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on Environmental Economics |
| By: | Alain-Désiré Nimubona; Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné |
| Abstract: | Pollution abatement goods and services are now largely being delivered by a specialized "eco-industry." This note reconsiders Pigouvian taxes in this context. We find that the optimal emission tax will depart from the marginal social cost of pollution according to the polluters' and the environment firms' relative market power. <P>La production des biens et services destinés à reduire la pollution incombe actuellement souvent à des firmes spécialisées qui forment ce que l'on appelle maintenant l'« éco-industrie ». Cette note reconsidère les taxes pigouviennes dans ce contexte. Il est démontré que la taxe optimale sur les émissions polluantes divergera du coût social marginal de la pollution selon les pouvoirs de marché relatifs des pollueurs et des entreprises environnementales. |
| Keywords: | Pigouvian taxes, environment industry, taxes pigouviennes, industries de l'environnement |
| JEL: | H23 L13 |
| Date: | 2005–04–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cir:cirwor:2005s-21&r=env |
| By: | Fabio Alberto Arias Arbeláez |
| Abstract: | En este trabajo se revisa la literatura sobre grupos de interés, en especial la interacción entre grupos de interés y una entidad de conservación ambiental, para estudiar las posibilidades de corroboración empírica de los equilibrios predichos por estos modelos e indicar formas de contrastar si la política pública, en conservación ambiental, se ajusta a la teoría del interés público o de la teoría del grupo de interés.En este trabajo se revisa la literatura sobre grupos de interés, en especial la interacción entre grupos de interés y una entidad de conservación ambiental, para estudiar las posibilidades de corroboración empírica de los equilibrios predichos por estos modelos e indicar formas de contrastar si la política pública, en conservación ambiental, se ajusta a la teoría del interés público o de la teoría del grupo de interés.En este trabajo se revisa la literatura sobre grupos de interés, en especial la interacción entre grupos de interés y una entidad de conservación ambiental, para estudiar las posibilidades de corroboración empírica de los equilibrios predichos por estos modelos e indicar formas de contrastar si la política pública, en conservación ambiental, se ajusta a la teoría del interés público o de la teoría del grupo de interés.En este trabajo se revisa la literatura sobre grupos de interés, en especial la interacción entre grupos de interés y una entidad de conservación ambiental, para estudiar las posibilidades de corroboración empírica de los equilibrios predichos por estos modelos e indicar formas de contrastar si la política pública, en conservación ambiental, se ajusta a la teoría del interés público o de la teoría del grupo de interés.En este trabajo se revisa la literatura sobre grupos de interés, en especial la interacción entre grupos de interés y una entidad de conservación ambiental, para estudiar las posibilidades de corroboración empírica de los equilibrios predichos por estos modelos e indicar formas de contrastar si la política pública, en conservación ambiental, se ajusta a la teoría del interés público o de la teoría del grupo de interés.En este trabajo se revisa la literatura sobre grupos de interés, en especial la interacción entre grupos de interés y una entidad de conservación ambiental, para estudiar las posibilidades de corroboración empírica de los equilibrios predichos por estos modelos e indicar formas de contrastar si la política pública, en conservación ambiental, se ajusta a la teoría del interés público o de la teoría del grupo de interés.En este trabajo se revisa la literatura sobre grupos de interés, en especial la interacción entre grupos de interés y una entidad de conservación ambiental, para estudiar las posibilidades de corroboración empírica de los equilibrios predichos por estos modelos e indicar formas de contrastar si la política pública, en conservación ambiental, se ajusta a la teoría del interés público o de la teoría del grupo de interés.En este trabajo se revisa la literatura sobre grupos de interés, en especial la interacción entre grupos de interés y una entidad de conservación ambiental, para estudiar las posibilidades de corroboración empírica de los equilibrios predichos por estos modelos e indicar formas de contrastar si la política pública, en conservación ambiental, se ajusta a la teoría del interés público o de la teoría del grupo de interés. |
| Keywords: | Grupos de interés |
| Date: | 2005–02–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:000141:000928&r=env |
| By: | Johansson-Stenman, Olof (Department of Economics, School of Economics and Commercial Law, Göteborg University) |
| Abstract: | An optimal first-best road charge should not only be differentiated with respect to factors that affect the direct external environmental and time costs from the road-user himself. Indirect effects, such as the fact that other cars will be more polluting when congestion increases, should also be taken into account. <p> |
