|
on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Giacomo Degli Antoni (University of Milano-Bicocca); Lorenzo Sacconi (University of Trento - Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | Social capital and corporate social responsibility (CSR) have received increasing attention in research on the role that elements such as trust, trustworthiness and social norms of reciprocity and cooperation may have in promoting socio-economic development. Although social capital and CSR seem to have features in common, their relationship has not yet been analysed in depth. This paper investigates the idea of a virtuous circle between the level of social capital and the implementation of CSR practices that fosters the creation of cooperative networks between the firm and all its stakeholders. By using both a theoretical approach developed by considering tools of network analysis and psychological game theory and an empirical approach based on original evidence from three case studies, this study shows the role that cognitive social capital (understood as a disposition to conform with ethical principles of cooperation) and the adoption of CSR practices may have in promoting the emergence of sustainable networks of relations between the firm and all its stakeholders (structural social capital). |
| Keywords: | Social capital, Corporate Social Responsibility, Social norms, Network, Cooperation, Trust |
| JEL: | A13 D23 L21 M14 Z10 |
| Date: | 2011–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ent:wpaper:wp28&r=evo |
| By: | Centorrino, Samuele; Djemaï, Elodie; Hopfensitz, Astrid; Milinski, Manfred; Seabright, Paul |
| Abstract: | We test the hypothesis that "genuine" or "convincing" smiling is a costly signal that has evolved to induce cooperation in situations requiring mutual trust. Potential trustees in a trust game made video clips for viewing by potential trusters before the latter decided whether to send them money. Ratings of the genuineness of smiles vary across clips; it is difficult to make convincing smiles to order. We argue that smiling convincingly is costly, because smiles from trustees playing for higher stakes are rated as significantly more convincing, so that rewards appear to induce effort. We show that it induces cooperation: smiles rated as more convincing strongly predict judgments about the trustworthiness of trustees, and willingness to send them money. Finally, we show that it is a honest signal: those smiling convincingly return more money on average to senders. Convincing smiles are to some extent a signal of the intrinsic character of trustees: less honest individuals find smiling convincingly more difficult. They are also informative about the greater amounts that trustees playing for higher stakes have available to share: it is harder to smile convincingly if you have less to offer. |
| Date: | 2011–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ide:wpaper:24350&r=evo |
| By: | Markus M. Mobius; Muriel Niederle; Paul Niehaus; Tanya S. Rosenblat |
| Abstract: | Evidence from social psychology suggests that agents process information about their own ability in a biased manner. This evidence has motivated exciting research in behavioral economics, but has also garnered critics who point out that it is potentially consistent with standard Bayesian updating. We implement a direct experimental test. We study a large sample of 656 undergraduate students, tracking the evolution of their beliefs about their own relative performance on an IQ test as they receive noisy feedback from a known data-generating process. Our design lets us repeatedly measure the complete relevant belief distribution incentive-compatibly. We find that subjects (1) place approximately full weight on their priors, but (2) are asymmetric, over-weighting positive feedback relative to negative, and (3) conservative, updating too little in response to both positive and negative signals. These biases are substantially less pronounced in a placebo experiment where ego is not at stake. We also find that (4) a substantial portion of subjects are averse to receiving information about their ability, and that (5) less confident subjects are causally more likely to be averse. We unify these phenomena by showing that they all arise naturally in a simple model of optimally biased Bayesian information processing. |
| JEL: | C91 C93 D83 |
| Date: | 2011–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17014&r=evo |
| By: | Angelo Antoci; Fabio Sabatini; Mauro Sodini |
| Abstract: | We set up a theoretical framework to analyze the possible role of economic growth and technological progress in the erosion of social capital. Under certain parameters, the relationship between technological progress and social capital can take the shape of an inverted U curve. We show the circumstances allowing the economy to follow trajectories where the stock of social capital grows endogenously and unboundedly. |
| Keywords: | Economic growth; social capital; social norms; technological progress. |
| JEL: | O33 Z13 |
| Date: | 2011–04–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eei:rpaper:eeri_rp_2011_07&r=evo |
| By: | THISSE, Jean - François (Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium; Paris School of Economics and CEPR) |
