nep-evo New Economics Papers
on Evolutionary Economics
Issue of 2011‒11‒07
nine papers chosen by
Matthew Baker
City University of New York

  1. Too smart to be selfish? Measures of intelligence, social preferences, and consistency By Chen, Chia-Ching; Chiu, I-Ming; Smith, John; Yamada, Tetsuji
  2. Behavioral biases and representative agent By Elyès Jouini; Clotilde Napp
  3. Deterministic monotone dynamics and dominated strategies By Yannick Viossat
  4. Do Women Prefer a Co-operative Work Environment? By Peter Kuhn; Marie-Claire Villeval
  5. An experiment on experimental instructions By Maria Bigoni; Davide Dragone
  6. Energy, the Environment and Behaviour Change: A survey of insights from behavioural economics By Baddeley, M.
  7. The creative industrial park : formation path and evolution mechanism By Yang, Yong-Zhong; Huang, Shu-Yi; Lin, Ming-Hua
  8. Group Size, Coordination, and the Effectiveness of the Punishment Mechanism in the VCM: An Experimental Investigation By Bin Xu; Bram Cadsby; Liangcong Fan; Fei Song
  9. The Intergenerational Transmission of Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Abilities By Grönqvist, Erik; Vlachos, Jonas; Öckert, Björn

  1. By: Chen, Chia-Ching; Chiu, I-Ming; Smith, John; Yamada, Tetsuji
    Abstract: Although there is an increasing interest in examining the relationship between cognitive ability and economic behavior, less is known about the relationship between cognitive ability and social preferences. We investigate the relationship between strongly incentivized measures of intelligence and measures of social preferences. We have data on a series of small-stakes dictator-type decisions, known as Social Value Orientation (SVO), in addition to choices in a larger-stakes dictator game. We also have access to the grade point averages (GPA) and Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) outcomes of our subjects. We find that subjects who perform better on the math portion of the SAT are more generous in both the dictator game and the SVO measure. By contrast we find that subjects with a higher GPA are more selfish in the dictator game and more generous according to the SVO. We also find that the consistency of the subjects is related to GPA but we do not find evidence that it is related to either portion of the SAT.
    Keywords: dictator game; Social Value Orientation; altruism; cognitive ability
    JEL: D64 C91
    Date: 2011–11–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:34438&r=evo
  2. By: Elyès Jouini (CEREMADE - CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision - CNRS : UMR7534 - Université Paris Dauphine - Paris IX); Clotilde Napp (CREST - Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique - INSEE - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Économique, DRM - Dauphine Recherches en Management - CNRS : UMR7088 - Université Paris Dauphine - Paris IX)
    Abstract: In this paper, we show that behavioral features can be obtained at a group level when the individuals of the group are heterogeneous enough. Starting from a standard model of Pareto optimal allocations, with expected utility maximizers but allowing for heterogeneity among individual beliefs, we show that the representative agent has an inverse S-shaped probability distortion function. As an application of this result, we show that an agent with a probability weighting function as in Cumulative Prospect Theory may be represented as a collection of agents with noisy beliefs.
    Keywords: Behavioral agent; probability weighting function; representative agent
    Date: 2012
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00550229&r=evo
  3. By: Yannick Viossat (CEREMADE - CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision - CNRS : UMR7534 - Université Paris Dauphine - Paris IX)
    Abstract: We survey and unify results on elimination of dominated strategies by monotonic dynamics and prove some new results that may be seen as dual to those of Hofbauer and Weibull (J. Econ. Theory, 1996, 558-573) on convex monotonic dynamics.
    Keywords: evolutionary game theory; evolutionary dynamics ; dominated strategies; monotonic dynamics
    Date: 2011–10–26
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00636620&r=evo
  4. By: Peter Kuhn (Department of Economics, University of California, Santa Barbara, 2127 North Hall, Santa Barbara, CA 93106-9210); Marie-Claire Villeval (Université de Lyon, Lyon, F-69007, France ; CNRS, GATE Lyon St Etienne,F-69130 Ecully, France)
    Abstract: Are women disproportionately attracted to work environments where cooperation rather than competition is rewarded ? This paper reports the results of a real-effort experiment in which participants choose between an individual compensation scheme and a team-based payment scheme. We find that women are more likely than men to select team-based compensation in our baseline treatment, but women and men join teams with equal frequency when we add an efficiency advantage to team production. Using a simple structural discrete choice framework to reconcile these facts, we show that three elements can account for the observed patterns in the team-entry gender gap : (1) a gender gap in confidence in others (i.e. women are less pessimistic about their prospective teammates’ relative ability), (2) a greater responsiveness among men to instrumental reasons for joining teams, and (3) a greater “pure” preference for working in a team environment among women.
    Keywords: gender, cooperation, self-selection, confidence, experiment
    JEL: C91 J16 J24 J31 M5
    Date: 2011
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:1127&r=evo
  5. By: Maria Bigoni (Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Universita di Bologna); Davide Dragone (Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Universita di Bologna and Max Plank Institute of Economics, Jena)
