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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Tobias Regner |
| Abstract: | We study the pricing and tipping behaviour of users of the online service `Google Answers'. While they set a price for the answer to their question ex ante, they can additionally give a tip to the researcher ex post. We develop a model that is based on reciprocal theories of social preferences pioneered by Rabin (1993) and extended by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004). The predictions of our model are empirically tested with the field data we obtained. The reasons for leaving a tip are analysed. A significant amount of users are motivated by social preferences. We also find strong support for reputation concerns. Moreover, researchers appear to adjust their effort based on the user's previous tipping behaviour. We conclude that an endogenous incomplete contracts design encourages people to contribute voluntarily. This is motivated by reciprocity when people are socially minded, but also generally by strategic behaviour to build up a good reputation. Efficiency is increased when contracts are left open deliberately as high effort is sustained. |
| Keywords: | social preferences, reciprocity, moral hazard, reputation, internet |
| JEL: | C24 C70 C93 D82 L86 |
| Date: | 2005–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bri:cmpowp:05/115&r=evo |
| By: | James Andreoni |
| Date: | 2005–03–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000679&r=evo |
| By: | Johansson-Stenman, Olof (Department of Economics, School of Economics and Commercial Law, Göteborg University); Mahmud, Minhaj (Department of Economics, School of Economics and Commercial Law, Göteborg University); Martinsson, Peter (Department of Economics, School of Economics and Commercial Law, Göteborg University) |
| Abstract: | Levels of trust are measured by asking standard survey questions on trust and by observing the behaviour in a trust game using a random sample in rural Bangladesh. Follow-up questions and correlations between the sent amount in the trust game and stated expectations reveal that the amount sent in the trust game is a weak measure of trust. The fear of future punishment, either within or after this life, for not being sufficiently generous to others, was the most frequently stated motive behind the respondents’ behaviour, highlighting the potential importance of motives that cannot be inferred directly from people’s behaviour. <p> |
| Keywords: | Trust; trust game; social capital; field experiment; Bangladesh |
| JEL: | C93 Z13 |
| Date: | 2005–03–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0166&r=evo |
| By: | Johansson-Stenman, Olof (Department of Economics, School of Economics and Commercial Law, Göteborg University); Mahmud, Minhaj (Department of Economics, School of Economics and Commercial Law, Göteborg University); Martinsson, Peter (Department of Economics, School of Economics and Commercial Law, Göteborg University) |
| Abstract: | Trust is measured using both survey questions and a standard trust experiment using a random sample of individuals in rural Bangladesh. We found no significant effect of the social distance between Hindus and Muslims in the trust experiment in terms of fractions sent or returned, but the responses to the survey questions indicate significant differences: Hindus, the minority, trust other people less in general, and Hindus trust Muslims more than the other way around. <p> |
| Keywords: | social capital; trust; social distance; religion; trust game; field experiment; Bangladesh |
| JEL: | C93 Z13 |
| Date: | 2005–03–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0167&r=evo |
| By: | George J. Mailath (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania); Stephen Morris (Cowles Foundation, Yale University) |
| Abstract: | Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in such games. It is always possible to coordinate continuation play by requiring behavior to have bounded recall (i.e., there is a bound L such that in any period, the last L signals are sufficient to determine behavior). We show that, in games with general almost-public private monitoring, this is essentially the only behavior that can coordinate continuation play. |
| Keywords: | repeated games, private monitoring, almost-public monitoring, coordination, bounded recall |
| JEL: | C72 C73 D82 |
| Date: | 2004–08–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pen:papers:05-014&r=evo |
| By: | Richard A. Easterlin |
| Abstract: | Contrary to the setpoint model of some psychologists, individual happiness does not tend to fluctuate around a constant level. Although the personality and genetic factors emphasized by setpoint theorists are important in explaining individual differences in happiness at a point in time, survey evidence demonstrates that over the life cycle economic circumstances, family life, health, and work are important in determining the course of happiness. However, life events do not necessarily dominate life cycle satisfaction in different domains, and economic theories of well-being would benefit from following psychologists’ lead by incorporating goals and adaptation. |
| Keywords: | Happiness, Aspirations, Adaptation |
| JEL: | D60 I31 A12 |
| Date: | 2005–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:scp:wpaper:05-8&r=evo |