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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Chatterjee, Sidharta |
| Abstract: | In this paper, I seek to understand the behavioral basis of higher organizational learning and adaption as a teleological dynamic equilibrium process to decipher the underlying psycho-physiological aspects of individual cognitive learning related to organizational adaption. Dynamics of cognitive learning has some differential paths within the neural circuitry which follows certain patterns that leads to individual as well as organized evolution in course of a learning process. I undertake a comparative analysis of human cognitive and behavioral changes and the active mechanisms underlying animal behavior and learning processes to understand the differential patterns of these adaptive changes in these two species. Cognitive behavioral learning processes have certain economic perspectives which help an individual to attain efficiency in workplace adaptation and in learning which however, the individual when being part of an alliance, ember positive influence on the society or organization as a whole. Comparatively, in primates, I review some empirical evidences drawn from chronological studies about cognitive behavioral learning process and adaptation as well as the presence of the capacity of making attributions about mental states, which exists in rudimentary form in chimpanzees and apes. Following this, I apply the outcomes of the findings on different aspects of human cognitive and adaptive behavioral learning-induced evolutionary changes and how human beings are able to exploit the presence of these additive advantages under cluster settings. |
| Keywords: | Animal behavior; cognitive economics; motivational energy; neural adaptation; neuroscience; Organizational learning; organizational adaptation; teleological process |
| JEL: | D23 Z1 D83 M54 M51 J2 D87 |
| Date: | 2010–12–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:27365&r=evo |
| By: | Frederik Carlsson (Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg); Mitesh Kataria (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Jena); Elina Lampi (Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg); M. Vittoria Levati (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Jena) |
| Abstract: | We augment a standard dictator game to investigate how preferences for an environmental project relate to willingness to limit others' choices. We explore this issue by distinguishing three student groups: economists, environmental economists, and environmental social scientists. We find that people are generally disposed to grant freedom of choice, but only within certain limits. In addition, our results are in line with the widely held belief that economists are more selfish than other people. Yet, against the notion of consumer sovereignty, economists are not less likely to restrict others' choices and impose restrictions closer to their own preferences than the other student groups. |
| Keywords: | dictator game, charitable giving, social preferences, paternalism |
| JEL: | C92 D64 |
| Date: | 2010–12–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2010-089&r=evo |
| By: | Ioannou, Christos A; Nompelis, Ioannis |
| Abstract: | A model of adaptive learning and innovation is used to simulate the evolution of finite automata in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma stage-game. The automata are prone to two types of errors: (a) implementation errors and (b) perception errors. The computational experiments incorporate different levels of errors in an effort to assess whether and how the distribution of outcomes and structures in the population changes. Under the proposed framework, the incorporation of implementation and perception errors is sufficient to reduce cooperative outcomes. In addition, the study identifies a threshold error-level. At and above the threshold error-level, the prevailing structures converge to the open-loop (history-independent) automaton Always-Defect. On the other hand, below the threshold, the prevailing structures are closed-loop (history-dependent) and diverse. The diversity thus impedes our inferential projections on the superiority of a particular automaton. Yet, the analysis still identifies some broad characteristics of the automata that work "reasonably well" in such environments. In particular, the complexity of the automata is decreasing in the probability of errors. Furthermore, the prevailing structures tend to exhibit low reciprocal cooperation and low tolerance to defections. These results show that the evolution of cooperative automata is considerably weaker than expected; and the change in the model is ecologically plausible: errors are common in strategic situations. <br><br> Keywords; Automata, Repeated Games, PrisonerÂ’s Dilemma, Bounded Rationality, Algorithms. <br><br> JEL Classification: C72, C80, C90 |
| Date: | 2010–12–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:stn:sotoec:1019&r=evo |
| By: | Marco Caliendo; Frank Fossen; Alexander Kritikos |
