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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Alexander Matros |
| Abstract: | This paper analyses an evolutionary version of the Public Good game of Eshel, Samuelson, and Shaked (1998) in which agents can choose between imitation and best-reply decision rules. We describe conditions under which altruistic and spiteful (maximizing) behavior arise: these conditions are established for any number of neighbors and any total number of agents in the population. Given mistake-free play, (short-run) outcomes are identical whether agents are constrained to employ an imitation rule only; or they can choose between imitation and best-reply rules. Given the possibility of mistakes, (long-run) outcomes vary across these two scenarios. The paper suggests how to provide public goods and gives an explanation of why we observe seemingly irrational cooperation - altruistic behavior - in the rational world. |
| JEL: | C70 C72 C73 |
| Date: | 2006–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pit:wpaper:309&r=evo |
| By: | Alex Coad (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - [CNRS : UMR8174] - [Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I], LEM - Laboratory of Economics and Management - [Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies]) |
| Abstract: | Complicated neoclassical models predict that if investment is sensitive to current financial performance, this is a sign that something is "wrong" and is to be regarded as a problem for policy. Evolutionary theory, on the other hand, refers to the principle of "growth of the fitter" to explain investment-cash flow sensitivities as the workings of a healthy economy. In particular, I attack the neoclassical assumption of managers maximizing shareholder-value. Such an assumption is not a helpful starting point for empirical studies into firm growth. one caricature of neoclassical theory could be "Assume firms are perfectly efficient. Why aren't they getting enoug funding ?", whereas evolutionary theory considers that firms are forever struggling to grow. This essay highlights how policy guidelines can be framed by the initial modelling assumptions, even though these latter are often chosen with analytical tractability in mind rather than realism. |
| Keywords: | Financial constraints, firm growth, evolutionary theory, neoclassical theory, investment. |
| Date: | 2007–05–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:papers:halshs-00144415_v1&r=evo |
| By: | Kris de Jaegher |
| Abstract: | Horn’s rule says that messages can be kept ambiguous if only a single interpretation is plausible. Speakers only perform costly disambiguation to convey surprising information. This paper shows that, while noncooperative game theory cannot justify Horn’s rule, evolutionary game theory can. In order to model the evolution of signalling, the pooling equilibrium needs to be one’s starting point. But in such an equilibrium, the plausible interpretation is made, and the receiver is therefore already predisposed to interpret absence of a signal as referring to a plausible event. From there on, a marked signal referring to an implausible event can evolve. At the same time, the paper identifies an exception to Horn’s rule. If giving a plausible interpretation for an implausible event is very costly, then in the pooling equilibrium the implausible interpretation is always made. In this exceptional case, only an inefficient separating equilibrium disobeying Horn’s rule can evolve. |
| Keywords: | Horn’s Rule, Signalling, Evolutionary Game Theory, Evolutionary Drift, Pragmatics. |
| JEL: | C72 D82 |
| Date: | 2007–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:use:tkiwps:0712&r=evo |
| By: | Kris de Jaegher |
| Abstract: | The literature on the electronic mail game shows that players’ mutual expectations may lock them into requiring an inefficiently large number of confirmations and confirmations of confirmations from one another. This paper shows that this result hinges on the assumption that, with the exception of the first message, each player can only send a message when receiving an immediately preceding message. We show that, once this assumption is lifted, equilibria involving confirmations of confirmations no longer pass standard refinements of the Nash equilibrium, and are no longer evolutionary stable. |
| Keywords: | Electronic Mail Game, Efficient Communication, Grounding, Equilibrium Refinements, Evolutionary Stability |
| JEL: | C70 D72 |
| Date: | 2007–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:use:tkiwps:0711&r=evo |