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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Angelo Antoci; Paolo Russu; Luca Zarri |
| Abstract: | Experimental evidence indicates that free riders and strongly reciprocal papers coexist in the public goods game framework. By means of an evolutionary analysis, we provide an endogenization of this behavioral regularity. |
| Keywords: | Free Riding, Cooperation, Strong Reciprocity, Public Goods Game, Evolutionary Game Theory. |
| JEL: | B41 C73 D74 Z13 |
| Date: | 2009–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ver:wpaper:54&r=evo |
| By: | Angelo Antoci; Paolo Russu; Luca Zarri |
| Abstract: | An oft-cited and robust result from Public Goods Game experiments is that, when subjects start playing, the aggregate level of contributions is significantly different from zero. At the same time, a sizeable proportion of players free ride from the outset. Behavioural economics has persuasively shown that these laboratory findings are compatible with the presence of motivationally heterogeneous agents, displaying both standard, self-centred preferences and non-standard, interdependent preferences. However, at the theoretical level, economists would prefer to account for motivational heterogeneity endogenously, instead of simply assuming it from the outset. Our work provides such endogenisation, by assuming that social evolution is driven by material payoffs only. By separately focusing on different types of ‘experimentally salient’ pro-social players (such as Reciprocators, Strong Reciprocators and Altruists), we are able to shed light – to our knowledge, for the first time, within the public good framework – on the evolutionary stability of two-type populations consisting of positive proportions of both ‘nice’ and ‘mean’ guys. |
| Keywords: | Free Riding; Strong Reciprocity; Altruism; Nonstrategic Punishment; Public Goods Game; Evolutionary Game Theory. |
| JEL: | C7 D6 H8 Z1 |
| Date: | 2009–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ver:wpaper:55&r=evo |
| By: | Ron Boschma; Koen Frenken |
| Abstract: | Within the evolutionary economic geography framework the role of institutions deserves more explicit attention. We argue that territorial institutions are to be viewed as orthogonal to organisational routines in that each territory is characterised by a variety of routines, and in that a single firm can apply its routines in different territorial contexts. It is therefore meaningful to distinguish between institutional economic geography and evolutionary economic geography as their explanans is different. Yet, the two approaches can be combined in a dynamic framework in which institutions co-evolve with organisational routines, particularly in emerging industries. Furthermore, integrating the evolutionary and institutional approach allows one to analyse the spatial diffusion of organisational routines that mediate conflicts between social groups, in particular, those between capitalists and labourers. An evolutionary economic geography advocates an empirical research program, both qualitative and quantitative, in which the relative importance of organisational routines and territorial institutions for regional development can be addressed. |
| Keywords: | evolutionary economic geography, routines, institutions |
| Date: | 2008–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:egu:wpaper:0817&r=evo |
| By: | Zhigao Liu |
| Abstract: | The paper tries to construct the historical methodology for evolutionary economic geography. I elevate history to the methodological foundation of evolutionary economic geography, on which concrete research methods should be based. I explore how to evolution in economic geography by placing history in historical time and historical contexts. Accordingly, the concepts of path creation and path dependence should be used together in historical study. More important, the concept of path interdependence, which stresses the importance of the circumstances under which different processes and events are likely to occur, opens a new window on the temporal aspects of the world. |
| Keywords: | Organizational ecology, fashion industry, creative industries, clusters, institutional lock-in |
| Date: | 2009–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:egu:wpaper:0901&r=evo |