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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Dziubinski, Marcin; Roy, Jaideep |
| Abstract: | The paper studies an evolutionary model where players from a given population are randomly matched in pairs each period to play a co- ordination game. At each instant, a player can choose to adopt one of the two possible behavior rules, called the rational rule and the as- piring rule, and then take actions prescribed by the chosen rule. The choice between the two rules depends upon their relative performance in the immediate past. We show that there are two stable long run outcomes where either the rational rule becomes extinct and all play- ers in the population achieve full eciency, or that both the behavior rules co-exist and there is only a partial use of ecient strategies in the population. These ndings support the use of the aspiration driven behavior in several existing studies and also help us take a comparative evolutionary look at the two rules in retrospect. |
| Keywords: | Co-evolution; Aspirations; Best-response; Random matching; Coordination games |
| JEL: | C73 C72 |
| Date: | 2007–11–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:5941&r=evo |
| By: | Jack Vromen |
| Abstract: | Hodgson and Knudsen want their version of Generalized Darwinism to meet two /desiderata. /First, their formulation of Darwinism should be sufficiently general and abstract, so that it only refers to general, domain-unspecific features that processes of biological and of socio-cultural evolution have in common with each other. Their formulation should leave out features of Darwinism that are specific to the biological domain only. Second, their version should be able to guide the development of theories that can causally explain processes of economic evolution. Hodgson and Knudsen argue that the latter – going from their abstract and general formulation of Darwinism to such full-fledged economic theories – is a matter of adding details that are specific to the economic domain. Both desiderata seem reasonable. Yet they pull in opposite directions. It is argued that in order to meet the first desideratum the formulation of Darwinism should be so general and abstract that it is bereft of any substance and content and, as such, of little use in guiding further theory development. If going from such a formulation to a full-fledged economic theory is called a matter of adding details, the devil surely is in the details. |
| Keywords: | Length 26 pages |
| Date: | 2007–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esi:evopap:2007-11&r=evo |
| By: | Gallice, Andrea |
| Abstract: | We investigate how the assumption that individuals are characterized by some recent forms of behavioural preferences changes the analysis of an otherwise classical welfare problem, namely the optimal allocation of a scarce resource among a finite number of claimants. We consider two preference specifications: inequity aversion and reference dependence. In the latter case we also study the implications of the claimants displaying a self-serving bias when setting their reference point. Using standard welfare criteria, we compute the optimal allocations that a benevolent social planner should implement in the various scenarios. Results are often remarkably different with respect to traditional (i.e., rational preferences) analysis. We discuss the policy implications and the role of a social planner. |
| Keywords: | inequity aversion; optimum allocation; reference dependence; self-serving bias; social welfare |
| JEL: | D01 D61 |
| Date: | 2007–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6572&r=evo |