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on Environmental Economics |
By: | Hassan Benchekroun; Seiichi Katayama; Ngo Van Long |
Abstract: | We show that, in a model with substitutability between capital and resources, the path of sustainable development may be non-smooth, and may exhibit the overshooting property: starting from low levels of capital and resources, the economy may accumulate capital beyond its steady-state level, before converging to it in finite time. <P>Nous démontrons que, dans un modèle avec la substitution entre le capital et les ressources naturelles, le sentier du développement peut être non-monotone. Si l’on commence avec un niveau faible de capital et de ressources naturelles, le sentier optimal peut dépasse le niveau du capital de l’état stationnaire. La convergence s’effectue en temps fini. |
Keywords: | sustainable development, renewable resources, développement soutenable, ressources naturelles renouvelables |
JEL: | C73 H41 D60 |
Date: | 2006–11–01 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cir:cirwor:2006s-26&r=env |
By: | Karel Janda (Institute of Economic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic; University of Economics, Department of Banking and Insurance, Prague, Czech Republic) |
Abstract: | The paper analyzes the government budget cost of credit guarantees and subsidies. The analysis is done both in a general qualitative manner and quantitatively for the case of Czech Supporting and Guarantee Agricultural and Forestry Fund (SGAFF). In the quantitative part of the paper we show that the portfolio of the SGAFF has a sufficient value to cover expected costs of credit guarantees and subsidies provided by the SGAFF. The qualitative theoretical model is dealing with government interventions designed to decrease the credit rationing of good farmers. The theoretical model shows that with uniform non-targeted supports the budget cost minimizing government unambiguously prefers lump-sum guarantees to interest rate subsidies. With supports targeted fully to disadvantaged farmers the government is indifferent between lump-sum guarantees, proportional guarantees and interest rates subsidies as far as the government budget costs are concerned. |
Keywords: | Transition; Credit; Subsidies; Guarantees |
JEL: | D82 G28 P31 |
Date: | 2005 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fau:wpaper:wp086&r=env |
By: | Jean-Pierre Nicolas (LET - Laboratoire d'économie des transports - [CNRS : UMR5593] - [Université Lumière - Lyon II] - [Ecole Nationale des Travaux Publics de l'Etat]); Fabien Duprez (CERTU - Centre d'études sur les réseaux de transport et l' urbanisme - [Ministère des Transports, de l'Équipement, du Tourisme et de la mer]); Sandrine Durand (LET - Laboratoire d'économie des transports - [CNRS : UMR5593] - [Université Lumière - Lyon II] - [Ecole Nationale des Travaux Publics de l'Etat]); Fabrice Poisson (LTE - Laboratoire Transport et Environnement - [INRETS]); Pierre-Louis Aubert (LET - Laboratoire d'économie des transports - [CNRS : UMR5593] - [Université Lumière - Lyon II] - [Ecole Nationale des Travaux Publics de l'Etat]); Mireille Chiron (UMRESTTE - Unité Mixte de Recherche Epidémiologique et de Surveillance transport travail Environnement - [INRETS] - [Université Claude Bernard - Lyon I]); Yves Crozet (LET - Laboratoire d'économie des transports - [CNRS : UMR5593] - [Université Lumière - Lyon II] - [Ecole Nationale des Travaux Publics de l'Etat]); Jacques Lambert (LTE - Laboratoire Transport et Environnement - [INRETS]) |
Abstract: | Cette communication s'intéresse à la valorisation monétaire des impacts environnementaux de la pollution atmosphérique locale. Comment, d'un côté, ces chiffres sont-ils construits par les économistes, et comment, de l'autre, sont-ils repris et utilisés pour établir des valeurs officielles dans le cadre des politiques publiques ? Nous mettons en lumière les écarts existant entre les deux et proposons des solutions pour les réduire. |
Keywords: | Pollution locale ; effets ; monétarisation ; actualisation ; valeurs tutélaires ; décision publique ; comparaison internationale |
Date: | 2006–10–19 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:papers:halshs-00097868_v1&r=env |
By: | Minh Ha-Duong (CIRED - Centre international de recherche sur l'environnement et le développement - [CIRAD : UMR56][CNRS : UMR8568] - [Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales][Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées][Ecole Nationale du Génie Rural des Eaux et des Forêts]) |
Abstract: | This paper aggregates experts' opinion on the climate sensitivity parameter from Morgan and Keith (1995) using the Transferable Belief Model. The non-independence of experts issue is dealt with by organizing experts into schools of thought, requiring non-interactivity only across but not within groups. The issue of dissonance, that is wide qualitative differences in beliefs, is dealt with by using a disjunctive rather than conjunctive rule to combine the groups. We find the fusion do not support the idea that climate sensitivity must necessarily be within the IPCC range at any level, that the plausibility of the [4.5, 12] range is about 0.62, and for [6.0, 12] it is 0.31. |
Keywords: | climate sensitivity; experts aggregation; Dempster-Shafer; Transferable Belief Model |
Date: | 2006–11–07 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:papers:halshs-00112129_v1&r=env |
By: | Patrick Criqui (LEPII - Laboratoire d'économie de la prospective et de l'intégration internationale - [CNRS : FR2664] - [Université Pierre Mendès-France - Grenoble II]); Alban Kitous (Enerdata S.A.); Loreta Stankeviciute (LEPII - Laboratoire d'économie de la prospective et de l'intégration internationale - [CNRS : FR2664] - [Université Pierre Mendès-France - Grenoble II]) |
