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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Smith, John |
| Abstract: | We interpret the social identity literature and examine its economic implications. We model a population of agents from two exogenous and well defined social groups. Agents are randomly matched to play a reduced form bargaining game. We show that this struggle for resources drives a conflict through the rational destruction of surplus. We assume that the population contains both unbiased and biased players. Biased players aggressively discriminate against members of the other social group. The existence and specification of the biased player is motivated by the social identity literature. For unbiased players, group membership has no payoff relevant consequences. We show that the unbiased players can contribute to the conflict by aggressively discriminating and that this behavior is consistent with existing empirical evidence. |
| Keywords: | social identity theory; social fragmentation |
| JEL: | L14 D74 C72 |
| Date: | 2010–06–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:23336&r=evo |
| By: | Jason Potts; John Foster; Anna Straton (School of Economics, The University of Queensland) |
| Abstract: | A basic tenet of ecological economics is that economic growth and development are ultimately constrained by environmental carrying capacities. It is from this basis that notions of a sustainable economy and of sustainable economic development emerge to undergird the ‘standard model’ of ecological economics. However, the belief in ‘hard’ environmental constraints may be obscuring the important role of the entrepreneur in the coevolution of economic and environmental relations, and hence limiting or distorting the analytic focus of ecological economics and the range of policy options that are considered for sustainable economic development. This paper outlines a co-evolutionary model of the dynamics of economic and ecological systems as connected by entrepreneurial behaviour. We then discuss some of the key analytic and policy implications. |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qld:uq2004:409&r=evo |
| By: | Harmsen - van Hout, Marjolein J.W. (E.ON Energy Research Center, Future Energy Consumer Needs and Behavior (FCN)); Dellaert, Benedict G.C. (Department of Business Economics / Marketing Section, Erasmus School of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam); Herings, P. Jean-Jacques (Department of Economics, School of Business and Economics, Maastricht University) |
| Abstract: | Network formation constitutes an important part of many social and economic processes, but relatively little is known about how individuals make their linking decisions in networks. This article provides an experimental investigation of behavioral effects in individual decisions of network formation. Our findings demonstrate that the inherent complexity of the network setting makes individuals’ choices systematically less payoff-guided and also strongly reduces their social orientation. Furthermore, we show that specific network complexity features aggravate the former effect. These behavioral effects have important implications for researchers and managers working in areas that involve network formation. |
| Keywords: | network formation; individual decision making; behavioral effects; network complexity; payoff orientation; social preferences; choice experiments; mixed logit |
| JEL: | A14 C91 D85 |
| Date: | 2010–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:fcnwpa:2010_005&r=evo |
| By: | Tsoukis, Chrsitopher; Tournemaine, Frederic |
| Abstract: | Standard growth theory is based on atomistic agents with no strategic interactions among them. In contrast, we model growth as resulting from a one-off, strategic game between workers and owners of capital (capitalists) on factor shares, in an otherwise standard AK growth model. The resulting distribution of income between factors further determines the marginal revenue product of capital and the rate of growth. We analyse the properties of four equilibria: competitive, Stackelberg equilibrium, a hybrid non-cooperative regime, and cooperative (Nash) solution. We show that our model provides a potentially richer view of the growth process than comparable models, and endogenises a key aspect of the social contract. |
| Keywords: | social conflict; factor shares; growth; catching up with the Joneses |
| JEL: | O41 E25 E22 |
| Date: | 2010–06–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:23365&r=evo |
| By: | Paola Manzini; Marco Mariotti |
| Abstract: | We study a psychologically based foundation for choice errors. The decision maker applies a preference ranking after forming a ?consideration set?prior to choosing an alternative. Membership of the consideration set is determined both by the alternative speci?c salience and by the rationality of the agent (his general propensity to consider all alternatives). The model turns out to include a logit formulation as a special case. In general, it has a rich set of implications both for exogenous parameters and for a situation in which alternatives can a¤ect their own salience (salience games). Such implications are relevant to assess the link between ?revealed? preferences and ?true?preferences: for example, less rational agents may paradoxically express their preference through choice more truthfully than more rational agents. |
| Keywords: | religiosity, life expectancy, church attendance |
| JEL: | D01 |
| Date: | 2010–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:san:wpecon:1003&r=evo |
| By: | Growiec, Katarzyna; Growiec, Jakub |
| Abstract: | This paper provides evidence that bridging and bonding social capital as well as social trust may interdependently affect individuals' earnings and subjective well-being. Based on cross-sectional World Values Survey 2000 data on individuals from Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs), we show that majority of citizens of these countries seem to fall in a "low trust trap" where deficits of bridging social capital and trust reinforce each other in lowering individuals' incomes and well-being. Apart from gradual modernization and economic growth, also increases in labor market participation can be perceived as a potential way out of this "trap", because employed people in CEECs tend to have statistically significantly more bridging social capital and more trust. We discuss our empirical results by providing an assessment of their robustness, and pointing out the high risk of endogeneity and omitted variables bias, often overlooked in earlier studies. |
| Keywords: | bridging social capital; bonding social capital; social trust; CEE countries; earnings; subjective well-being |
| JEL: | D10 J20 |
| Date: | 2010–06–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:23350&r=evo |