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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Raul Jimenez; Haydee Lugo; Maxi San Miguel |
| Abstract: | In many evolutionary algorithms, crossover is the main operator used in generating new individuals from old ones. However, the usual mechanism for generating offsprings in spatially structured evolutionary games has to date been clonation. Here we study the effect of incorporating crossover on these models. Our framework is the spatial Continuous Prisoner's Dilemma. For this evolutionary game, it has been reported that occasional errors (mutations) in the clonal process can explain the emergence of cooperation from a non-cooperative initial state. First, we show that this only occurs for particular regimes of low costs of cooperation. Then, we display how crossover gets greater the range of scenarios where cooperative mutants can invade selfish populations. In a social context, where crossover involves a general rule of gradual learning, our results show that the less that is learnt in a single step, the larger the degree of global cooperation finally attained. In general, the effect of step-by-step learning can be more efficient for the evolution of cooperation than a full blast one. |
| Keywords: | Evolutionary games, Continuous prisoner's dilemma, Spatially structured, Crossover, Learning |
| Date: | 2009–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cte:werepe:we092012&r=evo |
| By: | Ania, Ana B.; Wagener, Andreas |
| Abstract: | We interpret the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), recently adopted by the EU as a mode of governance in the area of social policy and other fields, as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. The best-practise feature and the iterative design of the OMC correspond to the behavioral rule ``imitate the best.'' In a redistribution game with utilitarian governments and mobile welfare beneficiaries, we compare the outcomes of imitative behavior (long-run evolutionary equilibrium), decentralized best-response behavior (Nash equilibrium), and coordinated policies. The main result is that the OMC allows policy coordination on a strict subset of the set of Nash equilibria, favoring in particular coordination on {\em intermediate} values of the policy instrument. |
| Keywords: | Open Method of Coordination; Finite-population Evolutionarily Stable Strategy; Imitation; Mobility; Redistribution. |
| JEL: | H77 H75 C73 |
| Date: | 2009–03–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lmu:muenec:10332&r=evo |
| By: | Göbel, Jürgen |
| Abstract: | The human being can be regarded as a product of evolution. She has prevailed in the evolutionary process because of her ability to create and to use knowledge. The creation and the use of knowledge depend on the cognitive and on the social order. Both types of order are interdependent. Hayek sought to analyze the principles of both types of order. In particular, he based his analysis on three research disciplines: Evolutionary Epistemology, Cognitive Psychology, and Systems Theory. In this article, we recapitulate and revise his respective analysis. Hayek’s approach thus appears as particularly sustainable and powerful. |
| Keywords: | Hayek; cognition; social order |
| JEL: | D02 B53 D87 |
| Date: | 2009–02–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:14290&r=evo |