nep-evo 2008-08-21 papers

on Evolutionary Economics

Issue of 2008‒08‒21
one paper chosen by
Matthew Baker
City University of New York

Evolutionarily Stable Preferences in Contests By Wolfgang Leininger

Evolutionarily Stable Preferences in Contests

By:	Wolfgang Leininger
Abstract:	We define an indirect evolutionary approach formally and apply it to (Tullock)contests. While it is known (Leininger, 2003) that the direct evolutionary approach in the form of finite population ESS (Schaffer, 1988) yields more aggressive behavior than in Nash equilibrium, it is now shown that the indirect evolutionary approach yields the same more aggressive behavior, too. This holds for any population size N, if evolution of preferences is determined by behavior in two-player contests. The evolutionarily stable preferences (ESP) of the indirect approach turn out to be negatively interdependent, thereby “rationalizing” the more aggressive behavior.
JEL:	C79 D72
Date:	2008–07
URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rwi:repape:0049&r=evo

This nep-evo issue is ©2008 by Matthew Baker. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.

General information on the NEP project can be found at http://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.

NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.