| Abstract: | This paper provides a bird-eye overview of the history of spatial economic theory. It is organized around three main ideas (and authors): (i) land use and urban economics (Thünen), (ii) the nature of competition across space (Hotelling), and (iii) new economic geography and the emergence of economic agglomerations (Krugman). |
| Date: | 2011–02–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cor:louvco:2011012&r=evo |
| By: | Charles D. Kolstad |
| Abstract: | Why cooperation occurs when noncooperation appears to be individually rational has been an issue in economics for at least a half century. In the 1960’s and 1970’s the context was cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game; in the 1980’s concern shifted to voluntary provision of public goods; in the 1990’s, the literature on coalition formation for public goods provision emerged, in the context of coalitions to provide transboundary pollution abatement. The problem is that theory suggests fairly low (even zero) levels of contributions to the public good and high levels of free riding. Experiments and empirical evidence suggests higher levels of cooperation. This is a major reason for the emergence in the 1990’s and more recently of the literature on other-regarding preferences (also known as social preferences). Such preferences tend to involve higher levels of cooperation (though not always). This paper contributes to the literature on coalitions, public good provision and other-regarding preferences. For standard preferences, the marginal per capita return (MPCR) to investing in the public good must be greater than one for contributing to be individually rational. We find that Charness-Rabin preferences tend to reduce this threshold for individual contributions. We also find that Charness-Rabin preferences reduce the equilibrium size of a coalition of agents formed to provide the public good. In addition to theoretical results, some experimental implications of the theoretical model are provided. In contrast to much of the literature, we treat the wealth of agents as heterogeneous. |
| JEL: | H4 H41 Q5 |
| Date: | 2011–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17017&r=evo |
| By: | Gaël Giraud (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - Paris School of Economics); Cécile Renouard (ESSEC - Business School) |
| Abstract: | Theories of justice in the spirit of Rawls and Harsanyi argue that fair-minded people should aspire to make choices for society as if in the original position, that is, behind a veil of ignorance that prevents them from knowing their own social positions. In this paper, we provide a fairly simple framework showing that preferences in front of the veil of ignorance (i.e., in face of everyday risky situations) can be entirely deduced from ethical preferences behind the veil. Moreover, by contrast with Kariv & Zame (2008), in many cases of interest, the converse is not true : Ethical decisions cannot be deduced from economic ones. This not only rehabilitates distributive theories of justice but even proves that standard decision theory in economic environments cannot be exonerated from ethical questioning. |
| Keywords: | Moral preferences, business ethics, social preferences, distributional justice, theory of justice, social choice, original position, veil of ignorance, utilitarianism, maximin principle, uncertainty. |
| JEL: | D63 |
| Date: | 2011–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mse:cesdoc:11026&r=evo |
| By: | Quamrul Ashraf (Williams College); Oded Galor |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the central hypothesis of the influential Malthusian theory, according to which improvements in the technological environment during the pre-industrial era had generated only temporary gains in income per capita, eventually leading to a larger, but not significantly richer, population. Exploiting exogenous sources of cross-country variations in land productivity and the level of technological advancement, the analysis demonstrates that, in accordance with the theory, technological superiority and higher land productivity had significant positive effects on population density but insignificant effects on the standard of living, during the time period 1-1500 CE. |
| Keywords: | Technological Progress, Population Density, Malthusian Stagnation, Land Productivity, Neolithic Revolution |
| JEL: | N10 N30 N50 O10 O40 O50 |
| Date: | 2010–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wil:wileco:2011-05&r=evo |
| By: | Damien Besancenot (CEPN - Centre d'Economie de l'Université Paris Nord - Université Paris-Nord - Paris XIII - CNRS : UMR7234); Dogguy Habib (CEPN - Centre d'Economie de l'Université Paris Nord - Université Paris-Nord - Paris XIII - CNRS : UMR7234) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyses the consequences of young researchers' scientifc choice on the dynamics of sciences. We develop a simple two state mean field game model to analyze the competition between two paradigms based on Kuhn's theory of scientifc revolutions. At the beginning of their career, young researchers choose the paradigm in which they want to work according to social and personal motivations. Despite the possibility of multiple equilibria the model exhibits at least one stable solution in which both paradigms always coexist. The occurrence of shocks on the parameters may induce the shift from one dominant paradigm to the other. During this shift, researchers' choice is proved to have a great impact on the evolution of sciences. |
