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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Andreoni,J. (University of Wisconsin-Madison, Social Systems Research Institute) |
| Date: | 2005 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:att:wimass:20057&r=evo |
| By: | Teck H. Ho; Noah Lim; Colin Camerer |
| Date: | 2005–10–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000476&r=evo |
| By: | Holger Strulik (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates how social composition affects social conflict and economic development when property rights are unenforceable. Groups follow Markovian strategies for consumption and investment and may also spend effort in an resource appropriation contest. It is shown that conflict prevents investment and growth in a society of symmetric groups. In a society at peace economic growth may occur. Growth, however, is decreasing in the degree of social fractionalization and smaller than it could be under secure property rights. In an economy populated by social groups of unequal size an asymmetric equilibrium exists. A large majority may behave peacefully although continuously challenged by a predatory minority. The rebelridden economy either stagnates or grows at a low rate. Growth is decreasing in the size of the predatory minority and its conflict intensity. A final part extends the analysis towards behavior of non-benevolent social elites. |
| Keywords: | social conflict; social fractionalization; property rights; stagnation; growth |
| JEL: | C73 D74 O11 |
| Date: | 2005–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0516&r=evo |
| By: | List, John (U of Chicago); Millimet, Daniel (SMU) |
| Abstract: | While laboratory experiments documenting some level of irrational behavior are now commonplace, explorations into whether such irrationalities exist in the field are rare. Equally as scarce are studies that explore the influence of market experience on the level and evolution of irrationality. Using field data gathered from more than 380 subjects of age 6-18, we investigate these issues using Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference experiments. To circumvent the endogeneity of market experience, we exogenously induce such experience through the design of a field experiment. Compliance with the experiment was not perfect, however. We are, nevertheless, able to bound the average treatment effect using the sharp bounds derived in Balke and Pearl [Journal of the American Economic Association, 1997, 92, 1171-1776]. Empirical results indicate that deviations from rational behavior exist in the field, but that market experience is a significant contributor to the development of rational choice. |
| Keywords: | rationality, market learning, field experiment, imperfect compliance, treatment effects, nonparametric bounds, instrumental variables, intent-to-treat |
| JEL: | C14 C93 |
| Date: | 2005–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:smu:ecowpa:0505&r=evo |