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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Thöni, Christian (University of St. Gallen); Gächter, Simon (University of Nottingham) |
| Abstract: | Substantial evidence suggests the behavioral relevance of social preferences and also the importance of social influence effects ("peer effects"). Yet, little is known about how peer effects and social preferences are related. In a three-person gift-exchange experiment we find causal evidence for peer effects in voluntary cooperation: agents' efforts are positively related despite the absence of material payoff interdependencies. We confront this result with major theories of social preferences which predict that efforts are unrelated, or negatively related. Some theories allow for positively-related efforts but cannot explain most observations. Conformism, norm following and considerations of social esteem are candidate explanations. |
| Keywords: | social preferences, voluntary cooperation, peer effects, reflection problem, gift exchange, conformism, social norms, social esteem |
| JEL: | C92 D03 |
| Date: | 2012–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6277&r=evo |
| By: | Andre Barreira da Silva Rocha (Departament of Economics, University of Leicester); Annick Laruelle (a.laruelle@ikerbasque.org); Peio Zuazo (Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I UPV/EHU) |
| Abstract: | We generalise and extend the work of Iñarra and Laruelle (2011) by studying two person symmetric evolutionary games with two strategies, a heterogenous population with two possible types of individuals and incomplete information. Comparing such games with their classic homogeneous version vith complete information found in the literature, we show that for the class of anti-coordination games the only evolutionarily stable strategy vanishes. Instead, we find infinite neutrally stable strategies. We also model the evolutionary process using two different replicator dynamics setups, each with a different inheritance rule, and we show that both lead to the same results with respect to stability. |
| Date: | 2012–01–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehu:ikerla:201157&r=evo |
| By: | Timothy N. Cason; Sau-Him Paul Lau; Vai-Lam Mui |
| Abstract: | History-dependent strategies are often used to support cooperation in repeated game models. Using the indefinitely repeated common-pool resource assignment game and a perfect stranger experimental design, this paper reports novel evidence that players who have successfully used an efficiency-enhancing turn-taking strategy will teach other players in subsequent supergames to adopt this strategy. We find that subjects engage in turn taking frequently in both the Low Conflict and the High Conflict treatments. Prior experience with turn taking significantly increases turn taking in both treatments. Moreover, successful turn taking often involves fast learning, and individuals with turn taking experience are more likely to be teachers than inexperienced individuals. The comparative statics results show that teaching in such an environment also responds to incentives, since teaching is empirically more frequent in the Low Conflict treatment with higher benefits and lower costs. |
| Keywords: | Learning, Teaching, Assignment Game, Laboratory Experiment, Repeated Games, Turn Taking, Common-Pool Resources |
| JEL: | C73 C91 |
| Date: | 2011–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pur:prukra:1267&r=evo |