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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Ahmed, Ali M. (Centre for Labour Market Policy Research (CAFO)); Salas, Osvaldo (Centre for Labour Market Policy Research (CAFO)) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the supernatural punishment theory. The theory postulates that religion increases cooperation because religious people fear the retributions that may follow if they do not follow the rules and norms provided by the religion. We report results for a public goods experiment conducted in India, Mexico, and Sweden. By asking participants whether they are religious or not, we study whether religiosity has an effect on voluntary cooperation in the public goods game. We found no significant behavioral differences between religious and nonreligious participants in the experiment. |
| Keywords: | Games; punishment theory; experiments; behavioral economics; religion |
| JEL: | C71 C90 D01 |
| Date: | 2008–02–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:vxcafo:2008_001&r=evo |
| By: | López-Pérez, Raúl (Departamento de Análisis Económico (Teoría e Historia Económica). Universidad Autónoma de Madrid.) |
| Abstract: | We present a game-theoretical model that accounts for abundant experimental evidence from games with non-binding communication (‘cheap talk’). It is based on two key ideas: People are conditionally averse to break norms of honesty and fairness (i.e., the emotional cost of breaking a norm is low if few people comply), and heterogeneous with regard to their concern for norms. The model explains (a) why cooperation in social dilemmas rises if players can previously announce their intended play, (b) why details of the communication protocol like the number of message senders and the order in which players communicate affect cooperation, (c) why players in sender-receiver games tend to transmit more information than a standard analysis would predict, and (d) why senders of false messages are often sanctioned if punishment is available. |
| Keywords: | Communication; Cooperation; Fairness; Heterogeneity; Honesty; Reciprocity; Social Norms |
| JEL: | C72 D01 D62 D64 Z13 |
| Date: | 2008–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uam:wpaper:200901&r=evo |
| By: | Michele Fratianni (Indiana University, Kelly School of Business, Bloomington US, Univ. Plitecnica Marche - Dept of Economics, MoFiR) |
| Abstract: | Financial products are unstandardized and subject to a great deal of uncertainty. They tend to concentrate geographically because of the reduction in information costs resulting from close contacts. Concentration leads to economies of scale and encourages external economies. Great financial centers enjoy a high degree of persistence but are not immune from decline and eventual demise. Yet, their achievements are passed along in a an evolutionary manner. In revisiting the historical record of seven international financial centers –Florence, Venice, Genoa, Antwerp, Amsterdam, London and New Yorku' the paper finds evidence of a long evolutionary chain of banking and finance. As to the present and the future, the forces of integration are likely to give an additional boost to the persistence of international financial centers. |
| Keywords: | Amsterdam, Antwerp, Banking, Evolution, Finance, Florence, Genoa, London, Money, New York, Venice |
| JEL: | G15 G21 H63 N20 |
| Date: | 2008–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:anc:wmofir:6&r=evo |