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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Massimiliano Landi (School of Economics, Singapore Management University); Mauro Sodini (Dipartimento di Statistica e Matematica Applicata all'Economia, Universita degli Studi di Pisa) |
| Abstract: | We propose an evolutionary analysis of a voting game where citizens have a preference for conformism that adds to the instrumental preference for the electoral outcome. Multiple equilibria arise, and some generate high turnout. Simulations of best response dynamics show that high turnout is asymptotically stable if conformism matters but its likelihood depends on the reference group for conformism: high turnout is more likely when voters care about their own group's choice, as this better overrides the free rider problem of voting games. Comparative statics on the voting cost distribution, the population's size or the groups' composition are also done. |
| Keywords: | Turnout, Turnout, coordination games, Poisson games, conformism, selection dynamics. |
| JEL: | D72 C72 C73 |
| Date: | 2010–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:siu:wpaper:25-2010&r=evo |
| By: | Jack Vromen |
| Abstract: | Inspired by Peter Godfrey-Smith’s book Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection (2009), the paper seeks to develop a view on Darwinizing evolutionary economics that differs from the view espoused in Hodgson and Knudsen project of Generalized Darwinism. It is argued that on Hodgson and Knudsen’s view "Darwinism" is understood on such a high level of abstraction and generality that it is emptied from virtually all content and substance. Only on the basis of a very abstract, general and broad understanding of the Darwinian principles of variation, selection and replication can Hodgson and Knudsen’s claim be defended that any acceptable explanation must invoke the three Darwinian principles. The price they have to pay for this, however, is that the Darwinian principles provide little, if any, heuristic guidance to further theory construction. By contrast, on the alternative view developed in the paper "Darwinism" has a definite content. On the alternative view not all economic processes are Darwinian in kind: some economic processes appear as paradigmatically Darwinian, others only as minimally Darwinian and yet others as not Darwinian at all. |
| Keywords: | Length 24 pages |
| Date: | 2010–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esi:evopap:2010-15&r=evo |
| By: | James Andreoni (University of California - San Diego); William T. Harbaugh (University of Oregon) |
| Abstract: | Experimental work on preferences over risk has typically considered choices over a small number of discrete options, some of which involve no risk. Such experiments often demonstrate contradictions of standard expected utility theory. We reconsider this literature with a new preference elicitation device that allows a continuous choice space over only risky options. Our analysis assumes only that preferences depend on the probability p and prize x; U = u(p; x): We then allow subjects to choose p and x continuously on a linear budget constraint, r1p + r2x = m, so that all prospects with a nonzero expected value are risky. We test five of the most importantly debated questions about risk preferences: rationality, prospect theory asymmetry, the independence axiom, probability weighting, and constant relative risk aversion. Overall, we find that the expected utility model does unexpectedly well. |
| Keywords: | expected utility |
| Date: | 2010–09–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ore:uoecwp:2010-14&r=evo |