    Abstract: In this paper we treat instructions as an experimental variable. Using a public good game, we study how the instructions' format affects the participants' understanding of the experiment, their speed of play and their experimental behavior. We show that longer instructions do not significantly improve the subjects' understanding of the experiment; on-screen instructions shorten average decision times with respect to on-paper instructions, and requiring forced inputs reduces waiting times, in particular for the slowest subjects. Consistent with cognitive load theory, we find that short, on-screen instructions which require forced inputs improve on subjects' comprehension and familiarity with the experimental task, and they contribute to reduce both decision and waiting times without affecting the overall pattern of contributions.
    Keywords: Cognitive load theory, Comprehension, Distraction, Experimental instructions
    JEL: C72 C90 H41
    Date: 2011–11–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2011-049&r=evo
  6. By: Baddeley, M.
    Abstract: Evidence of climate change is largely undisputed but moderating the impacts not only of climate change but also of resource depletion is a complex, multi-faceted problem. Technical solutions will have a large role to play but engineering behaviour change within households and firms is essential to harnessing the potential for energy efficient consumption, production and investment. To inform debates about behavior change, this paper explores some insights from behavioural economics including analyses of bounded rationality, cognitive bias / heuristics, temporal discounting, social in uences, well-being and emotions.
    JEL: Q5 Q58
    Date: 2011–10–28
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:1162&r=evo
  7. By: Yang, Yong-Zhong; Huang, Shu-Yi; Lin, Ming-Hua
    Abstract: This paper has built a three-stage assumption of creative industrial park on the base of evolutionary economics, which are the gather of units, the construction of interface and the development of network. The gather of units is a reflection of resource search, the construction of interface is a need of identity, and the development of network is a result of multi-dimensional expansion.In the three-stage evolution, the creative industrial park increases constantly their evolution level from the simple geographic gathered to the division and cooperation of labor, until the formation of novel systems. Then this paper analyzes the 798 creative industrial park using the three-stage assumption. This paper finds the main problem of 798’s self-destructing after the low level development of the third stage is the exclusion of the commercial prosperity to the art production. Accordingly,the paper puts forword four modes of promoting the integration between art and commerce. At last, this paper argues the different characteristics of the creative industrial park from other industrial parks. On the angle of formation path, the essence of creative industries is integration of culture and economy, technology. On the angle of evolution mechanism, it reflects novel characteristic of unit, identity characteristic of interface, and co-creation characteristic of network.
    Keywords: creative industrial park; formation path; evolution mechanism; integration of culture;economy;and technology
    JEL: B52 L8
    Date: 2011–10–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:34356&r=evo
  8. By: Bin Xu (Public Administration College, Zhejiang Gongshang University and Experimental Social Science Laboratory, Zhejiang University.); Bram Cadsby (Department of Economics, University of Guelph.); Liangcong Fan (College of Public Administration, Zhejiang University.); Fei Song (Ted Rogers School of Management, Ryerson University.)
    Abstract: In this study, we examine the effectiveness of the individual-punishment mechanism in larger groups, comparing groups of four to groups of 40 participants. We find that the individual punishment mechanism is remarkably robust when the MPCR is held constant despite the coordination problems inherent in an institution relying on decentralized individual punishment decisions in the context of a larger group. This reflects increased per-capita expenditures on punishment that offset the greater coordination difficulties in the larger group. However, if the marginal group return stays constant, resulting in an MPCR that shrinks with group size, no such offset occurs and punishment loses much but not all of its effectiveness at encouraging voluntary contributions to a public good.
    Keywords: Experiment, Public Good, Punishment, Large Groups
    JEL: C91 H41
    Date: 2011
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gue:guelph:2011-10.&r=evo
  9. By: Grönqvist, Erik (Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation (IFAU)); Vlachos, Jonas (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)); Öckert, Björn (Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation (IFAU))
    Abstract: We study the intergenerational transmission of cognitive and non-cognitive abilities between fathers and sons using population-wide enlistment data. Measurement error bias in fathers’ ability measures is corrected for using two sets of instruments. Results suggest that previous estimates of intergenerational ability correlations are biased downwards; once corrected for, the non-cognitive correlation is close to that of cognitive ability. We also predict mothers’ abilities and find the mother-son cognitive ability correlation to be stronger than the father-son correlation. Finally, educational attainment and labor market outcomes of both sons and daughters are strongly related to both parents’ cognitive and non-cognitive abilities.
    Keywords: Intergenerational Ability Correlations; Cognitive Ability; Non-Cognitive Ability; Measurement Error Bias
    JEL: I00 J13 J24
    Date: 2011–10–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0884&r=evo

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