Abstract: | Cette étude développe une analyse de l'articulation du marché européen des quotas pour les industries lourdes et le secteur électrique avec la régulation des émissions des autres secteurs. En particulier il est supposé qu'une taxation du carbone est mise en oeuvre dans les transports et le bâtiment. L'interaction entre taxe et prix du marché est simulée en supposant que les Etats achètent sur le marché les réductions d'émission nécessaires lorsque la taxe est insuffisante. |
Keywords: | CHANGEMENT CLIMATIQUE ; PERMIS NEGOCIABLE |
Date: | 2006–11–20 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:papers:halshs-00114747_v1&r=env |
By: | Lionel Ragot (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - [CNRS : UMR8174] - [Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I], MÉDEE - [Université de Lille 1]); Katheline Schubert (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - [CNRS : UMR8174] - [Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I]) |
Abstract: | The Kyoto Protocol, which came in force in February 2005, allows countries to resort to «supplementary activities» consisting particularly in carbon sequestration in agricultural soils. Existing papers studying the optimal carbon sequestration recognize the importance of the temporality of sequestration, but overlook the fact that it is a dissymmetric dynamic process. This paper takes explicitely into account the temporality of sequestration. Its first contribution is technical : we solve an optimal control problem with two stages and a dissymmetric dynamic process. The second contribution is empirical : we show that the error made when sequestration is supposed immediate can be very significant, and we exhibit numerically the optimal path of sequestration/de-sequestration for specific benefit, damage and cost functions, and a calibration that mimics roughly the world conditions. |
Keywords: | Environment, agriculture, carbon sequestration, Kyoto Protocol, optimal control. |
Date: | 2006–11–22 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:papers:halshs-00115685_v1&r=env |
By: | Aronsson, Thomas (Department of Economics, Umeå University); Persson, Lars (Department of Economics, Umeå University); Sjögren, Tomas (Department of Economics, Umeå University) |
Abstract: | This paper concerns income and commodity taxation in a multi-jurisdictional <p> framework with transboundary environmental damage. We assume that each jurisdiction <p> is large in the sense that its government is able to influence the world <p> market prices via public policy. In such a framework, a noncooperative Nash equilibrium <p> does not only imply that the commodity tax on the externality-generating <p> good is inefficiently low seen from the perspective of global well-being; it also <p> means that the marginal income tax rate is inefficiently high, and that too much <p> resources are spent on public goods. With the noncooperative Nash equilibrium <p> as a starting point, we also consider the welfare effects of policy coordination with <p> respect to taxation and public expenditures. |
Keywords: | Trade and Environment; Optimal Taxation; Externalities |
JEL: | F18 H21 H23 |
Date: | 2006–11–20 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:umnees:0699&r=env |
By: | Sébastien Lecocq; Michael Visser |
Abstract: | The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of climate conditions on Bordeaux wine prices. Unlike previous studies (based on data from the main weather station in Mérignac), we use climatological variables from many local stations. Two models are compared: one where prices are related to Mérignac weather conditions, and one where prices are related to local conditions (weather variables measured in the station the nearest to the château). Although a non-nested test suggests that the model based on local weather data is the preferred one, regressions of the two speciÞcations lead to very similar results. This is reassuring news for researchers interested in the relationship between climate and wine prices, but who do not have access to small-scale spatial variations in climate. |
Keywords: | Bordeaux, France, Wine price, climate conditions |
JEL: | Q19 |
Date: | 2006–09 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lea:leawpi:0610&r=env |
By: | Susan Woodman |
Abstract: | Le nouveau campus du Queen Margaret University College, au Royaume-Uni, est dans sa conception un centre éducatif de proximité, soucieux du développement durable. Les étudiants et le personnel initialement consultés au sujet de la conception du campus ont montré qu’ils souhaitaient vivement disposer d’un environnement écologiquement viable, dans lequel tous puissent jouir de très nombreux espaces verts. C’est pourquoi les architectes du campus se sont employés à développer au maximum la biodiversité, à favoriser les moyens de transport écologiques et à tirer le meilleur parti possible de la lumière du jour et de la ventilation naturelle à l’intérieur des bâtiments. Ce projet de réimplantation prévoit de transformer une douzaine d’hectares de terres agricoles pauvres en une diversité d’habitats pour la flore et la faune permettant la création d’espaces verts. Le campus sera ouvert au grand public à des fins éducatives et récréatives. |
Keywords: | développement durable |
Date: | 2006–11 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:eduaaa:2006/9-fr&r=env |
By: | CASTELLUCCI LAURA; D’AMATO ALESSIO |
Abstract: | - |
Date: | 2005–10 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rtv:ceiswp:221&r=env |
By: | BECCHETTI LEONARDO; MASTROMATTEO GIUSEPPE |
Abstract: | Economic growth remains a fundamental component of broader socioeconomic development indicators which are increasingly taken as a reference target by domestic policymakers and international institutions. The recent theoretical and empirical literature emphasizes how institutional quality, access to education, new ICT technologies and access to credit are fundamental determinants of growth, given their crucial role in transforming talents into socioeconomic outcomes in spite of the inequality in initial conditions and the existence of individual financial resource constraints. |