| Keywords: | Paradigm shift, Scienti c choice, Research dynamics, Mean eld game. |
| Date: | 2011–05–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cepnwp:halshs-00590527&r=evo |
| By: | James Andreoni; Laura K. Gee |
| Abstract: | This paper compares two methods to encourage socially optimal provision of a public good. We compare the efficacy of vigilante justice, as represented by peer-to-peer punishment, to delegated policing, as represented by the “hired gun” mechanism, to deter free riding and improve group welfare. The “hired gun” mechanism (Andreoni and Gee, 2011) is an example of a low cost device that promotes complete compliances and minimal enforcement as the unique Nash equilibrium. We find that subjects are willing to pay to hire a delegated policing mechanism over 70% of the time, and that this mechanism increases welfare between 15% to 40%. Moreover, the lion’s share of the welfare gain comes because the hired gun crowds out vigilante peer-to-peer punishments. |
| JEL: | C72 C91 C92 D7 H41 |
| Date: | 2011–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17033&r=evo |
| By: | Schipper, Burkhard C. (University of CA, Davis) |
| Abstract: | Morris (1996, 1997) introduced preference-based definitions of knowledge of belief in standard state-space structures. This paper extends this preference-based approach to unawareness structures (Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper, 2006, 2008). By defining unawareness and knowledge in terms of preferences over acts in unawareness structures and showing their equivalence to the epistemic notions of unawareness and knowledge, we try to build a bridge between decision theory and epistemic logic. Unawareness of an event is behaviorally characterized as the event being null and its negation being null. |
| JEL: | C70 C72 D80 D82 |
| Date: | 2011–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:ucdeco:11-6&r=evo |
| By: | Elvire Guillaud (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne) |
| Abstract: | People's preferences for state intervention in social policies vary. A cross-section analysis on individual-level survey data is conducted here to highlight the link between the economic position of agents and their specific demand for redistribution. Controlling for a number of factors usually found to affect individual preferences in the literature, the egoistic motives for redistribution are taken seriously and this article focuses on the role played by the occupational status of individuals in shaping their preferences. Thus, the relative importance of economic factors in terms of current and expected gains is estimated, taking into account individuals' experience of social mobility and risk aversion. Furthermore, the research presented here identifies which socio-political groups may be formed on the basis of their preferences for redistribution. |
| Keywords: | Redistribution, occupation, social mobility, ordered logit regression. |
| JEL: | D31 D72 H23 |
| Date: | 2011–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mse:cesdoc:11030&r=evo |
| By: | Situngkir, Hokky |
| Abstract: | We discuss the way of hoax spreading as gossip and rumor throughout the social media, i.e.: Twitter, by observing an empirical case in Indonesia. We discuss the spreading factor of the gossip in the social media and see the epidemiology of the propagation hoax before and after the hoax being clarified in the conventional mass media. The discussions brought us to the open enrchiment analysis of the sociology of gossip and rumors within the online services like Twitter for future observation of human behavior. |
| Keywords: | social media; gossip; rumor; hoax; Twitter. |
| JEL: | D12 C02 R00 Z10 C90 C70 C42 C80 |
| Date: | 2011–05–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:30674&r=evo |
| By: | Glenn W. Harrison; J. Todd Swarthout |
| Abstract: | The most popular experimental method for eliciting time preferences involves subjects making choices over smaller, sooner amounts of money and larger, later amounts of money. Under some theoretically possible configurations of preferences and procedures, the discount rates inferred from these choices could lead to misleading inferences about time preferences for consumption. Using a direct empirical test, we show that those configurations of preferences are empirically implausible. |
| Date: | 2011–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:exc:wpaper:2011-09&r=evo |
| By: | Johannes Abeler (University of Nottingham); Armin Falk (University of Bonn); Lorenz Goette (University of Lausanne); David Huffman (Swarthmore College) |
| Abstract: | A key open question for theories of reference-dependent preferences is what determines the reference point. One candidate is expectations: what people expect could affect how they feel about what actually occurs. In a real-effort experiment, we manipulate the rational expectations of subjects and check whether this manipulation influences their effort provision. We find that effort provision is significantly different between treatments in the way predicted by models of expectation-based reference-dependent preferences: if expectations are high, subjects work longer and earn more money than if expectations are low. |
| Keywords: | Reference Points, Expectations, Loss Aversion, Disappointment, Experiment |
| JEL: | C91 D01 D84 J22 |
| Date: | 2011–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trf:wpaper:358&r=evo |