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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Victor Hiller (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris) |
| Abstract: | This article investigates the co-evolution of labor relationships and workers preferences. According to recent experimental economics findinggs on social preferences, the workforce is assumed to be heterogeneous. It is composed by both cooperative and non-cooperative workers. In addition, firms differ by the type of contract they offer (explicit or implicit). Finally, both the distribution of preferences and the degree of contractual completeness are endogeneized. Preferences evolve through a process of cultural transmission and the proportion of implicit contracts is driven by an evolutionary process. The complementarity between the transmission of cooperation and the implementation of implicit contracts leads to multiple equilibria which allow for path-dependence. This property is illustrated by the evolutions of American and Japanese labor contracts during the Twentieth century. |
| Keywords: | Explicit contract, implicit contract, cultural transmission, preferences for reciprocity, path dependence. |
| Date: | 2008–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:paris1:halshs-00275734_v1&r=evo |
| By: | Dirk Engelmann; Urs Fischbacher |
| Abstract: | We study indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game. At any time only half of the subjects can build a reputation. This allows us to study both pure indirect reciprocity that is not contaminated by strategic reputation building and the impact of incentives for strategic reputation building on the helping rate. We find that pure indirect reciprocity exists, but also that the helping decisions are substantially a!ected by strategic considerations. We find that the behavioral pattern can best be captured by non-selfish preferences as assumed by reciprocity models. Finally, we find that strategic do better than non-strategic players and non-reciprocal do better than reciprocal players, casting doubt on previously proposed evolutionary explanations for indirect reciprocity. |
| Keywords: | indirect reciprocity, reputation, experimental economics |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:twi:respas:0034&r=evo |
| By: | Reinoud Joosten; Berend Roorda |
| Abstract: | We introduce a new kind of projection dynamics by employing a ray-projection both locally and globally. By global (local) we mean a projection of a vector (close to the unit simplex) unto the unit simplex along a ray through the origin. Using a correspondence between local and global ray-projection dynamics we prove that every interior evolutionarily stable strategy is an asymptotically stable fixed point. We also show that every strict equilibrium is an evolutionarily stable state and an evolutionarily stable equilibrium. Then, we employ several projections on a wider set of functions derived from the payoff structure. This yields an interesting class of so-called generalized projection dynamics which contains best-response, logit, replicator, and Brown-Von-Neumann dynamics among others. |
| Keywords: | evolutionary game theory, projection dynamics, orthogonal projection, ray projection, asymptotical and evolutionary stability Length 27 pages |
| JEL: | A12 C62 C72 C73 D83 |
| Date: | 2008–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esi:evopap:2008-11&r=evo |
| By: | Takako Fujiwara-Greve (Faculty of Economics, Keio University); Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara (Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo) |
| Abstract: | Ordinary repeated games do not apply to real societies where one can cheat and escape from partners. We formulate a model of endogenous relationships that a player can unilaterally end and start with a randomly-assigned new partner with no information flow. Focusing on two-person, two-action Prisoner's Dilemma, we show that the endogenous duration of partnerships generates a significantly different evolutionary stability structure from ordinary random matching games. Monomorphic equilibria require initial trust-building, while a polymorphic equilibrium includes earlier cooperators than any strategy in monomorphic equilibria and is thus more efficient. This is due to the nonlinearity of average payoffs.Length: 37pages |
| Date: | 2008–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tky:fseres:2008cf599&r=evo |
| By: | David Cayla (ATOM - Analyse Théorique des Organisations et des Marchés - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I) |
| Abstract: | This paper aims to analyze learning as a two-type process. A dynamic equilibrium process represents a stable learning process, that may express an individualistic behavioral learning or an organizational adaptation. A teleological process represents an intentional, goal-oriented, learning process. This second type of learning can express an individualistic cognitive learning or a managerial organizational change. It is argued that this learning typology can helps to understand why similar organizations or individuals may learn differently when confronted to the same environmental stimuli. |
| Keywords: | Dynamic Equilibrium; Learning; Organizational Learning; Teleology |
| Date: | 2008–06–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:paris1:halshs-00267975_v1&r=evo |
| By: | Jan Gunnarsson (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen); Torsten Wallin |
| Abstract: | This article examines how the birth and the development of regional systems of innovation are connected with economic selection and points to implications for regional-level policies. The research questions are explored using an evolutionary model, which emphasises geographical spaces and production of intermediate goods. In particular we are concerned with how cooperative behaviour of technology producers is affected by the need to protect technological secrecies and of being financially constrained by forms demanding innovative input. Based on the theoretical model, we provide an analysis using computer simulations. The primary fidings are, firstly, that the model generates predictions suited for empirical research on how economic selection influences cooperative behaviour of innovative actors. Secondly, we demonstrate how a region's entrepreneurial activity and growth can be controlled in a decentralised way by regions. |
| Keywords: | social capital; social identity; civil society; open methods of coordination |
| JEL: | L24 O33 R38 |
| Date: | 2008–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0823&r=evo |