nep-evo New Economics Papers
on Evolutionary Economics
Issue of 2007‒11‒03
three papers chosen by
Matthew Baker
City University of New York

  1. Imitation and Selective Matching in Reputational Games By Thierry Vignolo
  2. "Behavioral Aspects of Implementation Theory" By Hitoshi Matsushima
  3. A Theory of Reference-Dependent Behavior By Jose Apesteguia; Miguel A. Ballester

  1. By: Thierry Vignolo
    Abstract: This paper investigates imitation and selective matching in reputational games with an outside option. We identify two classes of such games, which are ultimatum and trust games. By selective matching we mean that short-runplayers have the possibility of selecting the long-run player they play against. We find that selective matching (unlike random matching) favors the equilibrium associated to reputation in the ultimatum game but not in the trust game.
    Keywords: Reputation; Long-run equilibria; Selective matching; Games with an outside option
    JEL: C72 C73 L1
    Date: 2007
  2. By: Hitoshi Matsushima (Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo)
    Abstract: This paper incorporates behavioral economics into implementation theory. We use mechanisms that are strictly detail-free. We assume that each agent dislikes telling a white lie when such lying does not serve her/his material interest. We present a permissive result wherein by using just a single detail-free mechanism, any alternative can be uniquely implemented in iterative dominance as long as the agents regard this alternative as being socially desirable.
    Date: 2007–10
  3. By: Jose Apesteguia; Miguel A. Ballester
    Abstract: Extensive field and experimental evidence in a variety of environments show that behavior depends on a reference point. This paper provides an axiomatic characterization of this dependence. We proceed by imposing gradually more structure on both choice correspondences and preference relations, requiring increasingly higher levels of rationality, and freeing the decision-maker from certain types of inconsistencies. The appropriate degree of behavioral structure will depend on the phenomenon that is to be modeled. Lastly, we provide two applications of our work: one to model the status-quo bias, and another to model addictive behavior.
    Keywords: Individual rationality, reference-dependence, rationalization, path independence, status-quo bias, addiction, habit formation, LeeX
    JEL: A12 B41 D11
    Date: 2007–10

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