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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Sedef Þen (Kastamonu Üniversitesi) |
| Abstract: | Economics is a science which is constantly progressing and interacting with other sciences. Studies in the economics literature discuss how people display a behavior in the economic decision- making progress. Psychology is a science which explains behavior of people and it cannot be ignored that psychology has a profound effect on economics. Human psychology and behaviors show complex structures, stereotyping people as indicating homogeneous behavior is criticized by many academics and researchers. In this study, it is examined how human psychology guides people when they make economic decisions and the purpose of this research is to analyze how the relationship between economics and psychology has progressed and to explain behavioral economics in this framework. |
| Keywords: | Psychological Economics, Behavioral Economics |
| JEL: | A12 |
| Date: | 2012–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:okn:wpaper:0001&r=evo |
| By: | Attanasi, Giuseppe; Garcia-Gallego, Aurora; Georgantzis, Nikolaos; Montesano, Aldo |
| Abstract: | We apply an alternating proposals protocol with a confirmation stage as a way of solving a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We interpret players’ proposals and (no) confirmation of outcomes of the game as a tacit communication device. The protocol leads to unprecedented high levels of cooperation in the laboratory. Assigning the power of confirmation to one of the two players alone, rather than alternating the role of a leader significantly increases the probability of signing a cooperative agreement in the first bargaining period. We interpret pre-agreement strategies as tacit messages on players’ willingness to cooperate and on their beliefs about the others’ type. |
| Keywords: | Prisoner’s Dilemma; Bargaining; Confirmed Proposals; Confirmed Agreement; Tacit Communication. |
| JEL: | C72 C91 C92 |
| Date: | 2011–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:25463&r=evo |
| By: | Opolot, Daniel (UNU-MERIT, University of Maastricht,) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the impact of interaction topologies on individual and aggregate behavior in environments with social interactions. We study social interaction games of an infnitely large population with local and global externalities. Local externalities are limited within agents' ego-networks while the global externality is derived from aggregate distribution in a feedback manner. We consider two forms of heterogeneity, that due to individual intrinsic tastes and that due to ego-networks. The agents know the potential number of other agents they will interact with but do not posses complete information about their neighbors' types and strategies so they base their decisions on expectations and beliefs. We characterize the existence, uniqueness and multiplicity of equilibrium distribution of strategies. By considering arbitrary interaction topologies, we show that the interaction structure greatly determines the uniqueness and multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes, as well as the equilibrium aggregate distribution of strategies as measured by the mean strategy. |
| Keywords: | Complex networks, Partial information, Local externality, Global externality, Adoption |
| JEL: | C72 D82 D84 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:unumer:2012014&r=evo |
| By: | Nejat Anbarci; Nick Feltovich |
| Abstract: | Previous research has shown that individuals do not respond to changes in their bargaining position to the extent predicted by standard bargaining theories. Most of these results come from experiments with bargaining power allocated exogenously, so that individuals may perceive it as having been “unearned” and thus be reluctant to exploit it. Typically these experiments also allowed equal splits of the “cake” (the amount bargained over) as equilibrium outcomes, leading to a powerful tendency toward 50-50 splits. We conduct a bargaining experiment in which subjects earn their bargaining power through a real–effort task. Treatments are based on the Nash demand game (NDG) and an unstructured bargaining game (UBG). Subjects bargain over a fixed amount of money, with disagreement payments determined entirely by the number of units of the real–effort task successfully completed. Task parameters are set to allow disagreement payoffs above half the cake size, in which case 50–50 splits are not individually rational, and thus not consistent with equilibrium. We find that subjects are least responsive to changes in own and opponent disagreement payoffs in the NDG with both disagreement payments below half the cake size. Responsiveness is higher in the UBG, and in the NDG when one disagreement payment is more than half the cake size, but in both cases it is still less than predicted. It is only in the UBG when a disagreement payment is more than half the cake size that responsiveness to disagreement payoffs reaches the predicted level. Our results imply that even when real–life bargaining position is determined by past behaviour rather than luck, the extent to which actual bargaining corresponds to theoretical predictions will depend on (1) the institutions within which bargaining takes place, and (2) the distribution of bargaining power; in particular, whether the 50–50 norm is a viable outcome. |