| Keywords: | Road pricing; environmental costs; externalities; indirect effects |
| JEL: | Q58 R41 R48 |
| Date: | 2005–03–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0168&r=env |
| By: | Fæhn, Taran (Research Department, Statistics Norway,); Gómez-Plana, Antonio G. (Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo); Kverndokk, Snorre (Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyses whether recycling revenues from carbon emission permit auctions can reduce unemployment in the Spanish economy. Spain's deviation from EU's intermediate emission goals is more serious than for most other EU countries, and the unemployment is also well above the EU average. We use a CGE model that includes a matching model with two types of labour, and which allows for different pricing rules and returns-to-scale assumptions. We find that abatement reduces unemployment due to beneficial impacts of recycling the revenue from permit sales. Unemployment is more effectively abated when revenues are used to reduce labour taxes rather than indirect taxes. Contrary to other studies of Europe, we find that the best option is to reduce payroll taxes on skilled labour. This reform is the most successful both in increasing demand and in dampening the supply response to rising wages. All the recycling schemes also generate dividends in terms of welfare, but none offset the abatement costs entirely. |
| Keywords: | Spanish unemployment; Tax reform; Emission Permit Auctions; Employment dividend; Matching functions; Increasing returns to scale; Computable general equilibrium models |
| JEL: | D58 J68 Q38 |
| Date: | 2005–12–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:osloec:2004_026&r=env |
| By: | Hagem , Cathrine (Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo); Westskog, Hege (CICERO, Center for International Climate and Environmental Research,) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we analyze how restricting intertemporal trading by prohibiting borrowing of emission permits affects the ability of a dominant agent to exploit its market power, and the consequences this has for the cost-effectiveness of implementing an emissions target. We show that the monopolist could take advantage of the constraint on borrowing by distributing the sale of permits ineffectively across periods, and moreover that this inefficiency is influenced by the way permits are initially allocated between agents. A cost-effective distribution of abatement across periods can be achieved by an appropriate distribution of the total endowments of permits over time for each agent. |
| Keywords: | pollution permits; intertemporal trading; market power; borrowing constraint |
| JEL: | D92 H74 Q52 |
| Date: | 2005–04–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:osloec:2005_004&r=env |
| By: | Golombek, Rolf (The Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research); Hoel, Michael (Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo) |
| Abstract: | A significant reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions will require development of new technologies if such reductions are to be achieved without excessive costs. An important question is whether an agreement of the Kyoto type, which does not include elements related to research and development (R&D) of new technologies, will give sufficient incentives to develop such new technologies. On the one hand, since greenhouse gas emissions will become costly for countries and private producers, countries and individual producers will have incentives to undertake effort and costs to develop new technologies. On the other hand, R&D in one country is not only advantageous for this country, but usually also for other countries. The reason for this is that producers in these countries in many cases will learn from the R&D project, for example, through(informal) networks, journals, and in some cases through the import of goods from the country where the new technology is developed. The purpose of the paper is to discuss properties of an international climate agreement of the Kyoto type when R&D investments undertaken in one country are beneficial also for other countries. We examine whether a Kyoto type of agreement can provide the correct social amount of aggregate emissions and R&D investments in new technologies. We argue that the outcome of a Kyoto type agreement will differ from the social optimum. In particular, for a given level of abatement a Kyoto type agreement provides too little R&D investments relative to the social optimum. |
| Keywords: | Climate policy; Kyoto; international environmental agreements; R&D; technology spillovers. |
| JEL: | P28 Q54 |
| Date: | 2005–04–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:osloec:2005_005&r=env |
| By: | Julio Peña Torres (ILADES-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado); Claudio Agostini (ILADES-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado); Sebastián Vergara (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)) |
