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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Michèle Belot; Raymond Duch (Centre for Experimental Social Sciences, Nuffield College, University of Oxford); Luis Miller |
| Abstract: | This study compares the behavior of students and non-students in a number of classic experimental games. We find that students are more likely to behave as homo-economicus agents than non-students in games involving other-regarding preferences (Dictator Game, Trust Game and Public Good Game). These differences persist even when controlling for demographics, cognitive ability and risk preferences. In games that do not engage other-regarding preferences (Beauty-contest and Second-price Auction) there is limited evidence of differences in behaviour between subject pools. In none of the five games is there evidence of significant differences in comprehension between students and non-students. Within subject analyses indicate that students are highly consistent in their other-regarding preferences while non-student subjects are inconsistent across other-regarding games. Our findings suggest that experiments using students will provide a lower bound estimate of other-regardedness in the general population while exaggerating the stability of other-regarding preferences. |
| Keywords: | lab experiments, convenience samples, other-regarding preferences, consistency |
| JEL: | C72 C81 C91 |
| Date: | 2010–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cex:dpaper:2010001&r=evo |
| By: | Garapin, A.; Llerena, D.; Hollard, M. |
| Abstract: | In this paper we examine the question of wether a collective activity can influence cooperation in a subsequent repeated one shot prisoner's dilemma (PD) game. We conduct two series of experiments. The first consists of control experiments in which 30 periods of a PD game are played, with a random re-matching of the pairs in every period. In a second series of experiments, subjects first play a donation game and then the PD game. In the donation game they collectively discuss the amount of a donation to a given charity, before putting the question to an individual and anonymous vote. Cooperation levels in the PD games preceded by the donation game are signficantly lower than those observed in the control experiment. |
| Keywords: | DONATION;COOPERATION;DEFECTION;REPEATED ONE SHOT PRISONER'S DILEMMA;EXPERIMENT |
| JEL: | C72 C91 C92 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gbl:wpaper:201007&r=evo |
| By: | Jackie Krafft (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - CNRS : UMR6227 - Université de Nice Sophia-Antipolis); Francesco Quatraro (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - CNRS : UMR6227 - Université de Nice Sophia-Antipolis, Department of Economics, University of Turin - University of Turin); Pier-Paolo Saviotti (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - CNRS : UMR6227 - Université de Nice Sophia-Antipolis, GAEL - Grenoble Applied Economic laboratory - Aucune) |
| Abstract: | This paper applies the methodological tools typical of social network analysis (SNA) within an evolutionary framework, to investigate the knowledge base dynamics of the biotechnology sector. Knowledge is here considered a collective good represented as a co-relational and a retrieval-interpretative structure. The internal structure of knowledge is described as a network the nodes of which are small units within traces of knowledge, such as patent documents, connected by links determined by their joint utilisation. We used measures referring to the network, like density, and to its nodes, like degree, closeness and betweenness centrality, to provide a synthetic description of the structure of the knowledge base and of its evolution over time. Eventually, we compared such measures with more established properties of the knowledge base calculated on the basis of co-occurrences of technological classes within patent documents. Empirical results show the existence of interesting and meaningful relationships across the different measures, providing support for the use of SNA to study the evolution of the knowledge bases of industrial sectors and their lifecycles. |
| Keywords: | Knowledge Base, Social Network Analysis, Variety, Coherence, Industry lifecycles; exploration/exploitation |
| Date: | 2010–11–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00539002_v1&r=evo |
| By: | Grönqvist, Erik (IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation); Öckert, Björn (FAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation); Vlachos, Jonas (Department of Economics, Stockholm University) |
| Abstract: | We study the intergenerational transmission of cognitive and non-cognitive abilities between parents and sons using population-wide enlistment data. Conscripts are eva-luated at the same age and with comparable methods across cohorts, and we correct for measurement error bias in fathers’ ability measures by using their brothers’ abilities as instruments. The “uncle instrument” is supported by a host of validity tests. This strat-egy also enables us to predict mothers’ abilities. Our results suggest that previous esti-mates of intergenerational ability correlations are biased downwards; in particular for non-cognitive skills. When this bias is corrected for the non-cognitive correlation is close to that of cognitive abilities. Using predicted abilities, we further find the mother-son cognitive ability correlation to be stronger than the father-son correlation. Finally, educational attainment and labor market outcomes of both sons and daughters are found to be strongly related to both parents’ cognitive and non-cognitive abilities. |
| Keywords: | Intergenerational ability correlations; cognitive ability; non-cognitive ability; measurement error bias |
| JEL: | J13 J24 |
| Date: | 2010–11–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:ifauwp:2010_012&r=evo |