nep-evo New Economics Papers
on Evolutionary Economics
Issue of 2008‒12‒21
two papers chosen by
Matthew Baker
City University of New York

  1. Property Rights and Investments: An Evolutionary Approach By Luciano Andreozzi
  2. Learning in experimental 2×2 games By Sebastian J. Goerg; Thorsten Chmura; Reinhard Selten

  1. By: Luciano Andreozzi
    Abstract: When contracts are not enforceable, or property rights are not clearly defined, individuals might lack an incentive to carry out costly investments even when they are socially efficient. Some recent contributions such as Ellingsen and Robles (2002) prove that this problem might be less dramatic than standard economic models would suggest. They propose evolutionary models in which only efficient equilibria can be (stocastically) stable. In this paper we show that these results are not robust with respect to the introduction of individual heterogeneity. When individuals have different cost functions, stochastically stable states are inefficient, even when they induce a positive (suboptimal) level of investment.
    Keywords: Specific Investment, Evolution, Fairness, Heterogeneous Agents
    JEL: L14 C78
    Date: 2008
  2. By: Sebastian J. Goerg; Thorsten Chmura; Reinhard Selten
    Abstract: In this paper we introduce four new learning models: impulse balance learning, impulse matching learning, action-sampling learning, and payoff-sampling learning. With this models and together with the models of self- tuning EWA learning and reinforcement learning, we conduct simulations over 12 different 2×2 games and compare the results with experimental data obtained by Selten & Chmura (2008). Our results are two-fold: While the simulations, especially those with action-sampling learning and impulse matching learning successfully replicate the experimental data on the aggregate, they fail in describing the individual behavior. A simple inertia rule beats the learning models in describing individuals behavior.
    Keywords: Learning, Action-sampling, Payo?-sampling, Impulse balance, Impulse matching, Reinforcement, self-tuning EWA, 2×2 games, Experimental data
    JEL: C72 C91 C92
    Date: 2008–12

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