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on Environmental Economics |
| By: | Stefan Ambec; Paul Lanoie (IEA, HEC Montréal) |
| Keywords: | Environmental policy; innovation; Porter hypothesis; environmental regulation; pollution; capital market; green products. |
| JEL: | D21 D23 G22 |
| Date: | 2007–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iea:carech:0704&r=env |
| By: | Sergey Paltsev; John M. Reilly; Henry D. Jacoby; Angelo C. Gurgel; Gilbert E. Metcalf; Andrei P. Sokolov; Jennifer F. Holak |
| Abstract: | The MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis model is applied to synthetic policies that match key attributes of a set of cap-and-trade proposals being considered by the U.S. Congress in spring 2007. The bills fall into two groups: one specifies emissions reductions of 50% to 80% below 1990 levels by 2050; the other establishes a tightening target for emissions intensity and stipulates a time-path for a "safety valve" limit on the emission price that approximately stabilizes U.S. emissions at the 2008 level. Initial period prices are estimated between $7 and $50 per ton CO2-e with these prices rising by a factor of four by 2050. Welfare costs vary from near zero to less than 0.5% at the start, rising in the most stringent case to near 2% in 2050. If allowances were auctioned these proposals could produce revenue between $100 billion and $500 billion per year depending on the case. Outcomes from U.S. policies depend on mitigation effort abroads, and simulations are provided to illuminate terms-of-trade effects that influence the emissions prices and welfare effects, and even the environmental effectiveness, of U.S. actions. Sensitivity tests also are provided of several of key design features. Finally, the U.S. proposals, and the assumptions about effort elsewhere, are extended to 2100 to allow exploration of the potential role of these bills in the longer-term challenge of reducing climate change risk. Simulations show that the 50% to 80% targets are consistent with global goals of atmospheric stabilization at 450 to 550 ppmv CO2 but only if other nations, including the developing countries, follow suit. |
| JEL: | Q4 Q48 Q54 |
| Date: | 2007–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13176&r=env |
| By: | Geir B. Asheim and Bjart Holtsmark (Statistics Norway) |
| Abstract: | Recent contributions show that climate agreements with broad participation can be implemented as weakly renegotiation-proof equilibria in simple models of greenhouse gas abatement where each country has a binary choice between cooperating (i.e., abate emissions) or defecting (no abatement). Here we show that this result carries over to a model where countries have a continuum of emission choices. Indeed, a Pareto-efficient climate agreement can always be implemented as a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium, for a sufficiently high discount factor. This means that one need not trade-off a “narrow but deep” treaty with a “broad but shallow” treaty. |
| Keywords: | Climate; non-cooperative game-theory; repeated games; weakly renegotiation-proof agreements |
| JEL: | C72 F53 Q54 |
| Date: | 2007–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ssb:dispap:505&r=env |
| By: | Holm, Claus (Department of Management Science and Logistics, Aarhus School of Business); Rikhardsson, Pall (Department of Management Science and Logistics, Aarhus School of Business) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the effect of environmental information on the investment <p> decisions of investors. The motivation for the experimental design <p> applied in this study is that unless actual decision making is observed, <p> the potential usefulness of environmental information (or lack <p> thereof) cannot be taken for granted. The study is based on an experiment <p> where groups of investors (varied by experience) were asked to <p> make investment allocation decisions based on financial information and <p> on supplementary environmental information (varied between cases). As <p> an investment allocation decision (varied by investment horizons) the <p> groups were asked to allocate funds to two companies based on the available <p> information. The findings suggest that environmental information has <p> the potential to influence investment allocation decisions. The findings <p> also suggest that the influence of environmental information on investment <p> allocation decisions is mitigated by the variables considered explicitly <p> in this study, i.e., the investment horizon (varied as short and long) <p> and investor experience (varied as novice and experienced investor). It is <p> concluded that because allocation decisions are multifaceted problems, <p> mixed results related to the influence of environmental information should <p> be expected |
| Keywords: | Environmental reporting; Environmental disclosures; Allocation; Decision making; Investment horizon; Investors; Experiment; |
| Date: | 2006–06–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhb:aarbfr:2006-002&r=env |
| By: | Broberg, Thomas (Department of Economics, Umeå University) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we analyze the multiple-bounded (MB) format in which uncertainty is directly incorporated into the WTP question. We introduce a new approach to estimate mean and median willingness to pay (WTP) using MB data by allowing respondents to expand their WTP intervals by shifting their upper bound. Thus, less certain respondents will state a wider WTP interval. This differs from the Welsh and Poe (1998) approach (WP) which shifts the entire WTP interval and likely overestimates mean and median WTP when uncertainty is introduced. To compare empirically our expansion approach to the WP-approach, we use survey data from 2004 that elicited WTP for implementation of a predator protection policy in Sweden. In addition to its more intuitive appeal, our results indicate that the interval expansion approach better fits the data and provides a smaller range of estimated WTP. It also with better precision estimates the mean and median WTP when preference uncertainty is considered, and its estimates are less sensitive to alternative distributional assumptions. |
| Keywords: | contingent valuation; preference uncertainty; elicitation format; multiple-bounded; payment card; willingness to pay; predators |
| JEL: | C81 Q20 Q26 Q28 |
| Date: | 2007–06–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:umnees:0714&r=env |
| By: | Ambec, S.; Ehlers, L. |
| Abstract: | This paper considers environments in which several agents (countries, farmers, cities) share water from a river. Each agent enjoys a concave benefit function from consuming water up to a satiation level. Noncooperative extraction is typically inefficient and any group of agents can gain if they agree on how to allocate water with monetary compensations. The paper describes which allocations of water and money are acceptable to riparian agents according to core stability and several criteria of fairness. It reviews some theoretical results. It then discusses the implementation of the proposed allocation with negotiation rules and in water markets. Lastly, it provides some policy insights. |
| Keywords: | WATER ALLOCATION;GAME;CORE;WATER MARKET;NEGOTIATION;RULES;EXTERNALITIES |
| JEL: | Q25 Q28 |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gbl:wpaper:200705&r=env |
| By: | Alain Mathieu |
| Abstract: | Diverses externalités négatives peuvent hypothéquer l’avenir des biocarburants de première génération. Les biocarburants de seconde génération, relevant de la filière lignocellulosique, sont exempts de telles critiques. Il reste à savoir dans quelle mesure une matière première considérée traditionnellement comme biocombustible va pouvoir franchir le cap de la recherche pour constituer un biocarburant compétitif. Ces questions sont examinées dans ce document. |
| Keywords: | Biocarburants, Externalités, Energies Renouvelables |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mop:credwp:07.71&r=env |