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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Reinoud Joosten |
| Abstract: | We present two new notions of evolutionary stability, the truly evolutionarily stable state (TESS) and the generalized evolutionarily stable equilibrium (GESE). The GESE generalizes the evolutionarily stable equilibrium (ESE) of Joosten [1996]. An ESE attracts all nearby trajectories monotonically, i.e., the Euclidean distance decreasing steadily in time. For a GESE this property should holds for at least one metric. The TESS generalizes the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) of Maynard Smith & Price [1973]. A TESS attracts nearby trajectories too, but the behavior of the dynamics nearby must be similar to the behavior of the replicator dynamics near an ESS. Both notions are defned on the dynamics and immediately imply asymptotical stability for the dynamics at hand, i.e., the equilibrium attracts all trajectories sufficiently nearby. We consider this the relevant and conceptually right approach in defining evolutionary equilibria, rather than defining a static equilibrium notion and search for appropriate dynamics guaranteeing its dynamic stability. Moreover, the GESE and the TESS take similar positions as the ESE and ESE do in relation to other equilibrium and fixed point concepts in general. |
| Keywords: | evolutionary stability, evolutionary game theory Length 27 pages |
| JEL: | A12 C62 C72 C73 D83 |
| Date: | 2009–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esi:evopap:2009-16&r=evo |
| By: | Antoine Mandel (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I); Nicola Botta (Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research - Telegrafenberg A51) |
| Abstract: | Building upon recent work of Gintis, we study evolutionary dynamics in an economy with Leontieff preferences and corner endowments for which the equilibrium is completely indeterminate. We exhibit a class of dynamics which selects, via stochastic stability, the equilibrium minimizing the quantities traded. |
| Keywords: | Exchange economies, bargaining games, equilibrium selection, stochastic stability. |
| Date: | 2009–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00442864_v1&r=evo |
| By: | John Duffy; Felix Munoz-Garcia (School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates how the introduction of social preferences affects players’ equilibrium behavior in both one-shot and infinitely repeated versions of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We first show that defection survives as the unique equilibrium of the stage game if at least one player is not too concerned about inequity aversion. Second, we demonstrate that in the infinitely repeated version of the game, fairness concerns operate as a “substitute: for time discounting, as fairness helps sustain cooperation for lower discount factors. We then extend our results to more general simultaneous-move games, and more general preferences. Furthermore, we examine how the introduction of incomplete information about players’ social preferences can help in the selection of the efficient cooperative outcome. Finally, we point out the implications of our findings for the design and analysis of experiments involving repeated games. In particular, repeated game equilibria which are thought to be supported by sufficiently large discount factors, may in fact be sustained by a combination of discounting and social preference parameters, an observation that may help rationalize recent experimental findings. |
| Keywords: | Prisoner’s dilemma; Repeated games; Inequity aversion; Time discounting; Time discounting; Social Preferences |
| JEL: | C72 C73 H43 D91 |
| Date: | 2009–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wsu:wpaper:munoz-4&r=evo |
| By: | Pablo Brañas-Garza (Universidad de Granada); Ramón Cobo-Reyes (Universidad de Granada); María Paz Espinosa (Universidad del País Vasco); Natalia Jiménez (Universidad de Granada); Jaromír Kovárík (Universidad del País Vasco); Giovanni Ponti (Universidad de Alicante; Università di Ferrara) |
| Abstract: | We report on a two-stage experiment in which i) we first elicit the social network within a section of undergraduate students and ii) we then measure their altruistic attitudes by means of a standard Dictator game. We observe that more socially integrated subjects are also more altruistic, as betweenness centrality and reciprocal degree are positively correlated with the level of giving, even after controlling for framing and social distance, which have been shown to signicantly affect giving in previous studies. Our findings suggest that social distance and social integration are complementary determinants of altruistic behavior. |
| Keywords: | Altruism, centrality, social network experiments |
| JEL: | C93 D85 |
| Date: | 2009–12–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehu:ikerla:200935&r=evo |
| By: | Gürerk, Özgür (University of Erfurt); Irlenbusch, Bernd (London School of Economics); Rockenbach, Bettina (University of Erfurt) |
| Abstract: | Economic and social interactions often take place in open communities but the dynamics of the community choice process and its impact on cooperation of its members are yet not well understood. We experimentally investigate community choice in social dilemmas. Participants repeatedly choose between a community with and an alternative without punishment opportunities. Within each community a social dilemma game is played. While the community with punishment grows over time and fully cooperates, the alternative becomes depopulated. We analyze the success of this "voting with feet" mechanism and find that endogenous self-selection is key while slow growth is less decisive. |
| Keywords: | cooperation, social dilemmas, community choice, punishment, voting with feet |
| JEL: | C72 C92 H41 |
| Date: | 2009–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4643&r=evo |
| By: | Swee-Hoon Chuah (Nottingham University Business School) |
| Abstract: | In contrast to current literature which mainly identifies relationships between particular economic behaviours and specific attitudes suggestive of those behaviours, we explore the potential of general human values for explaining economic behaviour. In particular, we investigate whether behaviours observed in binary-choice lotteries, time discounting, public good, ultimatum, dictator and trust game experiments can be explained by Schwartz’s theory of universal human values. We find that the values have explanatory power in relation to strategic, but not parametric, behaviours. We discuss this finding in terms of the sociology of values and suggest that situations involving human interactions provide the most conducive context for the expression of values. We also find that different subsets of the values relate to different strategic behaviours, indicating that there is no redundancy in their explanatory power. |
| Keywords: | Values, behaviour, survey, experiments |
| JEL: | C72 C91 D81 |
| Date: | 2010–01–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bbr:workpa:6&r=evo |
| By: | Funk, Matt |
| Abstract: | This paper introduces a game-theoretical framework for The Problem of Sustainable Economic Development, axioms which help clarify the problem itself, and, reductio ad absurdum, falsify many widely-held economic, evolutionary, and ecological principles. This brief communiqué lays the foundation for evolutionary stable economic development and survival strategies – strategies which foster international cooperation, global threat mitigation, food & energy security, long-distance dispersibility, and thus, ultimately, the long-term survival of the human species. |
| Keywords: | sustainable economic development; tragedy of the commons; noncooperative games; natural selection; global threats; food security; national security; human survival |
| JEL: | B40 Q57 C72 |
| Date: | 2009–12–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:19442&r=evo |