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on Environmental Economics |
| By: | Manel Antelo (Universidad de Santiago de Compostela) |
| Abstract: | This paper aims to examine optimal environmental taxation in an incomplete-information two-period model in which a monopolistic firm produces and pollutes. It is assumed that the polluting firm is privately informed about its costs of production, and the policymaker, which can only infer the firm's costs from observing the output produced in the first period, has the chance to set environmental taxes to affect emissions; the emitter of pollution may then choose a non-optimal level of production in such a period in order to manipulate the policymaker's beliefs concerning its costs. If the policymaker values environmental quality sufficiently, the low-cost polluter has an incentive to misrepresent itself as a high-cost firm in order to secure a low environmental tax in the second period. This leads the high-cost polluting firm to produce, in the first period, an output level that is not higher than output which would be optimal if only short-term considerations were taken into account. The optimal environmental tax rate in the first period, when the firm's output is a signal of its cost, is then lower than or equal to what it would be if the firm's output was not a signal of firm's costs. The expected emissions in the former context are also lower than or equal to those in the latter case. By contrast, when the policymaker's valuation of the environment is sufficiently low, the environmental tax is negative (a subsidy per unit of pollutant emitted) in both the signaling and non-signaling contexts and no less in the former context than in the latter. |
| Keywords: | Environmental tax and subsidy policy, monopolistic polluting firm, vertical asymmetric information, signaling and non-signaling |
| JEL: | D62 D82 L13 |
| Date: | 2005 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cea:doctra:e2005_08&r=env |
| By: | Gaspar J. Llanes Díaz- Salazar (Univesidad Pablo de Olavide); Manuel Alejandro Cardenete (Univesidad Pablo de Olavide); Carmen Rodríguez Morilla (Univesidad de Sevilla) |
| Abstract: | This paper aims to show the utility of the so-called Social Accounting Matrix and Environmental Accounts (SAMEA) for economic and environmental efficiency analysis. The article use the SAMEA for Spain in 2000, applied to the water resource and to greenhouses gases emissions. The estimation has been made from official data of the INE. This matrix is used like central core of a multisectorial model of the economic and environmental performance, and is calculated, what have been called "domestics multipliers SAMEA" and their decomposition into characteristic, direct, indirect and induced effects. These multipliers show some of the valuation economic and environmental efficiency. Also, is made an application of these multipliers that allows to appreciate that there is no causal interrelation between the sectors with a higher economic backward linkages and higher environmental deterioration backward linkages. |
| Keywords: | Input-Output Models; Evaluation of Environmental Effects; Air Pollution; Environmental Accounting |
| JEL: | C68 Q51 Q52 Q56 |
| Date: | 2005 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cea:doctra:e2005_09&r=env |
| By: | Joan Pasqual Rocabert (Departament d'Economia Aplicada, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona) |
| Abstract: | El propósito de este papel es describir los principales instrumentos económicos que pueden utilizarse en la política medio ambiental. Se examinan críticamente las soluciones clásicas, sin olvidar las espurias. Se introduce el tiempo en el análisis, se examina la importancia de la tasa de descuento en el cálculo económico y se presenta el concepto de economías de duración, para estudiar el conflicto entre los intereses individuales y el social y generar propuestas de solución. Se presta especial atención al conflicto entre los intereses de las generaciones presentes y las futuras, apuntando algunas vías para solventarlo. |
| Keywords: | externalidades, bienes públicos, medio ambiente, desarrollo sostenible,generaciones futuras |
| JEL: | H23 H41 H43 |
| Date: | 2005–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uab:wprdea:wpdea0510&r=env |
| By: | Marta Elena Biancardi |
| Abstract: | In this paper we propose a static model describing the commercial exploitation of a common property renewable resource by a population of agents. Players can cooperate or compete; cooperators maximize the utility of their group while defectors maximize their own profit. The model provide for one utility function which can be used for every kind of player. Agents aren't assumed to be divided into the two groups from the beginning; by solving the static game we obtained the best response function of i-th player without making other agents positions. Then, the Nash equilibria we calculated point out how different strategies - all the players cooperate, all the players compete or players can be divided into cooperators and defectors - can coexist. In any case we have analyzed, it's possible to observe how the total harvest depend on renewable resource stock, and how it influences agents' positions. Keywords Resource Exploitation, Game Theory |
| Date: | 2004–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ufg:qdsems:09-2004&r=env |