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on Environmental Economics |
| By: | Yasuyuki Sawada (Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo); Satoshi Shimizutani (Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University) |
| Abstract: | We investigate whether people were insured against unexpected losses caused by the Great Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) earthquake in 1995. The unique household data employed led to several empirical findings under a natural-experimental situation. The complete consumption insurance hypothesis is rejected overwhelmingly, suggesting the ineffectiveness of the formal and/or informal insurance mechanisms against the earthquake. We also investigate possible factors that inhibit full risk-sharing. Transfers may be particularly ineffective as insurance against losses for co-resident households. Households borrow extensively against housing damages, whereas dissavings are utilized for smaller asset damages, implying a hierarchy of risk-coping measures, from dissaving to borrowing. |
| Date: | 2005–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tky:fseres:2005cf314&r=env |
| By: | Lire Ersado |
| Abstract: | Ersado looks at the feasibility and potential of instituting small-scale irrigation dams to reduce Ethiopia’s dependence on rainfed agriculture and the associated food insecurity. He develops a theoretical framework to assess the welfare implications of irrigation development programs and provides empirical evidence from microdam construction and reforestation projects in northern Ethiopia. The author pays particular attention to health-related costs of establishing small-scale irrigation dams in areas prone to waterborne diseases. While the theoretical analyses imply that the net welfare impacts of irrigation dams cannot be known a priori due to potential health costs, the empirical evidence shows that current agricultural yield and farm profit have increased in villages with closer proximity to the dams than in those more distant. The increased disease incidence due to standing pools of water has, however, led to significant declines in the returns from investment in irrigation water. Households with poor health are less likely to adopt productivity-enhancing as well as resource-conserving technologies, which are crucial for achieving the ultimate goal of sustainable agricultural development. The ensuing sickness has also led to reduction in labor allocation to off-farm activities. The findings underline the importance of weighing beforehand the magnitude of potential economic benefits against health costs of water development programs. The overall evidence, however, suggests that carefully designed irrigation dams could significantly improve agricultural production and food security, particularly in areas where waterborne diseases pose negligible risk to health or can be cost-effectively controlled. This paper—a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region—is part of a larger effort in the Bank to achieve global food security and poverty alleviation. |
| Keywords: | Agriculture; Environment; Health & Population; Labor & Employment; Public Sector Management; Rural Development |
| Date: | 2005–01–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3494&r=env |
| By: | Vihang Patel (Indian Institute of Technology,Kharagpur) |
| Abstract: | The Flexible Mechanisms articulated in the Kyoto Protocol provide a robust framework for emission reduction issue in a manner that is not just economically efficient, but is also pro-growth for trade. In the presence of liquid or illiquid markets, to attain higher value from the emission trading, we have shown that coalition strategies provide a pertinent alternative to production optimization measures which may not be feasible at times. The whole game is analyzed taking a resource based view of the strategic factor markets. We have also illustrated the measures needed to provide stability to the coalitions and hence the coalition strategies. |
| Keywords: | coalition, strategy, game theory, emission, environment, resource based view, strategic factor market |
| JEL: | C7 D8 |
| Date: | 2005–01–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0501002&r=env |
| By: | Francisco Marco-Serrano |
| Abstract: | Within the framework of the Experimental Economics a Market Experiment is designed in order to test the existence of a dual demand (those from consumers and non-consumers) for Cultural Goods, following previous research (Rausell-Köster et al. (2001), Rausell-Köster and Marco-Serrano (2000), Rausell-Köster and Carrasco-Arroyo (1998)). |
| Keywords: | experiment design, consumers & non-consumers, inverse free- rider, cultural goods |
| JEL: | P Q Z |
| Date: | 2005–01–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwpot:0501003&r=env |
| By: | Edgar L. Feige (University of Wisconsin-Madison); David M. Blau (University of Wisconsin-Madison) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyses the problem of natural resource scarcity and its implications for economic development and international cooperation. We examine the meaning and measurement of resource “scarcity” and its implications for economic growth and development. The paper describes the conditions required for the efficient use of exhaustible natural resources and for optimal inter-temporal efficient paths and considers the consequences of uncertainty, risk, externalities, disequilibria and institutional constraints on the market’s ability to achieve efficient resource utilization. Particular attention is paid to the implications of the cartelization of natural resource industries and the disturbing tendency to use political rather than economic motivations as the basis for resource production and distribution decisions. Reference: Resources and Development: Natural Resource Polices and Economic Development in an Interdependent World. P. Dorner and M.A.El- Shafie (eds), University of Wisconsin Press, 1980 |
| Keywords: | Natural resource scarcity, cartels, OPEC, energy prices,economic development,non-renewable resources,efficiency |
| JEL: | Q3 Q4 L1 L41 D6 D8 |
| Date: | 2005–01–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwpot:0501004&r=env |
| By: | Brooks Kaiser (Gettysburg College); James Roumasset (Department of Economics, University of Hawaii at Manoa) |
| Abstract: | The standard view that the absence of property rights is inefficient contradicts the Coasean proposition that the relative efficiency of different institutions depends on their ability to economize on transaction costs. Moreover, the comparative theory of open access and private property institutions fails to recognize the intermediate institution of common property, finesses dynamic optimization, and provides an incomplete account of governance. We provide a comparative statics framework for alternative modes of resource management, albeit one that allows for dynamic optimization, and show that open access can be efficient under conditions of low population pressure. We show that the intensification of production with population pressure in Hawaii co-evolved with specialization and increased governance, in accordance with the efficiency theory. Instead of market-based specialization, however, economic organization in pre-contact Hawaii was hierarchically determined via top-down management of the ahupua´a. |
| Keywords: | Demsetz, property rights, Hawaiian history, specialization, decentralization |
| JEL: | C53 D12 F14 J14 |
| Date: | 2004 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hai:wpaper:200407&r=env |