nep-evo New Economics Papers
on Evolutionary Economics
Issue of 2010‒03‒20
four papers chosen by
Matthew Baker
City University of New York

  1. Social psychology and environmental economics : a new look at ex ante corrections of biased preference evaluation By Nicolas Jacquemet; Alexander G. James; Stéphane Luchini; Jason F. Shogren
  2. Religious affiliation and economic development: a recent literature review By Olimid , Anca Parmena
  3. Is the veil of ignorance transparent ?. By Gaël Giraud; Cécile Renouard
  4. Social Distance, Cooperation and Other Regarding Preferences: A New Approach Based on the Theory of Relational Goods By Leonardo Becchetti; Giacomo Degli Antoni; Marco Faillo

  1. By: Nicolas Jacquemet (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris); Alexander G. James (University of Wyoming - Department of Economics and Finance); Stéphane Luchini (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - CNRS : UMR6579); Jason F. Shogren (University of Wyoming - Department of Economics and Finance)
    Abstract: Environmental economics is now a long standing field of research ; much has been learned on how environmental policy can use incentives to drive individual behaviors. Among the many examples, preference elicitation is the most discussed case in which incentives fail to accurately implement efficient behavior. Using this as our motivating example, herein we explore the cross-fertilization between environmental economics and social psychology. We first review how the lessons drawn from social psychology helped address the hypothetical bias issue. We then turn to the future of this process by focusing on how cheap talk scripts influence preference elicitation. Our experimental results shows CT scripts work through persuasion – i.e. changes mind, but poorly changes actions. in that sense, preference elicitation still lacks a way of making communication binding – i.e. a way to alter intrinsic motivation of subjects to behave truthfully.
    Keywords: Social psychology, commitment, persuasive communication, preference elicitation.
    Date: 2010–02
  2. By: Olimid , Anca Parmena
    Abstract: This article provides an overview of the recent literature relevant to the study of the relation between economics and religion. The paper also appeals to the critical review on the implications of religious markets and church-state relation. The study argues that economic development depress religiosity. Subsequent comments will be linked to a much more comprehensive literature on the social and economic consequences of religious beliefs.
    Keywords: religiosity; economic development; state; society
    JEL: Z12 N3
    Date: 2010–03–04
  3. By: Gaël Giraud (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne); Cécile Renouard
    Abstract: Theories of justice in the spirit of Rawls and Harsanyi argue that fair-minded people should aspire to make choices for society as if in the original position, that is, behind a veil of ignorance that prevents them from knowing their own social positions in society. In this paper, we provide a framework showing that preferences in front of the veil of ignorance (i.e., in face of everyday risky situations) are entirely determined by ethical preferences behind the veil. Moreover, by contrast with Kariv & Zame (2008), in many cases of interest, the converse is not true : ethical decisions cannot be deduced from economic ones. This not only rehabilitates distributive theories of justice but even proves that standard decision theory in economic environments cannot be separated from ethical questioning.
    Keywords: Moral preferences, business ethics, social preferences, distributional justice, theory of justice, social choice, original position, veil of ignorance, utilitarianism, maximin principle.
    JEL: D63
    Date: 2010–01
  4. By: Leonardo Becchetti (University of Rome Tor Vergata); Giacomo Degli Antoni (EconomEtica); Marco Faillo (University of Trento - Faculty of Economics)
    Abstract: The paper is divided in six sections. In the second section we provide a short survey of the literature on relational goods. In the third section we describe the experimental design of the two experiments presented in Becchetti et al. (2007) and Becchetti, Degli Antoni and Faillo (2009) (hereafter also B2007 and B2009). In the fourth section we discuss the hypotheses on the effect of relational goods on players’ behaviour in the two experiments. In the fifth section we discuss the main findings. The sixth section concludes.
    Date: 2010–03

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