nep-evo New Economics Papers
on Evolutionary Economics
Issue of 2006‒05‒13
three papers chosen by
Matthew Baker
US Naval Academy, USA

  1. From a Routine-Based to a Knowledge-Based View: Towards an Evolutionary Theory of the Firm By Fritz Rahmeyer
  2. Daughters and Left-Wing Voting By Andrew J. Oswald; Nattavudh Powdthavee
  3. Mutual Monitoring in Teams: Theory and Experimental Evidence on the Importance of Reciprocity By Jeffrey Carpenter; Samuel Bowles; Herbert Gintis

  1. By: Fritz Rahmeyer (University of Augsburg, Department of Economics)
    Abstract: Evolutionary economics in the initial version of Nelson and Winter is concentrated on the analysis of the evolution of industries and markets and in that entrepreneurial innovation activities. But a theory of the firm beneath the level of the industry is not taken into account to a large extent. In order to widen its fundamental principles a resource-based, and as its extension, a knowledge-based view of the firm, both originated in the field of Business Strategy, are seen as promising candidates to close this gap within evolutionary economics. Industry dynamics as the evolution of a population of firms in this way is supplemented by a more detailed characterization of the internal structure of individual firms. It is the fundamental question with regard to the adequacy of an evolutionary interpretation of firm behaviour and development as to what extend a firm and its individual activities are considered to be capable of purposefully and actively influencing its environment, on the one hand, and are blindly selected by environmental pressure, on the other hand. In this way firms become intendedly heterogenous concerning market performance and organizational structure. Regarding the general topic of a theory of the firm, a unified approach will not be constructed, but more likely a hybrid one being composed of technological, institutional and efficiency-based elements.
    Keywords: economic evolution; resource-based view; knowledge-based view of the firm; theory of the firm management
    JEL: B52 D21 D83 L23
    Date: 2006–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aug:augsbe:0283&r=evo
  2. By: Andrew J. Oswald (University of Warwick and IZA Bonn); Nattavudh Powdthavee (University of London)
    Abstract: This paper provides evidence that daughters make people more left-wing. Having sons, by contrast, makes them more right-wing. Parents, politicians and voters are probably not aware of this phenomenon - nor are social scientists. The paper discusses its economic and evolutionary roots. It also speculates on where research might lead. The paper ends with a conjecture: left-wing individuals are people who come from families into which, over recent past generations, many females have been born.
    Keywords: voting, gender, daughters, political preferences, attitudes
    JEL: D1 D72 H1 J7
    Date: 2006–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2103&r=evo
  3. By: Jeffrey Carpenter (Middlebury College and IZA Bonn); Samuel Bowles (Santa Fe Institute and University of Siena); Herbert Gintis (Central European University and Santa Fe Institute)
    Abstract: Monitoring by peers is often an effective means of attenuating incentive problems. Most explanations of the efficacy of mutual monitoring rely either on small group size or on a version of the Folk theorem with repeated interactions which requires reasonably accurate public information concerning the behavior of each player. We provide a model of team production in which the effectiveness of mutual monitoring depends not on these factors, but rather on strong reciprocity: the willingness of some team members to engage in the costly punishment of shirkers. This alternative does not require small group size or public signals. An experimental public goods game provides evidence for the behavioral relevance of strong reciprocity in teams.
    Keywords: team production, public good, monitoring, punishment, experiment
    JEL: C92 H41 J41 J54 Z13
    Date: 2006–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2106&r=evo

This nep-evo issue is ©2006 by Matthew Baker. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at http://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.