|
on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Bruno S. Frey (University of Basel) |
| Abstract: | Over the last decades, empirical research on subjective well-being in the social<br />sciences has provided a major new stimulus to the discourse on individual happiness.<br />Recently this research has also been linked to economics where reported subjective wellbeing<br />is often taken as a proxy measure for individual welfare. In our review, we intend to<br />provide an evaluation of where the economic research on happiness stands and of three<br />directions it might develop. First, it offers new ways for testing the basic assumptions of the<br />economic approach and for going about a new understanding of utility. Second, it provides a<br />new possibility for the complementary testing of theories across fields in economics. Third,<br />we inquire how the insights gained from the study of individual happiness in economics affect<br />public policy.<br />Keywords: Economics, happiness, life satisfaction, survey data, income, public goods,<br />unemployment<br />JEL Classifications: A10, D60, H41, I31 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bsl:wpaper:04/10&r=evo |
| By: | Martin Dufwenberg; Simon Gaechter; Heike Hennig-Schmidt |
| Abstract: | Psychological game theory can provide rational-choice-based framing effects; frames influence beliefs, beliefs influence motivations. We explain this theoretically and explore empirical relevance experimentally. In a 2×2 design of one-shot public good games we show that frames affect subject’s first- and second-order beliefs, and contributions. From a psychological gametheoretic framework we derive two mutually compatible hypotheses about guilt aversion and reciprocity under which contributions are related to second- and first-order beliefs, respectively. Our results are consistent with either. |
| Keywords: | framing, psychological game theory, guilt aversion, reciprocity, public good games, voluntary cooperation |
| JEL: | C91 C72 D64 Z13 |
| Date: | 2010–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse15_2010&r=evo |
| By: | Anja Dettmann (Department of Geography, Philipps University Marburg); Thomas Brenner (Department of Geography, Philipps University Marburg) |
| Abstract: | Spatial proximity is assumed in the literature to be a prerequisite and trigger for cooperation and, subsequently, innovation. This paper examines conceptually the role of proximity between actors for cooperation activities. Using theories and findings from social psychology and combining them with geographical issues, it provides new insights into the emergence and development of professional collaborative relationships and the role that spatial proximity plays. Thereby the paper stays on the level of individuals (micro-level) and explains how the willingness to collaborate emerges and how local partner priorities are developed. |
| Keywords: | Collaboration, Partner Choice, Proximity, Innovation, Geography |
| JEL: | L14 O32 R10 |
| Date: | 2010–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pum:wpaper:2010-03&r=evo |
| By: | Stringham, Edward |
| Abstract: | Question 1 begins by discussing an area of subjectivism where most economists agree: Is economic value subjective? This area differentiates most modern economists from classical economists and many non-economists. Question 2 probes an area where many but not all economists agree: Are costs subjective? This area differentiates many Austrian and certain neoclassical economists from orthodox neoclassical economists following Alfred Marshall’s tradition. Questions 3, 4, 5, and 6 discuss areas where even fewer still economists agree: Can we survey people’s subjective preferences? Can we measure an individual’s utility? Can we compare utility between individuals? Can we aggregate the utility of many people? For these questions one can find Austrian and neoclassical economists on both sides of the debate. Questions 7, 8, 9, and 10 look at alternative approaches to making welfare comparisons between nations that do not purport to depend on measuring subjective utility, such as looking at per capita income, migration patterns, society-wide cost-benefit analysis with dollars as the unit of measurement, and a demonstrated preference Pareto rule. Where one stands on these issues depends on how far one is willing to extend the logic of economic subjectivism. And where one stands on questions of economic subjectivism has an important influence on how one analyzes the world and what policies one recommends. |
| Keywords: | welfare economics; economic efficiency; economic subjectivism |
| JEL: | D60 B53 B41 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:25384&r=evo |
| By: | Daniel Houser (George Mason University); Stefan Vetter (University of Munich); Joachim Winter (University of Munich) |
| Abstract: | We present evidence from a laboratory experiment showing that individuals who believe they were treated unfairly in an interaction with another person are more likely to cheat in a subsequent unrelated game. Specifically, subjects first participated in a dictator game. They then flipped a coin in private and reported the outcome. Subjects could increase their total payoff by cheating, i.e., lying about the outcome of the coin toss. We found that subjects were more likely to cheat in reporting the outcome of the coin flip when: 1) they received either nothing or a very small transfer from the dictator; and 2) they claimed to have been treated unfairly. This is consistent with the view that experiencing a norm violation is sufficient to justify the violation of another norm at the expense of a third party. This result extends the growing literature on social norms. |
| Keywords: | cheating; social norms; experimental design |
| JEL: | C91 D63 |
| Date: | 2010–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trf:wpaper:335&r=evo |
| By: | Woolcock, Michael; Szreter, Simon; Rao, Vijayendra |
