nep-evo New Economics Papers
on Evolutionary Economics
Issue of 2008‒11‒25
one paper chosen by
Matthew Baker
City University of New York

  1. Feedback; Punishment and Cooperation in Public Good Experiments By Nikos Nikiforakis

  1. By: Nikos Nikiforakis
    Abstract: A number of studies have shown that peer punishment can sustain cooperation in public good games. This paper shows that the format used to give subjects feedback is critical for the e¢ cacy of punishment. Providing subjects with infor- mation about the earnings of their peers leads to lower contributions and earnings compared to a treatment in which subjects receive information about the contri- butions of their peers even though the feedback format does not a¤ect incentives. The data suggest that this is because the feedback format acts as a coordination device, which in?uences the contribution standards that groups establish
    Keywords: feedback format; peer punishment; public good game; altruistic pun-ishment; cooperation
    JEL: C92 D70 H41
    Date: 2008

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