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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Björn Vollan (Philipps-University Marburg/University of Mannheim) |
| Abstract: | This paper reports on a set of trust games with third party punishment (TPP) where participants are either family members or friends or unrelated villagers. The experimental sessions were carried out in southern Namibia (Karas) and the bordering northern South Africa (Namaqualand). The aim was to test several hypotheses derived from kin selection theory as well as to assess the importance of third party punishment for encounters among family members and friends. Building on Hamilton, (1964) it was proposed by e.g. Madsen et al., (2007) that kinship is the baseline behaviour among humans. Thus, I use kinship as basis for comparison of how we treat friends and unrelated people and when there is the possibility to punish free-riding behaviour. It turns out that kinship is the baseline behaviour when no other features are available to humans. However, a personal exchange among friends that has a third party observer performs better than a personal exchange among family members without third party punishment. Contributions to family members can substantially be increased by third party punishment. Thus, human ability to sustain a norm by punishing freeriders at personal costs could also have played an important role in sustaining co-operation among kin. |
| Keywords: | Trust, field experiment, third party punishment, kinship, friendship |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mar:magkse:200809&r=evo |
| By: | URS FISCHBACHER (University of Konstanz); SIMON GAECHTER (University of Nottingham, School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | We provide a direct test of the role of social preferences and beliefs in voluntary cooperation and its decline. We elicit individuals’ cooperation preference in one experiment and use them – as well as subjects’ elicited beliefs – to make predictions about contributions to a public good played repeatedly. We find substantial heterogeneity in people’s preferences. With simulation methods based on this data, we show that the decline of cooperation is driven by the fact that most people have a preference to contribute less than others. Belief formation and virtual learning do not contribute to the decline of cooperation. Universal free riding is very likely despite the fact that most people are not selfish. |
| Keywords: | Public goods experiments, social preferences, conditional cooperation, free riding |
| JEL: | C91 C72 H41 D64 |
| Date: | 2008–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2008-07&r=evo |
| By: | Werner Güth (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Strategic Interaction Group) |
| Abstract: | Similar to welfare economics where with(out) interpersonal comparisons one defines unique (set-valued) welfare (Pareto) optima, we present a framework for one-person decision making where with(out) a prior probability distribution individual optimality prescribes usually a unique (set of) choice(s). Satisfiable aspirations in the sense that there exists some choice guaranteeing them define a much larger choice set whose intersection with the set of prior-free optimal choices is never empty. We also review experimental procedures and results which incentivize aspiration formation and reject even prior-free optimality experimentally. |
| Keywords: | Satisficing, bounded rationality, optimality |
| JEL: | B4 D81 D10 |
| Date: | 2008–07–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2008-055&r=evo |
| By: | T. VANACKER; S. MANIGART; M. MEULEMAN |
| Abstract: | Using multiple longitudinal case studies of young biotechnology firms, we study differences in the financing process between high and low performing firms. Findings suggest that initial differences in the specialization of the investors with whom entrepreneurs affiliate early on, affect the ease with which firms attract (specialized) follow-on financing and firm performance. We demonstrate the role of the social context in shaping initial financing outcomes, as entrepreneurs limit their search for financing to one or a few investors with whom they have pre-existing ties. Additionally, our research provides a dynamic view of the financing process. We identify isolating mechanisms, including entrepreneurial learning and homophily and network considerations in investor syndication, which limit entrepreneurs when trying to adopt successful financing strategies implemented by competitors later on. A core contribution is that we theorize on evolutionary processes in the financing process. This new perspective advances our knowledge on dynamics in the financing process and opens multiple avenues for future research. |
| Keywords: | entrepreneurship; new venture finance; financing process; venture capital; performance |
| Date: | 2008–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rug:rugwps:08/522&r=evo |
| By: | Nick Netzer |
| Keywords: | Evolution of Utility, Risk Attitudes, Time Preferences |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:twi:respas:0029&r=evo |