| Abstract: | The consensus among scholars and policymakers that"institutions matter"for development has led inexorably to a conclusion that"history matters,"since institutions clearlyform and evolve over time. Unfortunately, however, the next logical step has not yet been taken, which is to recognize that historians (and not only economic historians) might also have useful and distinctive insights to offer. This paper endeavors to open and sustain a constructive dialogue between history -- understood as both"the past"and"the discipline"-- and development policy by (a) clarifying what the craft of historical scholarship entails, especially as it pertains to understanding causal mechanisms, contexts, and complex processes of institutional change; (b) providing examples of historical research that support, qualify, or challenge the most influential research (by economists and economic historians) in contemporary development policy; and (c) offering some general principles and specific implications that historians, on the basis of the distinctive content and method of their research, bring to development policy debates. |
| Keywords: | Cultural Policy,Economic Theory&Research,Population Policies,Cultural Heritage&Preservation,Development Economics&Aid Effectiveness |
| Date: | 2010–09–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:5425&r=evo |
| By: | Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky |
| Abstract: | The Type Indeterminacy model is a theoretical framework that uses some elements of quantum formalism to model the constructive preference perspective suggested by Kahneman and Tversky. In this paper we extend the TI-model from simple to strategic decision-making and show that TI-games open a new field of strategic interaction. We first establish an equivalence result between static games of incomplete information and static TI-games. We next develop a new solution concept for non-commuting dynamic TI-games. The updating rule captures the novelty brought about by Type Indeterminacy namely that in addition to affecting information and payoffs, the action of a player impacts on the profile of types. We provide an example showing that TI-game predictions cannot be obtained as Bayes Nash equilibrium of the corresponding classical game. |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pse:psecon:2010-20&r=evo |
| By: | Piet Keizer |
| Abstract: | Orthodox economics focuses on the analysis of the way the economic force or motivation operates, thereby abstracting from the functioning of other primary forces or motivations, such as the social and the psychic motivation. By assuming perfect rationality psychic problems are ignored. This text discusses six approaches in psychology . cognitive, behaviourist, biological, psychodynamic, humanistic and social psychology - to find out what orthodox economics needs in order to extend its analysis with the more realistic idea of imperfect rationality. In this discussion the state of the art of behavioural economics in included. |
| Keywords: | orthodox economics, psychology, behavioural economics, imperfect rationality |
| JEL: | A11 A12 B13 B41 |
| Date: | 2010–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:use:tkiwps:1017&r=evo |
| By: | Joel Carton (Department of Economics, Florida International University); Eran A. Guse (Department of Economics, West Virginia University) |
| Abstract: | We investigate the stability properties of Muth's model of price movements when agents choose a production level using replicator dynamic learning. It turns out that when there is a discrete set of possible production levels, possible stable states and stability conditions differ between adaptive learning and replicator dynamic learning. Furthermore, we show that the stability disparities between the two types of learning are due to the way asymptotic stability is defined under the replicator dynamics. |
| Keywords: | Asymptotic stability, replicator dynamics, cobweb model, E-stability, Nash equilibria. |
| JEL: | C62 C73 D83 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wvu:wpaper:10-18&r=evo |
| By: | Franco Ruzzenenti; Diego Garlaschelli; Riccardo Basosi |
| Abstract: | We exploit the symmetry concepts developed in the companion review of this article to introduce a stochastic version of link reversal symmetry, which leads to an improved understanding of the reciprocity of directed networks. We apply our formalism to the international trade network and show that a strong embedding in economic space determines particular symmetries of the network, while the observed evolution of reciprocity is consistent with a symmetry breaking taking place in production space. Our results show that networks can be strongly affected by symmetry-breaking phenomena occurring in embedding spaces, and that stochastic network symmetries can successfully suggest, or rule out, possible underlying mechanisms. |
| Date: | 2010–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1009.4489&r=evo |
| By: | Kirsten Häger (School of Economics and Business Administration, Friedrich Schiller University Jena) |
| Abstract: | Envy and altruism have been studied extensively in adults. Here, we report data from an experiment studying envious and altruistic behavior in children. We study a sample of German school children aged seven to ten in a natural setting. We run two treatments. One treatment investigates envy, the other one studies altruism. Additionally, we collect data on the children's cognitive and social skills, and on their socio-demographic background. Controlling for these factors, we find that older children are significantly more altruistic. Boys care more about their relative position than girls. Socio-demographic information have limited predictive power in both treatments. |
| Keywords: | artefactual field experiment, children, envy, altruism |
| JEL: | C91 C99 |
| Date: | 2010–09–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2010-063&r=evo |