| Abstract: | The main goal of this paper consists in estimating the input parameters of an annual harvest function for the Chilean jack mackerel stock; particularly, the effects of biomass on catch. One of the main problems faced is that the biomass variable is possibly endogenous, which would bias the estimators if the problem remains unsolved. Our empirical strategy consists in estimating a per vessel harvest function using panel data, which allows us to control for vessels' unobserved heterogeneity, and episodes of 'El Niño' phenomenon as valid instrumental variable for biomass, which allows us to control for the potential biomass endogeneity. This strategy produces consistent estimates of the biomass coefficient. The results, using a panel of industrial vessels operating in the central-southern region of Chile during the period 1985-2002, show that the endogeneity of the biomass variable biases upwardly the magnitude of its coefficient in a Cobb-Douglas harvest function. In the case of our data, the endogeneity bias even changes the sign of the catch-to-biomass elasticity. A first contribution of the paper is to address the endogeneity of biomass in a harvest function, an issue often underestimated in the empirical literature. A second contribution is related to 'El Niño' effects on the Chilean jack mackerel stock. The results show that an oceanic 'El Niño' episode not only has negative contemporaneous effects on jack mackerel biomass but also negative biomass effects lasting for at least two additional years. |
| Keywords: | El Niño phenomenon; pelagic fisheries; Chilean jack mackerel; Instrumental variable estimation; marginal stock effects; endogenous biomass |
| Date: | 2005–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ila:ilades:inv160&r=env |
| By: | C.Veeramani (Indian Council for Research on International Economic Rela); B.N.Goldar (Indian Council for Research on International Economic Rela) |
| Keywords: | Investment climate, Total factor productivity, manufacturing, Indian states |
| JEL: | L D L |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ind:icrier:127&r=env |
| By: | Doyle, Matthew; Singh, Rajesh; Weninger, Quinn |
| Abstract: | This Appendix is supplemntary to "Fisheries Management with Stock Uncertainty and Costly Capital Adjustment: An Application to Pacific Halibut" and "Fisheries Management with Stock Uncertainty and Costly Capital Adjustment" |
| JEL: | D2 Q2 |
| Date: | 2005–04–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:isu:genres:12291&r=env |
| By: | Mathew Forstater |
| Abstract: | The job numbers in the United States and around the globe continue to look bleak. Not only are the absolute numbers dismal, but also job growth has dragged on with no hope for a substantial change in prospects. This situation supports the view that we are facing a long-term problem that requires critical and creative problem-solving responses. Since unemployment is the major cause of poverty, many of our most pressing social problems are directly or indirectly related to joblessness. I argue that not only the quantity but also the quality of jobs is at issue. |
| Date: | 2005–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lev:levypn:pn05_1&r=env |
| By: | Linda Christanty (CFG Jakarta); Raymond Atje (Department of Economics, Centre for Strategic and International Studies) |
| Abstract: | This paper has, as its title suggests, discusses policy and regulatory development in the forestry sector for a period of more than 30 years. During this period the forestry sector has experienced a lot of changes. It has contributed significantly to the country’s economic development, especially during the later years prior to the crisis. At the onset of the crisis forestry-related activities, including plantations, were among the main producers of exported goods. This development was partly a result of various policies and regulations introduced during the period under consideration. Some of those policies had only short time horizons,and very often did not adhere to sound economic and environmental considerations. There has been an intense pressure on the government to improve the management of the forestry sector. It is doubtful however that there will soon be a major reform in the sector. Some of the old players are on their way out, but other interest groups that are vying to replace them. The nature of the game in the forestry sector has not changed that much over the years, i.e., it is still the one that nurtures rent seeking and predatory behavior. |
| Keywords: | Indonesia, forestry policy, regulations, New Order |
| Date: | 2004–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eab:govern:56&r=env |
| By: | Linda Christanty (CFG Jakarta); Raymond Atje (Department of Economics, Centre for Strategic and International Studies); Kurnya Roesad (Department of Economics, Centre for Strategic and International Studies) |
