nep-evo New Economics Papers
on Evolutionary Economics
Issue of 2007‒07‒27
three papers chosen by
Matthew Baker
City University of New York
  1. Inequity Aversion and Individual Behavior in Public Good Games: An Experimental Investigation By Dannenberg, Astrid; Riechmann, Thomas; Sturm, Bodo; Vogt, Carsten
  2. Are Experimental Economists Prone to Framing Effects? A Natural Field Experiment By Simon Gaechter; Henrik Orzen; Elke Renner; Chris Starmer
  3. The Evolution of Coorporation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence By Pedro Dal Bo; Guillaume R. Frechette
  1. By: Dannenberg, Astrid; Riechmann, Thomas; Sturm, Bodo; Vogt, Carsten
    Abstract: We present a simple two-steps procedure for a within-subject test of the inequity aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). In the first step, subjects played modified ultimatum and dictator games and were classified according to their preferences. In the second step, subjects with specific preferences according to the Fehr and Schmidt model were matched into pairs and interacted with each other in a standard public good game and a public good game with punishment possibility. Our results show that the specific composition of groups significantly influences the subjects’ performance in the public good games. We identify the aversion against advantageous inequity and the information about the coplayer’s type as the main influencing factors for the behavior of subjects.
    Keywords: individual preferences, inequity aversion, experimental economics, public goods
    JEL: C91 C92 H41
    Date: 2007
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:5693&r=evo
  2. By: Simon Gaechter (Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, University of Nottingham); Henrik Orzen (Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, University of Nottingham); Elke Renner (Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, University of Nottingham); Chris Starmer (Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, University of Nottingham)
    Abstract: An extensive literature demonstrates the existence of framing effects in the laboratory and in questionnaire studies. This paper reports new evidence from a natural field experiment using a subject pool one may consider as particularly resistant to such effects: experimental economists. We find that while the behaviour of junior experimental economists is affected by the description of the decision task they face, this is not the case for the more senior members of our subject pool.
    Keywords: Framing; field experiments
    JEL: C93 D01
    Date: 2007–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2007-01&r=evo
  3. By: Pedro Dal Bo; Guillaume R. Frechette
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bro:econwp:2007-7&r=evo
This nep-evo issue is ©2007 by Matthew Baker. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at http://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.
This page is being maintained by Thomas Krichel. It was last updated on 2023‒07‒08 at 14:03.