| Abstract: | Experimental evidence reveals that there is a strong willingness to trust and to act in both positively and negatively reciprocal ways. So far it is rarely analyzed whether these variables of social cognition influence everyday decision making behavior. We focus on entrepreneurs who are permanently facing exchange processes in the interplay with investors, sellers, and buyers, as well as needing to trust others and reciprocate with their network. We base our analysis on the German Socio-Economic Panel and recently introduced questions about trust, positive reciprocity, and negative reciprocity to examine the extent that these variables influence the entrepreneurial decision processes. More specifically, we analyze whether i) the willingness to trust other people influences the probability of starting a business; ii) trust, positive reciprocity, and negative reciprocity influence the exit probability of entrepreneurs; and iii) willingness to trust and to act reciprocally influences the probability of being an entrepreneur versus an employee or a manager. Our findings reveal that, in particular, trust impacts entrepreneurial development. Interestingly, entrepreneurs are more trustful than employees, but much less trustful than managers. |
| Keywords: | Entrepreneurship, trust, reciprocity |
| JEL: | D81 J23 M13 L26 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp1085&r=evo |
| By: | Schuster, Stephan |
| Abstract: | In this paper, a reinforcement learning version of the connections game first analysed by Jackson and Wolinsky is presented and compared with benchmark results of fully informed and rational players. Using an agent-based simulation approach, the main nding is that the pattern of reinforcement learning process is similar, but does not fully converge to the benchmark results. Before these optimal results can be discovered in a learning process, agents often get locked in a state of random switching or early lock-in. |
| Keywords: | agent-based computational economics; strategic network formation; network games; reinforcement learning |
| JEL: | C63 D85 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:27388&r=evo |
| By: | Maria Vittoria Levati (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena); Topi Miettinen (Aalto School of Economics, Alto); Birendra K. Rai (Monash Univeristy, Clayton) |
| Abstract: | The existing literature acknowledges that a mismatch between the experimenter's and the subjects' models of an experimental task can adversely affect the interpretation of data from laboratory experiments. We discuss why the two common experimental designs (between-subjects and within-subjects) used to conduct experiments may fail to sufficiently account for this concern. An alternative design for laboratory experiments is proposed which may alleviate this concern especially in studies of social preferences. The proposed design is used to answer some questions that have attracted continued attention in the literature on social preferences in general and reciprocity in particular. |
| Keywords: | Experimental design, Context, Trust game |
| JEL: | C70 C90 D63 D64 |
| Date: | 2010–12–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2010-090&r=evo |
| By: | Breitmoser, Yves; Tan, Jonathan H.W. |
| Abstract: | Are "generous" bargaining offers made out of fairness or in fear of rejection? We disentangle risk and social references by analyzing experimental behavior in three majority bargaining games: (1) a random-proposer game with infinite time horizon; 2) a one round proposer game with disagreement payoffs equal to the infinite horizon continuation payoffs; and, (3) a demand commitment game. Inequity aversion predicts very differently across these games, but risk aversion does not. Observed strategies violate neither stationarity nor truncation consistency. This allows us to use structural models of bargaining behavior to estimate the latent type shares of subjects with CES, inequity averse, and Prospect theoretic preferences. The Prospect theoretic, i.e. reference-dependent, model of utility explains the observations far better than any mixture of alternative models. |
| Keywords: | coalitional bargaining; non-cooperative modeling; random utility model; quantal response equilibrium; laboratory experiment |
| JEL: | C78 D78 C72 |
| Date: | 2010–12–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:27444&r=evo |
| By: | Agnes Bäker (Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen); Werner Güth (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group); Kerstin Pull (Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen); M. Stadler (Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen) |
| Abstract: | In generosity games, one agreement payoff is exogenously given, whereas the other is endogenously determined by the proposer's choice of the "pie" size. This has been shown to induce pie choices which are either efficiency or equality seeking. In our experiment, before playing the generosity game, participants are asked to buy their role via a random price mechanism. This should entitle them to exploit the chances which their role provides and at the same time avoid the selection bias of competitive auctions. We find that entitlement crowds out equality seeking and strengthens efficiency seeking. Interpreting participants' willingness to pay as an aspiration level of how much they want to earn, our design further allows us to test for satisficing behavior. Indeed, we find evidence for satisficing behavior in the data. |
| Keywords: | Entitlement, Generosity Game, Efficiency Seeking, Inequity Aversion, Satisficing |
| JEL: | C7 C91 |
| Date: | 2010–12–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2010-091&r=evo |