| Abstract: | This paper looks into Indonesia’s recent experience with the decentralization process and assesses opportunities and challenges for the forestry sector. Despite its brief existence since only 2001 and the limited data available, decentralization in the forestry sector has shown some significant trends. The paper finds that co-ordination between different levels of government is still lacking, lacking a clear division of tasks between central, provincial and district governments. Indonesia’s move to a more market – based forestry governance system is currently impeded by the lack of a sound and secure property and tenure rights system, exacerbated by legal uncertainties, and weak monitoring and enforcement capacities on the local level. Overall, when compared to other forest-rich countries, decentralization has not sufficiently empowered regional and local governments in the forestry sector, as the central government retains most of the power to manage the country’s forests. |
| Keywords: | Indonesia, decentralisation, forestry sector |
| Date: | 2004–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eab:govern:57&r=env |
| By: | Tubagus Feridhanusetyawan (Department of Economics, Centre for Strategic and International Studies); Yose Rizal Damuri (Department of Economics, Centre for Strategic and International Studies) |
| Abstract: | This paper uses simulations based on a GTAP model to reproduce the economic crisis in Southeast Asia, and in particular in Indonesia. The model is a static-real sector model, so the focus of the simulation is on the declining investment and the declining prices of non-traded goods during the crisis. The simulation is conducted by creating an exogenous shock on risk premium in Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia, which leads to smaller allocation of regional investment in these countries, lower stock of capital goods, and lower production. The second shock, which is the declining price of land and natural resource, opens the possibility of resource allocation between sectors in the economy. The results of the crisis simulation show that the declining overall GDP during the crisis is accompanied by declining productions of capital and labor-intensive commodities, and expansion of natural resource and land based sectors. Based on the simulation, the economic crisis is expected to lower production of forestry and forestry related manufacturing sectors, mainly because these sectors are more capital or labor intensive, rather than land or natural resource intensive. Consistent with the modeling exercise, the output of these sectors also declined in reality during the worst time of the crisis in 1997-99. The simulation results also show that the negative impact of the crisis on welfare, measured as the changes in equivalent variation, is serious. The second simulation in this study measures the impact of trade liberalization on the economy after the crisis. The results show that the potential benefit from trade liberalization is large, and larger than the welfare lost during the crisis. In other words, pursuing more progressive trade liberalization would speed up the economic recovery after the crisis by creating more opportunity to get the most benefit from the global economy. |
| Keywords: | Southeast Asia, Indonesia, Asian crisis, forestry sector, computable general equilibrium (CGE) |
| Date: | 2004–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eab:macroe:62&r=env |
| By: | Raymond Atje (Department of Economics, Centre for Strategic and International Studies); Kurnya Roesad (Department of Economics, Centre for Strategic and International Studies) |
| Abstract: | The existing economic incentive regime was one main factor behind high deforestation rates in Indonesia. Government intervention to push for the expansion wood processing industries resulted in unsustainable resource use patterns. Uncertain tenurial arrangements and property rights, unenforceable contractual obligations and weak monitoring and enforcement by the government exacerbated the situation. Indonesia’s existing forest management system does not provide efficient structures of control rights to any of the sector’s many stakeholders. The lack of well-defined property rights has prevented various stakeholders from trading their control rights so as to improve the efficiency of the management. Future economic research on forestry issues in Indonesia could therefore highlight the importance of secure property and ownership rights in any strategies to implement sustainable forestry management. |
| Keywords: | Indonesia, forestry management, property rights, incentive design |
| Date: | 2004–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eab:microe:54&r=env |
| By: | Erwidodo (Center for Agro Socioeconomic Research); Satria Astana (Center for Socioeconomic Research on Foresty, Ministry of Forestry, Indonesia) |
