provide a new picture of maritime disasters. Women have a distinct survival disadvantage compared to men. Captains and crew survive at a significantly higher rate than passengers. We also find that the captain has the power to enforce normative behavior, that the gender gap in survival rates has declined, that women have a larger disadvantage in British shipwrecks, and that there seems to be no association between duration of a disaster and the impact of social norms. Taken together, our findings show that behavior in life-and-death situation is best captured by the expression ‘Every man for himself’. |
| Keywords: | Social norms; Disaster; Women and children first; Mortality; High stakes |
| JEL: | C70 D63 D81 J16 |
| Date: | 2012–04–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:uunewp:2012_008&r=evo |