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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Martorana, Marco Ferdinando; Mazza, Isidoro |
| Abstract: | Dynamic models of learning and adaptation have provided realistic predictions in terms of voting behavior. This study aims at contributing to their scant empirical verification. We develop a learning algorithm based on bounded rationality estimating the pattern of learning process through a two-stage econometric model. The analysis links voting behavior to past choices and economic satisfaction derived from previous period election and state of the economy. This represents a novelty in the literature on voting that assumes given voter preferences. Results show that persistence is positively affected by the combination of income changes and past behavior and by union membership. |
| Keywords: | voting; bounded rationality; learning; political accountability |
| JEL: | C23 D72 C25 |
| Date: | 2010–12–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:29135&r=evo |
| By: | Schilirò, Daniele |
| Abstract: | The essay analyzes the decision process in economics and its relationship with the concept of rationality starting from the theory of rational choice, that is, a systemic approach based on the formal axiomatic method applied mainly in the microeconomic field, which has become the heart of neoclassical economics. The work also focuses on the important contribution of the cognitive economics to the concept of rationality and, consequently, of criticism that this theoretical approach moves to the standard economic theory in the definition of choices, indicating a systematic discrepancy between theory and empirical evidence. Moreover, the analysis puts forward the topic of rational expectations, as the rationality of expectations concerns the preferences, and also because the hypothesis of rational expectations has characterized the development of modern macroeconomics and influenced the issue of the efficient use of information by the economic agents. This work wants to highlight, using a very little formal language, the complexity of the choice process and the unsolved relationship between economic and psychological dimensions of such a process, but at the same time it wants to argue that the economic theory as a whole is far away today from an abstract conception perfectly rational and fully informed individuals which choose without making mistakes. |
| Keywords: | decisione; razionalità; incertezza; aspettative |
| JEL: | D84 D01 |
| Date: | 2011–03–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:29477&r=evo |
| By: | Aadland, David; Shaffer, Sherrill |
| Abstract: | Economists have generally ignored the notion that perceived time may differ from clock time. Borrowing from the behavioral psychology literature, we investigate the case of time compression whereby perceived time passes more quickly than actual time. A framework is presented to embed time compression in economic models. We then apply the principle to a standard lifecycle permanent income model with endogenous labor. Time compression provides an alternative explanation of why older individuals, even those without declining labor productivity, may choose to reduce their work effort. |
| Keywords: | Time Compression; Discounting; Lifecycle Permanent Income Model; Retirement |
| JEL: | D91 |
| Date: | 2010–10–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:29298&r=evo |
| By: | Carfì, David; Ricciardello, Angela |
| Abstract: | In this paper we define the canonical mixed extension of a decision form game. We motivate the necessity to introduce this concept and we show several examples about the new concept. In particular we focus our study upon the mixed equilibria of a finite decision form game. Many devel- opments appear possible for applications to economics, physics, medicine and biology in those cases for which the systems involved do not have natural utility functions but are only capable to react versus the external actions. |
| Keywords: | Decision form game; mixed extension. |
| JEL: | C79 C02 C7 C73 C72 |
| Date: | 2011–02–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:28971&r=evo |
| By: | Aadland, David; Finnoff, David; Huang, Kevin X.D. |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we investigate the nature of rational expectations equilibria for economic epidemiological models. Unlike mathematical epidemiological models, economic epidemiological models can produce regions of indeterminacy or instability around the endemic steady state. We consider SI, SIS, SIR and SIRS versions of economic compartmental models and show how well-intentioned public policy may contribute to disease instability and uncertainty. |
| Keywords: | economic epidemiology; equilibria; dynamics; disease; indeterminacy; rational expectations |
| JEL: | D1 I1 |
| Date: | 2011–01–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:29299&r=evo |
| By: | H. Eika, Kari (Ministry of Health and Care Services) |
| Abstract: | This experimental study asks whether generosity decreases emotional distance, a question pertinent to human service quality. Highly vulnerable service recipients may not enforce quality standards. Quality can then be viewed as an act of generosity, a gift from the provider to the recipient. For a human service provider that sympathizes with the recipient, delivering poor quality is psychologically costly. To reduce this cost she may increase emotional distance. Since human service quality presupposes social interaction and involvement, quality is reduced further. The mechanism – which can account for vicious and virtuous circles in the provision of quality – is explored in a binary dictator game where the recipients pay-off is uncertain. The dictator decides whether to know the recipients pay-off and how. Subjects are more eager to inquire about their recipients pay-off when they themselves have been generous, and to do so by contacting the recipient when the recipient correctly perceives that action to be kind. |
| Keywords: | human services; emotional distance; cognitive dissonance; generosity; dictator game |
| JEL: | C90 D23 D64 I11 I21 |
| Date: | 2010–07–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:osloec:2011_006&r=evo |
| By: | Carl-Johan Dalgaard (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen); Holger Strulik (University of Hannover) |
| Abstract: | The present study examines whether the Preston curve reflects a causal impact of income on longevity or, for example, factors correlated with both income and life expectancy. In order to understand the Preston curve better, we develop a model of optimal intertemporal consumption in which the representative consumer is subject to physiological aging. In modeling aging we draw on recent research in the fields of biology and medicine. The speed of the aging process, and thus the time of death, are endogenously determined by optimal health investments. We calibrate the model to US data and proceed to show that the model accounts for nearly 80% of the cross-country differences in life expectancy that the Preston curve captures. |
| Keywords: | aging; longevity; health investments; savings; Preston curve |
| JEL: | D91 J17 J26 I12 |
| Date: | 2010–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kud:kuiedp:1109&r=evo |