| Abstract: | There are at least two problems left unsolved that calls for our attention, namely: (i) millions of hectare of logged over areas and most of them are degraded and others are underutilized and left unproductive, and (ii) high supply-demand gap of logs, due to a huge excess demand for logs and pulpwood. Industrial timber and estate crop plantations are considered to be the alternative way out towards reaching sustainable natural forest management. Evidence suggests that many logging companies are in fact more interested on clear-cutting timber than truly establishing the plantation. The main reason has been the need to get cheap timber for fulfilling an excess demand for pulpwood by pulp and paper industries. Many logging companies who also own estate crop plantations apply for a license to establish (timber or estate crop) plantation in the conversion area, clear the forest for logs and pulpwood, and eventually abandon the cleared land The paper presents a historical perspective of agricultural development in Indonesia, focusing on food and cash crop developments particularly in the outer islands of Indonesia. The authors explore agricultural-forestry linkage is highlighted in section present a discussion on further development of industrial timber and estate crop plantation as logical ways towards sustainable forest management in the future. |
| Keywords: | Indonesia, forestry, agriculture, timber, estate crop, sustainable forestry |
| Date: | 2004–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eab:microe:59&r=env |
| By: | Arya B. Gaduh (Department of Economics, Centre for Strategic and International Studies); Kurnya Roesad (Department of Economics, Centre for Strategic and International Studies) |
| Abstract: | For most of the 1980s and 1990s, Indonesia’s forest industry was characterized by protectionist policies. The combination of a log-export ban and the enforcement of artificially low prices of logs by APKINDO had fostered the inefficient domestic wood-panel producers, while potentially killed off more efficient wood-panel producers abroad. The removal of APKINDO and the log export ban, as major parts of the IMF – led economic reform agenda since 1998 was expected to improve allocative efficiency in the wood – processing sector. However, the removal of these policies likely increased pressure on Indonesia’s forests. An artificially low price of logs reduces their supply, and henceforth, relieves pressures off forests. Taking away the ban gradually moves the prices back to the international level, hence increasing the rate of wood extraction. As such, absent other forms of intervention, we face a trade-off between economic efficiency and environmental sustainability of the log export ban policy. This paper is an attempt to describe, and quantify when possible, this trade-off empirically. It asks whether the log export ban has encouraged less efficient use of domestic logs and whether it has helped to reduce the rate of round wood extraction. The empirical study suggests that the former did occur during the LEB and APKINDO regime of 1985-1997, while the latter cannot be shown empirically. |
| Keywords: | Indonesia, log ban, crisis, adjustment, forestry sector. |
| Date: | 2004–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eab:microe:66&r=env |
| By: | adela parra romero (cinara - universidad del valle); viviana vargas franco (universidad nacional de colombia); carlos castellar palma (universidad del valle) |
| Abstract: | Los estudios de DAP han sido implementados en el sector de Agua potable y saneamiento (AAS), como una herramienta que ayuda a determinar con mayor acierto la viabilidad financiera ex-ante de proyectos de abastecimiento de agua y saneamiento básico, y en un sentido más amplio promover un mejor nivel de recuperación de costos y la sostenibilidad de los sistemas a construir. En este sentido a nivel internacional y nacional se ha creado un especial interés en la forma en que estos estudios son aplicados y específicamente en la metodología estadística utilizada para la planeación y ejecución de los estudios. La DAP es obtenida, a través de la aplicación de una encuesta a los usuarios potenciales del proyecto, donde la DAP se indaga utilizando alguno de los formatos de pregunta disponibles para este fin. Algunos de estos formatos son el formato referéndum, múltiple, subasta y abierto, sin embrago aún no hay un acuerdo sobre cual es el formato óptimo, en que condiciones se debe aplicar y cual es el modelo estadístico apropiado para estimar de manera confiable la DAP. Este articulo presenta una metodología estadística basada en la revisión de los formatos de pregunta y los modelos estadísticos apropiados para estimar la DAP. Se presenta además, un caso de estudio donde se estima la Disponibilidad a Pagar por el mejoramiento del servicio de agua para el municipio de Jamundi ,Valle; utilizando el formato referéndum.. |
| Keywords: | contingent valuation, willingness to pay, project benefits, environmental valuation, statistics |
| JEL: | C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C8 |
| Date: | 2005–02–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwpem:0502014&r=env |
| By: | J. S. Armstrong (The Wharton School) |
