nep-env New Economics Papers
on Environmental Economics
Issue of 2006‒12‒09
five papers chosen by
Francisco S.Ramos
Federal University of Pernambuco

  1. Introducing Forest Access Cost Functions into a General Equilibrium Model By Gouel, Christophe; Hertel, Thomas
  2. The Role of Global Land Use in Determining Greenhouse Gases Mitigation Costs By Hertel, Thomas; Lee, Huey-Lin; Rose, Steven; Sohngen, Brent
  3. Is inequality harmful for the environment in a growing economy ? By Hubert Kempf; Stéphane Rossignol
  4. Uncertainty management in the IPCC: agreeing to disagree By Minh Ha-Duong; Rob Swart; Lenny Bernstein; Arthur Petersen
  5. Sharing a River among Satiable Countries By AMBEC, Steve; EHLERS, Lars

  1. By: Gouel, Christophe; Hertel, Thomas
    Abstract: The purpose of this Research Memorandum is to propose an approach to incorporating forest access cost functions into global general equilibrium models such as GTAP. Towards this end, we develop a long run access cost function which can be calibrated to national data on total forest land, currently inaccessible forest land, forest land rents, and expected rates of return on investment. This is illustrated for an 11 region aggregation of the GTAP-AEZ data base. We find that this long run function generates far too high a rate of annual access, and so we introduce a short run component which introduces a quadratic term into the cost function. This can be chosen to target current rates of forest access as reported by the FAO. Finally, we discuss the treatment of this new type of investment in the general equilibrium model.
    Date: 2006
  2. By: Hertel, Thomas; Lee, Huey-Lin; Rose, Steven; Sohngen, Brent
    Abstract: This paper develops a CGE model with unique regional land types and detailed non-CO2 GHG emissions which it uses to analyze the potential for reductions in land-based greenhouse gas emissions as well as forest sequestration. In our global, general equilibrium analysis of carbon taxation, we find that forest carbon sequestration is the dominant means for global GHG emissions reduction in the land using sectors. However, when compared to the rest of the world, emissions abatement in the US comes disproportionately from agriculture, and, within agriculture, disproportionately from reductions in fertilizer-related emissions (primarily in maize production). In the world as a whole, agriculture-related mitigation comes predominantly in reduced methane emissions from ruminant livestock, which is followed in relative importance by reductions in methane emissions from paddy rice. We also find significant linkages between emissions in one region and mitigation in another (i.e. leakage). For example, in the US agriculture, abatement potential is cut in half when we move from a national tax to a global carbon tax. This is a consequence of the strong export orientation of US agriculture, which responds to reduced production in the rest of the world by increasing its own production and hence emissions.
    Date: 2006
  3. By: Hubert Kempf (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - [CNRS : UMR8174] - [Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I]); Stéphane Rossignol (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - [CNRS : UMR8174] - [Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I], Université de Versailles - [Université de Versailles-Saint Quentin en Yvelines])
    Abstract: In this paper we investigate the relationship between inequality and the environment in a growing economy from a political economy perspective. We consider an endogenous growth economy, where growth generates pollution and a deterioration of the environment. Public expenditures may either be devoted to supporting growth or abating pollution. The decision over the public programs is done in a direct democracy, with simple majority rule. We prove that the median voter is decisive and show that inequality is harmful for the environment : the poorer the median voter relative to the average individual, the less she will tax and devote resources to the environment, preferring to support growth.
    Keywords: Inequality, growth, environmental policy, political economy.
    Date: 2006–11–29
  4. By: Minh Ha-Duong (CIRED - Centre international de recherche sur l'environnement et le développement - [CIRAD : UMR56][CNRS : UMR8568] - [Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales][Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées][Ecole Nationale du Génie Rural des Eaux et des Forêts]); Rob Swart (Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency - [Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency]); Lenny Bernstein (L.S. Bernstein & Associates, L.L.C. - [L.S. Bernstein & Associates, L.L.C.]); Arthur Petersen (Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency - [Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency])
    Abstract: Looking back over three and a half Assessment Reports, we see that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has given increasing attention to the management and reporting of uncertainties, but coordination across working groups (WGs) has remained an issue. We argue that there are good reasons for working groups to use different methods to assess uncertainty, thus it is better that working groups agree to disagree rather than seek to bring everybody on one party line.
    Keywords: IPCC; uncertainty
    Date: 2006–11–30
  5. By: AMBEC, Steve; EHLERS, Lars
    Abstract: With diminishing global water reserves the problem of water allocation becomes increasingly important. We consider the problem of efficiently sharing a river among a group of satiable countries. Inducing countries to efficiently cooperate requires monetary compensations via international agreements. We show that cooperation of the other countries exerts a positive externality on the benefit of a coalition. Our problem is to distribute the benefit of efficiently sharing the river under these constraints. If the countries outside of a coalition do not cooperate at all, then the downstream incremental distribution is the unique compromise between the absolute territorial sovereignty (ATS) doctrine and the unlimited territorial integrity (UTI) doctrine. If all countries outside of a coalition cooperate, then there may not exist any distribution satisfying the UTI doctrine.
    Keywords: Water Allocation, Externalities
    JEL: C71 D62 H23
    Date: 2006

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