| By: | Katheline Schubert (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris); Emmanuelle Augeraud-Véron (MIA - Mathématiques, Image et Applications - Université de La Rochelle : EA3165); Hippolyte D'Albis (Toulouse School of Economics - Toulouse School of Economics, LERNA - Economie des Ressources Naturelles - INRA : UR1081 - CEA : DPG - Université des Sciences Sociales - Toulouse I) |
| Abstract: | In this article, we study the joint dynamics of the demography and the economy. We explore how economic conditions affect fertility choices, and in return how the population growth rate affects both financial and labor markets. Our main contribution is to consider a realistic demographic setup that allows characterizing the age at which individuals decide to give birth to their children. In such a framework, we aim at studying the existence of an equilibrium. We notably prove there exists a monetary steady state if the average age of consumers is greater than the average age of producers. |
| Keywords: | Demographic economics; fertility choices; monetary equilibrium |
| Date: | 2010–12–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00547274_v1&r=evo |
| By: | D'Exelle, Ben (University of East Anglia); Riedl, Arno (Maastricht University) |
| Abstract: | We explore network effects on generosity for different network dimensions. To this end we elicit multiple network dimensions (friendship, social support, economic exchange, etc.) in a rural village in the Southern hemisphere and measure generosity with a sequence of dictator games conducted in the field. We find that networks of different dimensions differ substantially in density, clustering, and centrality. When relating generosity to networks we observe that social distance only matters for friendship ties but that structural network variables are important in all network dimensions. Importantly, these effects are not invariant across different network dimensions. We also find that individual characteristics are unrelated with generosity per se but that they have strong explanatory power for network formation. |
| Keywords: | networks, generosity, network formation, experiments |
| JEL: | C72 C90 D64 L14 Z13 |
| Date: | 2010–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5356&r=evo |
| By: | Thomas DEMUYNCK |
| Abstract: | This research examines the computational complexity of two boundedly rational choice models that use multiple rationales to explain observed choice behavior. First, we show that the notion of rationalizability by K rationales as introduced by Kalai, Rubinstein, and Spiegler (2002) is NP-complete for K greater or equal to two. Second, we show that the question of sequential rationalizability by K rationales, introduced by Manzini and Mariotti (2007), is NP-complete for K greater or equal to three if choices are single valued, and that it is NP-complete for K greater or equal to one if we allow for multi-valued choice correspondences. Motivated by these results, we present two binary integer feasibility programs that characterize the two boundedly rational choice models and we compute their power. Finally, by using results from descriptive complexity theory, we explain why it has been so difficult to obtain `nice' characterizations for these models. |
| Date: | 2010–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ete:ceswps:ces10.23&r=evo |
| By: | Schoonbroodt, Alice; Tertilt, Michele |
| Abstract: | Is there an economic rationale for pronatalist policies? We propose and analyze a particular market failure that leads to inefficiently low fertility in equilibrium. The friction is caused by the lack of ownership of children: if parents have no claim on their children’s income, the private benefit from producing a child can be smaller than the social benefit. We analyze an overlapping-generations model with fertility choice and parental altruism. Ownership is modeled as a minimum constraint on transfers from parents to children. Using the efficiency concepts proposed in Golosov, Jones, and Tertilt (2007), we find that whenever the transfer floor is binding, fertility choices are inefficient. Second, we show that the usual conditions for efficiency are not sufficient in this context. Third, in contrast to settings with exogenous fertility, a PAYG social security system cannot be used to implement efficient allocations. To achieve an efficient outcome, government transfers need to be tied to fertility choice. <br><br> Keywords; Overlapping generations, Fertility, Efficiency <br><br> JEL Classification: D6, E1, H55, J13 |
| Date: | 2010–12–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:stn:sotoec:1020&r=evo |
| By: | Rowthorn, Robert; Seabright, Paul |
| Abstract: | This paper explains the multiple adoption of agriculture around ten thousand years ago, in spite of the fact that the first farmers suffered worse health and nutrition than their hunter gatherer predecessors. If output is harder for farmers to defend, adoption may entail increased defense investments, and equilibrium consumption levels may decline as agricultural productivity increases over a signi ficant range, before eventually increasing thereafter. Agricultural adoption may have been a prisoners' dilemma in that adoption was individually attractive even though all groups would have been better off committing not to adopt while the initial productivity advantage of agriculture remained low. |
| Keywords: | agriculture, defense, property rights, contest functions, Neolithic transition |
| JEL: | D74 N30 N40 O12 O40 Q10 |
| Date: | 2010–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ide:wpaper:23850&r=evo |