| Abstract: | Those making environmental decisions must not only characterize the present, they must also forecast the future. They must do so for at least two reasons. First, if a no-action alternative is pursued, they must consider whether current trends will be favorable or unfavorable in the future. Second, if an intervention is pursued instead, they must evaluate both its probable success given future trends and its impacts on the human and natural environment. Forecasting, by which I mean explicit processes for determining what is likely to happen in the future, can help address each of these areas. |
| Keywords: | forecasting, environment |
| JEL: | A |
| Date: | 2005–02–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwpgt:0502017&r=env |
| By: | Maheshjani (G.H.Jani.charitable trust,kampteelane,Rajnandgaon- 491441 C.G. India) |
| Abstract: | In the present world due to grren house effects and carbons , the problem of air pollution is very much effective, if we take any step to stop this pollution ,it will effect badly to economics , USA has denied to stop green house effects , this is paer news , sothat purification of air is another way. Maheshjani |
| Keywords: | Enviornment purification herbal sticks |
| JEL: | A |
| Date: | 2005–03–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwpgt:0503012&r=env |
| By: | E. Dijkgraaf (Erasmus University Rotterdam, ECRi, SEOR) |
| Abstract: | Elbert Dijkgraaf defended his PhD-thesis 'Regulating the Dutch Waste Market' at 5 november 2004. This thesis analyses whether the risen costs of waste collection and treatment can be diminished by changing policy instruments. The thesis shows that user fees are very effective in reducing the total waste quantity, while they also result in better separation behavior. Furthermore, the use of contracting out to private or public firms reduces total collection costs. Third, a social cost benefit analysis, in which environmental effects are included, shows that landfilling is much cheaper than incineration. Finally, the use of international competition might reduce treatment costs. In total the thesis concludes that a cost saving of nearly 40% of current costs is possible when all four changes are implemented. |
| Keywords: | Waste market, collection, treatment, landfilling, incineration, contracting out, cost-benefit analysis, model |
| JEL: | D21 H21 H31 H42 H43 H71 L33 L99 Q38 Q42 |
| Date: | 2005–02–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0502005&r=env |
| By: | E. Dijkgraaf (Erasmus University Rotterdam, ECRi, SEOR); R. H. J. M. Gradus (Erasmus University Rotterdam, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we analyse whether collusion exists in the Dutch waste collection market, which shows a high degree of concentration. Although scale effects might be in accordance with this market outcome, the question is whether this concentration is in fact a result of fair competition. Using data for (nearly) all Dutch municipalities we estimate whether collusion exists and what the impact is on tariffs for waste collection. The results indicate that high concentration increases prices and therefore (partly) offsets the advantage of contracting out. The presence of competing public firms might be essential to ensure more and fair competition. |
| Keywords: | Waste collection, collusion, public-private firms, contracting out |
| JEL: | D43 L33 R51 |
| Date: | 2005–02–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0502006&r=env |
| By: | Américo Mendes (Portuguese Catholic University - Porto, Faculty of Economics & Management) |
| Abstract: | This paper is a follow up on a earlier one (Mendes, 1998) where I proposed a series of models for forest owners associations represented as organisation made up of two groups of strategically interacting players: the forest owners who are members of the association and the board of directors they have elected. The directors decide on the amount of services provided by the association which can be public goods (collective representation of the members, promotion of their common interests, diffusion of general information about forest programmes and best forest management practices, etc.) and private goods and services (silvicultural works preventive of forest fires, technical advice, etc.). The models were set up as games in strategic form with complete information and no payoff uncertainty. Here I pick up the second of, what is called in that previous paper, the 'Portuguese' models and extend it in the following directions: - there is payoff risk for the forest owners due to exogenous hazards (forest fires or others); - forest owners can buy private services from the owners which contribute to reduce the losses resulting from those hazards. The main focus in this paper is to derive the comparative static results about the demand of these private services by the forest owners. |
| Keywords: | forest owners’ associations, public and private goods joint supply, game theory |
| JEL: | L |
| Date: | 2005–03–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0503005&r=env |
