nep-evo New Economics Papers
on Evolutionary Economics
Issue of 2007‒09‒30
one paper chosen by
Matthew Baker
City University of New York

  1. Learning by Similarity in Coordination Problems By Jakub Steiner; Colin Stewart

  1. By: Jakub Steiner; Colin Stewart
    Abstract: We study a learning process in which subjects extrapolate from their experience of similar past strategic situations to the current decision problem. When applied to coordination games, this learning process leads to contagion of behavior from problems with extreme payoffs and unique equilibria to very dissimilar problems. In the long-run, contagion results in unique behavior even though there are multiple equilibria when the games are analyzed in isolation. Characterization of the long-run state is based on a formal parallel to rational equilibria of games with subjective priors. The results of contagion due to learning share the qualitative features of those from contagion due to incomplete information, but quantitatively they differ.
    Keywords: Similarity, learning, contagion, case-based reasoning, global games, coordination, subjective priors.
    Date: 2007–04

This nep-evo issue is ©2007 by Matthew Baker. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.