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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Funk, Matt |
| Abstract: | This paper offers a solution to 'The Problem of Sustainable Economic Development' on islands. This hypothesis offers a foundational, sub-game solution to The Island Survival Game, a counterintuitive, dominant economic development strategy for ‘islands’ (and relatively insular states). This discourse also tables conceptual building blocks, prerequisite analytical tools, and a guiding principle for The Earth Island Survival Game, a bounded delay supergame which models 'The Problem of Sustainable Economic Development' at the global level. We begin our exploration with an introduction to The Principle of Relative Insularity, a postulate which informs ESS for ‘island’ and ‘continental’ players alike. Next, we model ‘island’ economic development with two bio-geo-politico-economic models and respective strategies: The Mustique Co. Development Plan, and The Prince Edward Island Federal-Provincial Program for Social and Economic Advancement. These diametrically opposed strategies offer an extraordinary comparative study. One island serves as a highly descriptive model for 'The Problem of Sustainable Economic Development'; the other model informs ESS. 'The Earth Island Survival Game' serves as a remarkable learning tool, offering lessons which promote islander survival, resource holding power, cooperative behaviour, and independence by illuminating the illusive path toward sustainable economic development. |
| Keywords: | Non-cooperative games; evolutionary game theory; relative insularity; islands; tragedy of the commons; sustainable economic development; theory of value; resource holding power; evolutionary stable strategy; natural selection; long distance dispersal |
| JEL: | O1 O13 C72 |
| Date: | 2009–08–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:16771&r=evo |
| By: | Andreas Georgiadis; Alan Manning |
| Abstract: | Economists have a well-developed theory of value but the theory of why people hold thevalues they do is rudimentary at best. In spite of the fact that it is common to argue thatvalues are important, most work on values is normative and the positive theory of values isrelatively under- developed. In this paper we propose a simple yet general way to think aboutvalues - they are about how one trades-off one own's utility against that of others - and arguethat we can draw on the large literature on pro-social behavior for hypotheses on how peoplewill choose values. Then, using data from the UK's Citizenship Survey we show howmodels of self-interest, fairness, reciprocity and identity, can explain many of the patternsthat we observe in the data across a wide variety of values. |
| Keywords: | Values, Pro-Social Behaviour |
| JEL: | D63 Z13 |
| Date: | 2009–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp0943&r=evo |
| By: | Spiliopoulos, Leonidas |
| Abstract: | This paper addresses how neural networks learn to play one-shot normal form games through experience in an environment of randomly generated game payoffs and randomly selected opponents. This agent based computational approach allows the modeling of learning all strategic types of normal form games, irregardless of the number of pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibria that they exhibit. This is a more realistic model of learning than the oft used models in the game theory learning literature which are usually restricted either to repeated games against the same opponent (or games with different payoffs but belonging to the same strategic class). The neural network agents were found to approximate human behavior in experimental one-shot games very well as the Spearman correlation coefficients between their behavior and that of human subjects ranged from 0.49 to 0.8857 across numerous experimental studies. Also, they exhibited the endogenous emergence of heuristics that have been found effective in describing human behavior in one-shot games. The notion of bounded rationality is explored by varying the topologies of the neural networks, which indirectly affects their ability to act as universal approximators of any function. The neural networks' behavior was assessed across various dimensions such as convergence to Nash equilibria, equilibrium selection and adherence to principles of iterated dominance. |
| Keywords: | Behavioral game theory; Learning; Global games; Neural networks; Agent-based computational economics; Simulations; Complex adaptive systems; Artificial intelligence |
| JEL: | C45 C70 C73 |
| Date: | 2009–08–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:16765&r=evo |
| By: | Rainer Schnell |
| Abstract: | Social scientists have ignored biological constraints of human behavior for a long time almost completely. If prediction of behavior is considered as essential for a social science. The neglect of any variable, which might influence human behavior, is hardly justified. Therefore, this paper gives examples of such biological variables and their measurement in social surveys. |
| Keywords: | bio-social surveys, behavioral genetics, biobanks, sociobiology |
| JEL: | C81 Y8 |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rsw:rswwps:rswwps67&r=evo |
| By: | Indu Rao |
| Abstract: | This paper presents findings from an extensive review of literature on organizational cultural (OC) and highlights the relevance of OC with respect to individual, organizational, intra-organizational, industry and external environment related variables. This paper presents a behavioral perspective on OC and contributes to its emerging dynamic aspect. A behavioral model of OC is suggested and propositions are drawn to explain the dynamics involved. |
| Keywords: | anthropology, sociology, organizational culture, OC, intr-organizational, industry, external environment, variables, behavioral model, model, organization, literature, |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:2162&r=evo |