| By: | Paroma Sanyal (Brandeis University) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the impact of changing market structure on environmental research expenditure by investor owned utilities in the US electricity sector for the period 1989-1997. The main finding suggests that after controlling for firm characteristics and the “greenness” of the state, deregulation decreases such R&D expenditure, while effective competition increases it. When these opposing trends are factored in, the empirical model estimates that for a one percent increase in overall market competition, environmental research declines by 1.1 percent. It also finds that environmental regulations like the Clean Air Act, can help stem the decline in environmental research even in the face of market restructuring and competition. |
| Keywords: | Electricity Deregulation, Environmental R&D, Clean Air Act |
| JEL: | O32 L94 L51 |
| Date: | 2005–04–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0504015&r=env |
| By: | Patricia Silva (World Bank); Stefano Pagiola (World Bank) |
| Abstract: | The World Bank’s Operational Policy on Economic Evaluation of Investment Operations requires that project evaluations include all the costs and benefits generated by the project, including environmental costs and benefits. Theis review examines the use of environmental valuation in 101 projects in the World Bank’s environmental portfolio approved in fiscal years 2000, 2001, and 2002. It has three broad objectives. First, it examines the extent to which environmental costs and benefits have been incorporated in the economic analysis of projects. Second, it examines how well valuation was used. Third, it seeks to identify areas of weakness so as to feed into plans for capacity building. The results show that the use of environmental valuation has increased substantially in the last decade. Ten years ago, one project in 162 used environmental valuation. In recent years, as many as one third of the projects in the environmental portfolio did so. While this represents a substantial improvement, there remains considerable scope for growth. |
| Keywords: | environmental economics, valuation of environmental impacts, cost-benefit analysis |
| JEL: | P Q Z |
| Date: | 2005–02–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwpot:0502007&r=env |
| By: | Tibor Neugebauer (University Hannover) |
| Abstract: | Flaaten’s (1991) study on competing species conjectures that a higher price (harvesting costs) of one species yields a lower (greater) own stock-size and a greater (lower) stock-size of the competing species. I show both conjectures are wrong. |
| Keywords: | fishery management, multiple species model, renewable resources |
| JEL: | Q22 |
| Date: | 2005–03–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwpot:0503012&r=env |
| By: | Rahul Shastri (National Akademi of Development) |
| Abstract: | Sustainable development depends upon participation by the people, and their awareness of the environmental effects of their actions. This paper analyses the awareness of the deforesting effect (DFE) of firewood use in the users. It shows that those who bear the costs of deforestation, either by travelling long distances, or by buying all their firewood, are more likely to be aware than others of DFE. Specifically, ceteris paribus, households that buy all their firewood are 3 times as likely to be aware as households that collect at least part of their firewood, ceteris paribus. Likewise, every extra kilometre travelled to collect free firewood increases the odds of awareness by 94%, ceteris paribus. Income, education of the head, and community affiliation show no significant association with awareness. However, those in poorer dwellings are more likely to be aware of the DFE than those in pucca houses, ceteris paribus. Large cultivators are more likely to be aware of DFE, whereas ag. Labour are less likely to be aware than other occupations, controlling for other factors. Significantly, firewood users in less fertile districts appear to be more likely to be aware of the DFE effect than firewood users in more fertile districts. This study also reveals the severe limitations of tools of bivariate analysis (correlations, cross-tabulations, chi- squares) in multivariate situations involving survey data. In some cases bivariate tools fail to detect associations revealed to be significant by logistic analysis, and in other cases, they detect a spurious association by attributing the effects of excluded variables to the included independent variable. The results of the study suggest that reforestation/social forestry efforts should shortlist villages far removed from free firewood, or purchasing their entire stock of firewood. And that education of DFE should have a special focus on agricultural labour, dwellers of pucca houses, and more fertile districts, relative to other groups. |
| Keywords: | Fuelwood use, Environmental Awareness, Deforestation |
| JEL: | P Q Z |
| Date: | 2005–04–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwpot:0504001&r=env |
| By: | Rahul Shastri (National Akademi of Development) |
