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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | S.E.G. Lea; L.Newson |
| Abstract: | Until a few generations ago, humans made their living by foraging, like other animals. We have therefore inherited genes that allowed our ancestors to thrive as hunters and gatherers. Thriving in a modern economy requires very different behaviours but we cope because the human brain evolved to be flexible with the ability to form cooperative networks with other humans and to maintain the shared body of information, expertise and values which we call “cultureâ€. We argue that human economic behaviour is influenced by both the genes and the culture that we “inherit†and that both are a result of a Darwinian evolutionary process. An evolutionary approach is therefore likely to be of value in developing theories of economic behaviour. We then use this approach to analyse in broad terms how people that are born with the brains of foragers living in a small-scale society become consumers in a modern society and where this behaviour is likely to lead our species. |
| Keywords: | Length 31 pages |
| Date: | 2007–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esi:evopap:2007-04&r=evo |
| By: | Ellingsen, Tore (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics); Johannesson, Magnus (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | A distinctive feature of humans compared to other species is the high rate of cooperation with non-kin. One explanation is that humans are motivated by concerns for social esteem. In this paper we experimentally investigate the impact of anticipated verbal feedback on altruistic behavior. We study pairwise interactions in which one subject, the “divider”, decides how to split a sum of money between herself and a recipient. Thereafter, the recipient can send an unrestricted anonymous message to the divider. The subjects’ relationship is anonymous and one-shot to rule out any reputation effects. Compared to a control treatment without feedback messages, donations increase substantially when recipients can communicate. With verbal feedback, the fraction of zero donations decreases from about 40% to about 20%, and there is a corresponding increase in the fraction of equal splits from about 30% to about 50%. Recipients who receive no money almost always express disapproval of the divider, sometimes strongly and in foul language. Following an equal split, almost all recipients praise the divider. The results suggest that anticipated verbal rewards and punishments play a role in promoting altruistic behavior among humans. |
| Keywords: | Punishment; Approval; Disapproval; Dictator game; Altruism; Communication; Verbal feedback |
| JEL: | C91 D64 |
| Date: | 2007–06–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:hastef:0668&r=evo |