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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Gramig, Benjamin M.; Horan, Richard D. |
| Abstract: | We develop a dynamic model of livestock disease and decentralized economic behavior as a jointly-determined system. By accounting for feedbacks between behavioral choices and disease outcomes we capture the endogenous nature of infection risks. We consider government mandated testing of livestock herds and how private biosecurity incentives are affected by the structure of disease eradication polices. How well disease control policies are targeted affects their effectiveness and may result in farmers substituting government testing and disease surveillance for private biosecurity. Numerical simulation results demonstrate that failing to account for feedbacks between disease and economic dynamics may underestimate the level of infection. Not accounting for behavioral responses to infection risks may overestimate the effectiveness of government disease control policies. |
| Keywords: | bioeconomics, epidemiology, replicator dynamics, externalities, strategic behavior, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy, |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea09:49260&r=evo |
| By: | Nicholas C. Barberis |
| Abstract: | Casino gambling is a hugely popular activity around the world, but there are still very few models of why people go to casinos or of how they behave when they get there. In this paper, we show that prospect theory can offer a surprisingly rich theory of gambling, one that captures many features of actual gambling behavior. First, we demonstrate that, for a wide range of parameter values, a prospect theory agent would be willing to gamble in a casino, even if the casino only offers bets with zero or negative expected value. Second, we show that prospect theory predicts a plausible time inconsistency: at the moment he enters a casino, a prospect theory agent plans to follow one particular gambling strategy; but after he enters, he wants to switch to a different strategy. The model therefore predicts heterogeneity in gambling behavior: how a gambler behaves depends on whether he is aware of the time-inconsistency; and, if he is aware of it, on whether he is able to commit, in advance, to his initial plan of action. |
| JEL: | D81 |
| Date: | 2009–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14947&r=evo |
| By: | Asirvatham, Jebaraj; McNamara, Paul E. |
| Abstract: | Neoclassical economic theory models individuals as making consistent choices over time and it assumes these choices are the outcome of rational utility maximization. Recent theoretical developments in the theory of consumer decision-making have drawn evidence from other disciplines such as, neuroscience (McClure et al, 2004) and psychology, and proposed more generalized models in a dual-self framework explicitly accounting for self-control or impulsivity (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2004; Fudenberg and Levine, 2006; and Brocas and Carillo, 2008). This study attempts to understand the dietary choices in a dual-self framework while explicitly identifying calorie intake owing to impulsivity and self-control. We construct standard psychological measures using the responses to the Dutch Eating Behavioral Questionnaire (DEBQ) filled by the respondents of the UK Diet and Nutrition Survey. These measures have been tested for their validity and apply to a broad range of population: of different weights, across gender, ethnicity (Bardone-Cone, and Boyd, 2007) and are used in experiments (Ouwens, 2005).Using panel data methods, we find that impulsivity increases calorie intake and self-control decreases calorie intake. Further, caloric intake is larger than one can restrain and therefore the result of the intrapersonal conflict is positive calories intake on average. |
| Keywords: | Self-control, Nutrition, diet, health, impulsivity, BMI, Consumer/Household Economics, Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety, Health Economics and Policy, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, D12, D03, I00, |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea09:49472&r=evo |