| Keywords: | Nash demand game, unstructured bargaining, real effort, disagreement, experiment |
| JEL: | C78 C72 D81 |
| Date: | 2012–03–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dkn:econwp:eco_2012_2&r=evo |
| By: | Giovanna d’Adda |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the effect of leadership on the level and evolution of pro-social behavior using an artefactual field experiment on local public good provision. Participants decide how much to contribute to an actual conservation project. They can then revise their donations after being randomly matched in pairs on the basis of their authority and having observed each other’s contributions. Authority is measured through a social ranking exercise identifying formal and moral leaders within the community. I find that giving by a pair is higher and shows a lower tendency to decrease over time when a leader is part of a pair. This is because higher-ranked pair members in general, and leaders in particular, donate more and are less likely to revise contributions downwards after giving more than their counterparts. Leadership effects are stronger when moral authority is made salient within the experiment, in line with the ethical nature of the decision under study. These findings highlight the importance of identifying different forms of leadership and targeting the relevant leaders in projects aimed at local public good provision. |
| Keywords: | Leadership, local public goods, experimental, Colombia |
| JEL: | D7 H4 O1 |
| Date: | 2012–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:econwp:059&r=evo |
| By: | Peter Skott (University of Massachusetts Amherst) |
| Abstract: | Mainstream macroeconomics has pursued .micro founded.models based on the explicit optimization by representative agents. The result has been a long and wasteful detour. But elements of the Lucas critique are relevant, also for heterodox economists. Challenging common heterodox views on microeconomics and formalization, this paper argues that (i) economic models should not be based purely on empirically observed regularities,(ii) heterodox economists must be able to tell an integrated story about goal-oriented micro behavior in a specific macro environment, and (iii)relatively simple analytical models have an essential role to play. JEL Categories: E1; B5 |
| Keywords: | micro foundations, pluralism, old Keynesian theory, Kaleckian investment function. |
| Date: | 2012–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ums:papers:2012-04&r=evo |
| By: | Niclas Berggren (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) and University of Economics in Prague); Christian Bjørnskov (Department of Economics and Business, Aarhus University, Denmark) |
| Abstract: | Social and cultural determinants of economic institutions and outcomes have come to the forefront of economic research. We introduce religiosity, measured as the share for which religion is important in daily life, to explain institutional quality in the form of property rights and the rule of law. Previous studies have only measured the impact of membership shares of different religions, with mixed results. We find, in a cross-country regression analysis comprising up to 112 countries, that religiosity is negatively related to our institutional outcome variables. This only holds in democracies (not autocracies), which suggests that religiosity affects the way institutions work through the political process. Individual religions are not related to our measure of institutional quality. |
| Keywords: | Religion, religiosity, rule of law, property rights, institutions |
| JEL: | K11 K42 Z12 |
| Date: | 2012–03–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aah:aarhec:2012-08&r=evo |
| By: | Proto, Eugenio (University of Warwick); Sgroi, Daniel (University of Warwick and CAGE) |
| Abstract: | We perform an experiment designed to assess the accuracy of beliefs about distributions. The beliefs relate to behavior (mobile phone purchasing decisions, hypothetical restaurant choices), attitudes (happiness, politics) and observable characteristics (height, weight) and are typically formed through real world experiences. We nd a powerful and ubiquitous bias in perceptions that is \self-centered" in the sense that an individual's beliefs about the population distribution changes with their own position in the distribution. In particular, those at extremes tend to perceive themselves as closer to the middle of the distribution than is the case. We discuss possible explanations for this bias. Key words: subjective beliefs ; attitudes ; observable characteristics ; self-centered bias JEL classification: D03 ; C83 ; D84 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:978&r=evo |