|
on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | David Masclet (CREM - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Management - http://crem.univ-rennes1.fr/ - [CNRS : UMR6211] - [Université Rennes I][Université de Caen] - []); Laurent Denant (CREM - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Management - http://crem.univ-rennes1.fr/ - [CNRS : UMR6211] - [Université Rennes I][Université de Caen] - []); Charles Noussair (EMORY UNIVERSITY - Emory University - [Emory University] - [] - []) |
| Abstract: | We present the results of an experiment that explores the sanctioning behavior of individuals who experience a social dilemma. In the game we study, players choose contribution levels to a public good and subsequently have multiple opportunities to reduce the earnings of the other members of the group. The treatments vary in terms of individuals' opportunities to (a) avenge sanctions that have been directed toward themselves, and (b) punish others' sanctioning behavior with respect to third parties. We find that the individuals avenge sanctions they have received, punish those who fail to sanction third parties, and punish low contributors, even when punishment is costly to the sanctioner. When there are five rounds of unrestricted sanctioning, contributions and welfare are significantly lower than when only one round of sanctioning opportunities exists, and welfare is lower than the zero-cooperation benchmark. |
| Keywords: | Public Good; Punishment; Revenge; counterpunishement |
| Date: | 2006–03–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:papers:halshs-00009664_v1&r=evo |
| By: | Pelikan, Pavel (Prague University of Economics and The Ratio Institute) |
| Abstract: | In addition to recognizing that human rationality has bounds, these are recognized to be unequal across individuals. Unequally bounded rationality is found to be a special scarce resource, tied to individuals and used for deciding on its own uses. In consequence, its allocation to uses in society cannot approach efficiency without a trial-and-error evolution. Important differences are found between the institutions (“the rules of the game”) that can shape this evolution on markets and the ones that can shape it within governments. The policy implications appear ideologically mixed: against all national planning, selective industrial policies, and government ownership of enterprises in production, but for some paternalism and redistribution in final consumption. |
| Keywords: | Rationality; institutions; organizations; entrepreneurs: owners |
| JEL: | A10 D61 G10 H10 O16 P51 |
| Date: | 2006–03–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:ratioi:0085&r=evo |
| By: | Gilles Saint-Paul (University of Toulouse 1, CEPR and IZA Bonn) |
| Abstract: | This paper derives the conditions under which fitness-reducing alleles can survive in a longrun stationary equilibrium for a trading population, extending the results in Saint-Paul (2002) for arbitrary systems of sexual reproduction. |
| Keywords: | trade, genotypes, natural selection, gene-culture coevolution |
| JEL: | J1 J22 |
| Date: | 2006–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2027&r=evo |