nep-evo New Economics Papers
on Evolutionary Economics
Issue of 2006‒06‒24
three papers chosen by
Matthew Baker
US Naval Academy, USA

  1. Population-Dependent Costs of Detecting Trustworthiness - An Indirect Evolutionary Analysis - By Werner Güth; Hartmut Kliemt; Stefan Napel
  2. Moral Norms in a Partly Compliant Society By Sebastian Kranz
  3. Equilibrium Allele Distribution in Trading Populations By SAINT-PAUL, Gilles

  1. By: Werner Güth; Hartmut Kliemt; Stefan Napel
    Abstract: If the (un)trustworthy are rare, people will talk about them, making their detection more reliable and / or less costly. When, however, both types appear in large numbers, detecting (un)trustworthiness will be considerably more difficult and possibly too costly. Based on Güth and Kliemt (2000) we analyze how the composition of a population of trustworthy, resp. untrustworthy individuals evolves if the cost and reliability of type detection depend on the population composition.
    Date: 2006–06
  2. By: Sebastian Kranz
    Abstract: This paper analyses competition of moral norms and institutions in a society where a fixed share of people unconditionally complies with norms and the remaining people act selfishly. Whether a person is a norm-complier or selfish is private knowledge. A model of voting-by-feet shows that those norms and institutions arise that maximize expected utility of norm-compliers, taken into account selfish players' behavior. Such complier optimal norms lead to a simple behavioral model that, when combined with preferences for equitable outcomes, is in line with the relevant stylized facts from a wide range of economic experiments, like reciprocal behavior, costly punishment, the role of intentions, giving in dictator games and concerns for social efficiency. The paper contributes to the literature on voting-by-feet, institutional design, ethics and social preferences.
    Keywords: moral norms, social preferences, fairness, reciprocity, rule utilitarianism, voting-by-feet, farsighted-stability, cultural evolution, golden rule, social norms
    JEL: A13 C7 D02 D63 D64 D71 D8 Z13
    Date: 2006–05
  3. By: SAINT-PAUL, Gilles
    Date: 2006–03

This nep-evo issue is ©2006 by Matthew Baker. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.