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on Environmental Economics |
| By: | Silva, Patricia |
| Abstract: | Coastal resources in Tanzania have come under increasing pressure over the past three decades, which has led to a significant decline in the biodiversity and productivity of coastal ecosystems. The livelihoods of coastal communities that directly depend on these resources are consequently under increasing threat and vulnerability. Marine protected areas (MPAs) are one tool for managing coastal and marine resources that have been increasingly used in Tanzania. Promotion of alternative income generating activities (AIGAs) is often a component of MPA management strategies to reduce fishing pressure and address poverty concerns. However, empirical evidence on whether these AIGAs are successful in reducing pressure on fisheries, or their impact on poverty, is scarce and inconclusive. This paper seeks to contribute to this debate by investigating the linkages between household characteristics, MPA activities, and household choice of fishing gear. The empirical analysis is based on household survey data from a sample of villages located along the coast of mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar. The author finds that some aspects of poverty increase the likelihood of using destructive fishing gear. MPAs do not directly affect household choice of fishing gear. However, households participating in AIGAs are less likely to use destructive fishing gear, suggesting that MPA support to these activities in Tanzania has a positive influence on household choice of fishing gear. The author also finds the use of destructive fishing gear is associated with higher consumption levels, whereas participation in AIGAs does not significantly affect household consumption levels. |
| Keywords: | Water Conservation,Environmental Economics & Policies,Fishing Industry,Wildlife Resources,Coastal and Marine Resources |
| Date: | 2006–02–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3831&r=env |
| By: | Ivana Capozza (Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Università degli Studi di Bari, Via Camillo Rosalba 53, BARI) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we investigate how the interaction between the product and the emission permit markets may affect firms' propensity to adopt cleaner technologies. The adoption of a cleaner technology has the direct effect of reducing the compliance cost of the firm, but it also involves a strategic decision, if the industry is not perfectly competitive. We look at this problem from both a theoretical and an experimental point of view. We develop a model of duopoly, in which two firms engage in quantity competition in the output market and behave as price takers in the permit market. Firms have the possibility of investing in a cleaner production technology, which is available on the market at some cost. We set up a dynamic game over an infinite horizon in order to investigate firms' investment decisions: in each period, each firm decides whether to invest in the new technology or not. The stationary equilibria to this game crucially depend on both the cost of switching to the cleanest technology and the emission cap. Technology diffusion is one of the possible equilibria of the game. In order to test the predictions of the theory, we design and implement an "innovation experiment" that replicates the "innovation game". The results of our pilot experiment suggest that firms' behaviour will eventually lead to innovation diffusion. |
| Keywords: | tradable permits, technology adoption, oligopoly, laboratory experiments |
| JEL: | C91 L13 Q28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bai:series:wp0008&r=env |
| By: | Raine Hermans; Martti Kulvik |
| Date: | 2005–06–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rif:dpaper:988&r=env |