|
on Environmental Economics |
| By: | Sandrine Mathy (CIRED - Centre International de Recherche sur l'Environnement et le Développement - http://www.centre-cired.fr - CNRS : UMR8568 - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales;Ecole Nationale du Génie Rural des Eaux et des Forêts;Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées); Christophe De Gouvello (CIRED - Centre International de Recherche sur l'Environnement et le Développement - http://www.centre-cired.fr - CNRS : UMR8568 - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales;Ecole Nationale du Génie Rural des Eaux et des Forêts;Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées); Pierre Mollon (EDF - Electricité de France) |
| Abstract: | The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol, aims to minimise the cost of Annex B countries' commitments to reduce emissions, but also to limit the risk that the Developing Countries unquestionable right to develop will offset the Annex B countries efforts: the CDM should promote faster progress along a less polluting development path.<br />Beyond political principles, the pertinent players have to be incorporated into the decision making process of future CDM. The issues for host country include attracting the investment capacity, by taking advantage of the additional incentive created by CDM certificates. For private investors, the objective is to maximise the sum of commercial revenues plus CDM carbon income.<br />This paper examines potential CDM project opportunities in the power sector. The Tahumanu project consists of building a hydroelectric power plant instead of subsidized diesel plants in the Bolivian Pando Province. Simulations show that it offers a realistic illustration of possible set up and arrangements of CDM projects with the host country. |
| Keywords: | Bolivia; power sector; GHG emission reductions; private sector; decision process; carbon rent |
| Date: | 2006–02–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:papers:halshs-00009164_v1&r=env |
| By: | Sandrine Mathy (CIRED - Centre International de Recherche sur l'Environnement et le Développement - http://www.centre-cired.fr - CNRS : UMR8568 - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales;Ecole Nationale du Génie Rural des Eaux et des Forêts;Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées) |
| Abstract: | Les politiques climatiques ne seront pas acceptées par les pays en développement tant qu'elles seront perçues comme une contrainte supplémentaire sur leur développement. La répartition du fardeau imposée par le changement climatique sur ces pays doit donc être perçue comme équitable. Cependant, la diversité des métriques envisageables pour juger du caractère équitable d'une allocation de quotas compromet la possibilité d'aboutir à un accord. Par contre, un système de permis d'émissions négociables induit des transferts compensatoires qui peuvent être importants et aider à la mise en place d'un ensemble de quotas et de mesures d'accompagnement visant la levée de barrières au développement. |
| Keywords: | politiques climatiques; développement; équité; politiques domestiques |
| Date: | 2006–02–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:papers:halshs-00009165_v1&r=env |
| By: | Golombek, Rolf (The Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research); Hoel, Michael (Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo) |
| Abstract: | We study an international climate agreement that assigns emission quotas to each participating country. Unlike the simplest models in the literature, we assume that abatement costs are affected by R&D activities undertaken in all firms in all countries, i.e. abatement technologies are endogenous. In line with the Kyoto agreement we assume that the international climate agreement does not include R&D policies. We show that for a secondbest agreement, marginal costs of abatement should exceed the Pigovian level. Moreover, marginal costs of abatement differ across countries in the second-best quota agreement with heterogeneous countries. In other words, the second-best outcome cannot be achieved if emission quotas are tradable. |
| Keywords: | Climate policy; international climate agreements; emission quotas; technology spillovers |
| JEL: | H23 O30 Q20 Q25 Q28 |
| Date: | 2006–02–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:osloec:2006_003&r=env |
| By: | Murray Carlson; Zeigham Khoker; Sheridan Titman |
| Abstract: | We develop equilibrium models of an exhaustible resource market where both prices and extraction choices are determined endogenously. Our analysis highlights a role for adjustment costs in generating price dynamics that are consistent with observed oil and gas forward prices as well as with the two-factor prices processes that were calibrated in Schwartz and Smith (2000). Stochastic volatility aries in our two-factor model as a natural consequence of production for oil and natural gas prices. Differences between the endogenous price processes considered in earlier papers can generate significant differences in both financial and real option values. |
| JEL: | Q4 G1 |
| Date: | 2006–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12000&r=env |
| By: | Rudiger Ahrend |
| Abstract: | In recent years economists have come to see rich natural resource endowments as a ?curse? or ?precious bane? that inevitably undermines development and slows economic growth. Resource-based development undeniably involves important risks. Nonetheless, the resource curse - if it exists - is at least no fatalité, as the examples of Australia, Canada and the Scandinavian countries demonstrate. This paper argues that the serious challenges posed by resource-dependence, which include an increased vulnerability to external shocks, the risk of ?Dutch disease?, and the risk of developing specific institutional pathologies, can be overcome, or at least very substantially mitigated, if accompanied by the right economic policies. It then analyses in detail what these ?right? economic policies are, and how to set up economic and political framework conditions to facilitate their successful implementation. The paper thereafter looks specifically at Russia as a prominent example of a resource-based economy. It investigates briefly the main drivers of Russian growth in recent years, and makes specific recommendations that would help the Russian economy to sustain high growth. <P>Comment soutenir la croissance dans une économie fondée sur l'exploitation des ressources naturelles ? Ces dernières années les économistes ont commencé à envisager la dotation en ressources naturelles comme une "malédiction" qui inévitablement mine le développement économique et freine la croissance. Le développement économique fondé sur l'exploitation des ressources naturelles comporte sans aucun doute des risques importants. Cependant, la malédiction des ressources -- si elle existe -- n'est pas toujours une fatalité, comme le montre les exemples de l'Australie, du Canada et des pays scandinaves. Cet article soutient que les défis sérieux posés par une forte dépendance envers les ressources naturelles - comme une vulnérabilité accrue aux chocs externes, le risque d'un "syndrome néerlandais" et le risque de développer des pathologies institutionnelles spécifiques - peuvent être maîtrisés, ou au moins très sensiblement amoindris, s'ils s'accompagnent de politiques économiques adéquates. L'article analyse en détail ces politiques économiques "adéquates", et comment mettre en place un cadre politique et économique qui facilite l'implémentation réussie de ces politiques. Le cas de la Russie est ensuite étudié comme un important exemple d'une économie fondée sur l'exploitation des ressources naturelles. L'article examine brièvement les principaux moteurs de la croissance de ces dernières années, et formule des propositions qui pourraient aider la Russie à maintenir une croissance forte. |
| Keywords: | economic growth, croissance économique, transition, transition, fiscal policy, politique budgétaire, monetary policy, politique monétaire, Russia, Russie, capital flight, natural resources, dutch disease, resource curse, oil, diversification, ressources naturelles, syndrome néerlandais, malédiction des ressources, pétrole, diversification |
| JEL: | E6 O1 O52 P2 Q43 |
| Date: | 2006–02–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:ecoaaa:478-en&r=env |
| By: | Wollscheid, Jim R.; Mani, Muthukumara; Fredriksson, Per G. |
| Abstract: | This paper provides new empirical evidence to the debate on the optimal locus of power over environmental policymak ing in developing countries. The authors develop a simple lobby group model with mobile capital. The model predicts that a decentralized institutional structure leads to weaker environmental policy due to more intensive lobbying by capital owners and workers. They test this prediction using novel cross-sectional developing country data. The results are consistent with the prediction of the model, in particular for air pollution policies. The authors also find that the effect of decentralization declines with a greater degree of trade openness. They believe this is the first developing country evidence on the environmental policy effects of federalism. |
| Keywords: | Environmental Economics & Policies,Economic Theory & Research,Banks & Banking Reform,Environmental Governance,Green Issues |
| Date: | 2006–02–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3847&r=env |