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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Ardia, David; Boudt, Kris; Carl, Peter; Mullen, Katharine M.; Peterson, Brian |
| Abstract: | The R package DEoptim implements the differential evolution algorithm. This algorithm is an evolutionary technique similar to genetic algorithms that is useful for the solution of global optimization problems. In this note we provide an introduction to the package and demonstrate its utility for financial applications by solving a non-convex portfolio optimization problem. |
| Keywords: | Differential optimization; non-convex portfolio optimization; DEoptim; R software |
| JEL: | G1 G11 C61 |
| Date: | 2010–04–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:22135&r=evo |
| By: | Guererk, Oezguer; Rockenbach, Bettina; Wolff, Irenaeus |
| Abstract: | Considerable experimental evidence shows that although costly peer-punishment enhances cooperation in repeated public-good games, heavy punishment in early rounds leads to average period payoffs below the non-cooperative equilibrium benchmark. In an environment where past payoffs determine present contribution capabilities, this could be devastating. Groups could fall prey to a poverty trap or, to avoid this, abstain from punishment altogether. We show that neither is the case generally. By continuously contributing larger fractions of their wealth, groups with punishment possibilities exhibit increasing wealth increments, while increments fall when punishment possibilities are absent. Nonetheless, single groups do succumb to the above-mentioned hazards. |
| Keywords: | Public good; Dynamic game; Punishment; Endowment endogeneity; Poverty-trap; Experiment |
| JEL: | H41 C91 C73 |
| Date: | 2010–03–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:22097&r=evo |
| By: | Luigi Guiso; Paola Sapienza; Luigi Zingales |
| Abstract: | This chapter reviews the recent debate about the role of social capital in economics. We argue that all the difficulties this concept has encountered in economics are due to a vague and excessively broad definition. For this reason, we restrict social capital to the set of values and beliefs that help cooperation—which for clarity we label civic capital. We argue that this definition differentiates social capital from human capital and satisfies the properties of the standard notion of capital. We then argue that civic capital can explain why differences in economic performance persist over centuries and discuss how the effect of civic capital can be distinguished empirically from other variables that affect economic performance and its persistence, including institutions and geography. |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco2010/08&r=evo |
| By: | Mariani, Fabio (Université Catholique de Louvain) |
| Abstract: | Virtue is modeled as an asset that women can use in the marriage market: since men value virginity in prospective mates, preserving her virtue increases a woman's chances of marrying a high-status husband, and therefore allows for upward social mobility. Consistent with some historical and anthropological evidence, we find that the prevalence (and the value) of virginity, across societies and over time, can be influenced by socio-economic factors such as male income inequality, gender differences, social status and stratification, and overall economic development. |
| Keywords: | mating, marriage, cultural values, social classes, gender |
| JEL: | D1 J12 Z13 |
| Date: | 2010–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4875&r=evo |