| Abstract: | It is well known in Environmental Economics that payment offered on the Willingness to Pay (WTP) principle is much smaller than the compensation demanded on the Willingness to Accept (WTA) principle. Payment under WTP goes into the environment and is communally enjoyed, whereas compensation under WTA goes into one’s bank account. Public goods/benefits are valued less than private goods/benefits, due to technical reasons, as well as ‘pure property consciousness’. This explains why WTP is much less than WTA. It is suggested here that the ratio of WTP to WTA can be taken as an index of socialisation of property consciousness. A value of zero would indicate complete individualism, while a value of 1 would indicate an indifference between public and private forms of enjoyment of environmental benefits. It is interesting to note that this ratio is generally less than ½, (95% confidence interval: 0.8 £ q £ 0.38). The measure has a wide range of application. It can be derived from the difference in valuation of any quasi public good that can also be privately supplied and enjoyed. And its measurement may throw light on the failures and successes of co- operative/public/collective property based experiments. |
| Keywords: | Willingness to Pay, Willingness to Accept, Property consciousness, Socialisation |
| JEL: | A Q |
| Date: | 2005–04–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0504001&r=env |
| By: | Florent Pratlong (ERASME-Ecole Centrale de Paris, EUREQua and PRISM-LASI) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the implications of the distribution of emission permits related to a strategic environmental policy and shows how it alters the competitive relation among firms in the international product market. Our model introduces permits trading into the Brander-Spencer [1985] framework. It analyzes a class of two stages Cournot game involving two governments (Home and Foreign) and their respective industry. It shows the incentive for the Home government to distort is initial distribution of permits from the first-best rule to achieve trade-related policy objectives, enabling its domestic producers to improve their market shares. We establish that the Home government implements a higher distribution of permits than the optimal level. |
| Keywords: | Tradable emission permits, international oligopoly, strategic policy. |
| JEL: | F13 F18 Q28 |
| Date: | 2005–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mse:wpsorb:v05011&r=env |
| By: | Basak Bayramoglu (PSE and EUREQua); Jean-François Jacques (EURiSCO) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyses a transboundary pollution problem between two countries and studies the efficiency comparison of uniform versus differentiated abatement standards when there are imperfect transferts between countries. To achieve this goal, we use a negotiation game and the Nash bargaining solution as equilibrium. On the one hand, we remark that the argument of similarity of countries to defend the use of uniform standards is not appropriate, when there exists high level of fixed costs in abatement technology for symmetric countries. On the other hand, for asymmetric countries, according to the total welfare criteria, we notice first that differentiated standards with transfers are generally better than uniform standards with transfers. Secondly, differentiated standards without transfers always outperform uniform standards without transfers. Last, the numerical results show that the asymmetry on abatement benefits between the countries makes the uniform regime with imperfect transfers better than the differentiated regime without transfers, while an asymmetry on abatement costs gives the opposite result. |
| Keywords: | Transboundary pollution, cooperative games, bargaining, standards, transfers. |
| JEL: | Q50 C71 |
| Date: | 2005–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mse:wpsorb:v05014&r=env |
| By: | Euston Quah (Department of Economics, National University of Singapore) |
| Abstract: | This paper focusses narrowly on three areas of public policy concerning the environment deemed necessary for sustainable economic growth. It has relevance to Asian nations as they continue to demand for higher growth and at the same time keeping environmental degradation in check. The three areas are: (1) the issue of siting environmentally unfriendly but nationally required facilities, otherwise known as the NIMBY syndrome, (2) the waste generation problem, and (3) the need to price green goods. In addition to the above three areas for public policy, the paper also discusses a number of pragmatic principles for use in environmental management. Such things as cost-benefit analysis and project appraisal; the pursuit of clean and advanced technologies and inherent conflicts; exploring market solutions; understanding multiple stakeholders; and last but not least the need to establish data baselines for environmental quantity and quality. |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sca:scaewp:0504&r=env |