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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Rowthorn, Robert E.; Guzmán, Ricardo Andrés; Rodríguez-Sickert, Carlos |
| Abstract: | Gratuitous cooperation (in favour of non-relatives and without repeated interaction) eludes traditional evolutionary explanations. In this paper we survey the various theories of cooperative behaviour, and we describe our own effort to integrate these theories into a self-contained framework. Our main conclusions are as follows. First: altruistic punishment, conformism and gratuitous cooperation co-evolve, and group selection is a necessary ingredient for the co-evolution to take place. Second: people do not cooperate by mistake, as most theories imply; on the contrary, people knowingly sacrifice themselves for others. Third: in cooperative dilemmas conformism is an expression of preference, not a learning rule. Fourth, group-mutations (e.g., the rare emergence of a charismatic leader that brings order to the group) are necessary to sustain cooperation in the long run. |
| Keywords: | Cooperation; altruism; altruistic punishment; conformism; group-selection |
| JEL: | H41 Z13 |
| Date: | 2009–01–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:12574&r=evo |
| By: | Vanessa Mertins (Institute for Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the EC, University of Trier) |
| Abstract: | While economists have neglected procedures for a long time, other social scientists early established a substantial research program. By now, there exists a large gap between a sheer bulk of empirical, experimental, and theoretical studies by non-economists and the fact that there is hardly any economic research on procedures. We argue that due to clear evidence for procedures in uencing human decision-making, economists can not remain silent about procedural aspects of strategic interactions any longer. There is an important research agenda to be developed. This survey article is intended to discuss an important approach by which the standard economic model, which is based on consequentialist preferences, needs to be enriched: not only outcomes shape human behavior but also the way in which decisions are taken. Behavioral economics may serve as an important link. Its aim is to integrate insights of cognitive and social psychologists as well as experimental economists with neoclassical economic theory. We argue that experimental economics should increase its efforts to identify procedural effects and that these experiments should be more incorporated in the theoretical literature as part of an ongoing dialogue between theorists and experimentalists. Among procedural aspects, procedural fairness suggests itself to become an integrative part. To highlight the need for rethinking the standard economic approach we review social science literature on procedural effects, with a special focus on experimental economics and inspired theory-building. |
| Date: | 2008–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iaa:wpaper:200806&r=evo |
| By: | Lucy F. Ackert; Ann B. Gillette; Jorge Martinez-Vazquez; Mark Rider |
| Abstract: | We use an experimental method to investigate whether systematic relationships exist across distinct aspects of individual preferences: risk aversion in monetary outcomes, altruism in a twoperson context, and social preferences in a larger group context. Individual preferences across these three contexts are measured, and there is no possibility for risk sharing, wealth effects, or updating expectations of the population choices. We find that social preferences are related to demographic variables, including years of education, gender, and age. Perhaps most importantly, self allocation in a two-person dictator game is related to social preferences in a group context. Participants who are more generous in a dictator game are more likely to vote against their selfinterest in a group decision-making task which we interpret to be expressions of social preferences. |
| JEL: | C91 C92 D63 H21 |
| Date: | 2009–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:exc:wpaper:2009-04&r=evo |