Date: | 2006–01 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rtv:ceiswp:226&r=env |
By: | D’AMATO ALESSIO; VALENTINI EDILIO |
Abstract: | This paper deals with the issue of whether the power of allocating tradeable emission permits within a federal system (or an economic union) should be centralized or delegated to the single states/nations. To this end, we develop a simple two stage game played by two governments and their respective industries producing a homogeneous output that is sold in a third country. We show that when emission permits are traded competitively at a federal (or economic union) level, a decentralized emission trading system (DETS) would result in a lower than optimal price of permits, as well as in an aggregate emission target which is larger than the socially optimal target that would arise under a centralized system (CETS). This result partly hinges on standard international externality considerations; on the other hand, we find a new ”channel” through which decentralized permits distribution could lead to distortions: under a DETS, national governments play a Cournot game, and choose the amount of allowances to be distributed to domestic firms without accounting for the spillover such distribution generates on the other country via the price of allowances. |
Date: | 2006–05 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rtv:ceiswp:235&r=env |
By: | AUCI SABRINA; BECCHETTI LEONARDO; RANDO LUCA |
Abstract: | Several theoretical models investigating the relationship between economic growth and environmental degradation postulate that consumers’ willingness to pay for it gets higher as far as per capita income grows. We test this hypothesis on willingness to pay (WTP) for the environment data collected from the World Value Survey database for a large number of countries and find strong support for it after controlling for demographics, personal values and country variables such as domestic institutional quality and pollution intensity. We also document that the additional and most robust determinants of the WTP are age, education, religious practice, proxies of civic values (tax morale, sense of belonging to a wider community) and quality of domestic institutions. |
Date: | 2006–09 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rtv:ceiswp:239&r=env |
By: | José Ramón Ruiz Tamarit (Universitat de València); Manuel Sánchez Moreno (Universitat de València) |
Abstract: | This paper develops a two-sector model for a renewable natural resource based economy. Pareto efficient results show the optimal harvesting rate that allows for sustained long-run optimal growth, which is upper-bounded by the biological rate of reproduction. Regulation prevents from resource over-exploitation and exhaustion which arise under open access. The Ramsey policy allowing the competitive economy to reach the first-best solution, leads the government to tax harvesting activity from firms and distribute the receipts among households. In the short-run the tax is variable. In the long-run, the lower the intrinsic rate of reproduction the higher the constant unit tax on the resource use. |
Keywords: | Natural Resources, Efficiency, Open Access, Ramsey Regulation, Growth. |
JEL: | C62 D90 O41 Q2 H2 |
Date: | 2006–11 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2006-21&r=env |
By: | Beatriz Gaitan; Terry L. Roe |
Abstract: | We investigate the Ramsey-like dynamics of nonrenewable resource abundance on economic growth and welfare in a two country world. One country is endowed with a non-renewable- resource Otherwise, countries are identical. The one country result of Rodríguez and Sachs (1999) that the initial stock of the resource influences negatively the GDP growth of the resource-rich country, is shown to not hold in general. The endowment of the nonrenewable resource can have an initial positive effect on the growth rate of the resource-rich country provided the elasticity of the initial price of the resource with regard to the initial stock of the resource is greater than minus one. The ratio of the consumption levels of the two countries are shown to be constant over time, and determined by the ratio of initial wealth. An analytical solution of the model allows us to indicate how accumulable and depletable assets affect per country welfare and income growth. For this case we demonstrate that a technological change -that is nonrenewable resource saving- can benefit the resource-rich country’s relative welfare. |
Keywords: | Growth, Development, Non-renewable Resources, International Trade |
JEL: | O13 O41 |
Date: | 2005–06 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:deg:conpap:c010_052&r=env |
By: | Elissaios Papyrakis; Reyer Gerlagh |
Abstract: | This paper investigates the connection between resource abundance and innovation, as a transmission mechanism that can elucidate part of the resource curse hypothesis; i.e. the observed negative impact of resource wealth on income growth. We develop a variation of the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model with endogenous growth to explain the phenomenon. In this model, consumers trade off leisure versus consumption, and firms trade off innovation efforts versus manufacturing. For this model, we show that an increase in resource income frustrates economic growth in two ways: directly by reducing work effort and indirectly by inducing a smaller proportion of the labor force to engage in innovation. |
Keywords: | Natural Resources, Growth, Innovation |
JEL: | O13 O31 Q33 |
Date: | 2005–06 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:deg:conpap:c010_054&r=env |